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ABSTRACT 
NATO enlargement is the most contentious issue affecting the 
European security environment. Given that it is likely to occur, 
it is the responsibility of policy analysts and leaders to consider 
both the expected benefits for and the possible consequences of 
enlargement upon the overall security environment. To do this, 
policy makers must have the tools to explore all aspects of the 
issue. This study attempts to provide three such tools. 
First, case studies provide a view of some of the systemic and 
state level factors shaping the debate in Russia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the United States. 
Second, the study pits contending theories of these levels of 
analysis against each other to see if one does a better job of 
explaining/predicting state behavior. Finally, the study gives an 
overview of several policy implications of enlargement, including: 
how security guarantees will be extended to new members; possible 
Russian reactions to enlargement; and, strategies for enlargement 
to ameliorate the expected adverse reaction of the Russians. How 
NATO expands will directly influence how the Russians react. 
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:I • :INTRODUCT:ION 
The old order is dying, the new cannot yet be born. In 
the period between, morbid realities assert themselves. 
Antonio Gramsci 
The expansion of NATO is no longer a question of whether, 
but when and how. 
President Bill Clinton 
Warsaw, July 1994 
NATO is acting like a big drunken hooligan in a 
kindergarten who says he will hit anyone he likes. 
Aleksandr Lebed 
Secretary, National Security Council 
Russian Federation 
A. :INTRODUCT:ION 
There have been those who have described the area between 
Germany and Russia as a "security vacuum." According to 
Howard Frost, a Washington-based international security 
affairs analyst, "As applied to Eastern Europe, the concept of 
a security vacuum is intended to refer to the region's lack of 
international structure, uncertain democracies, weak 
economies, ethnic strife, and potentially troublesome 
neighbors to the east." (Frost, 1993, p. 37} Others have 
termed the area a "grey zone" between Russia and Western 
Europe, neither black nor white, but some mixture of the two. 
(Kaminski, 1994} 
1 
This terminology has two main problems. The first is 
that it is almost universally applied in a pejorative sense. 
The second is that it is applied monolithically. Security 
vacuum, grey zone, and even seemingly innocuous 
geographically-based terms such as Central and Eastern Europe 
all have connotations of uniformity. However, this is not the 
case within the area. While there are certain characteristics 
and concerns that all of the countries in the region share, 
they each also possess a unique set of circumstances and 
perspectives. This is also true of the countries outside of 
the region who are affected by the stability, or instability, 
of the region. 
Regardless of the similarities and differences between 
the countries involved in the debate, they would all agree on 
one thing -- today, the most contentious issue in European 
security is the possible future enlargement1 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Central and Eastern 
1Throughout much of the literature and debate on this subject, the terms enlargement and 
expansion are used interchangeably. Whether by astute political foresight or inadvertent luck, 
NATO chose the term enlargement in its first study of the subject. The terminological problem 
is that the two terms have different connotations, one negative and one positive, when translated 
into Russian. fu The Oxford Russian-English Dictionary, expansion (3KCIIAHCIUI) has a 
political connotation, and it is the root word for the noun expansionism (3KCIIAHCIIOHHM) 
and the adjective expansionist(ic) (3KCIIAHCIIOHHCTCKIIH). According to Oleg Ivanov, a 
Russian student at the Naval Postgraduate School, these translations of expansion are negative, 
due to the political connotation. Enlargement (P ACillliPEHIIE), on the other hand, does not 
have a political connotation or negative translation. It can also mean broadening, widening, or 
extension, which are more "politically correct." Therefore, this study will use enlargement to 
preclude any prior biases. 
2 
Europe. One would expect such a volatile subject to receive 
in-depth study and analysis. Since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in December of 1991, governments, their 
militaries, foreign policy experts, and academics, from 
Washington to Moscow, have been analyzing, discussing, and 
weighing options on the enlargement of NATO. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Each country involved has its own position, or set of 
positions, on the debate. For this study, there are a number 
of key questions. Why do nations align? What are the 
structural and domestic factors and conditions that affect a 
country's support or opposition to alliance formation, 
expansion, or continuation? Why do alliances continue to 
exist if the threat they were designed to oppose is gone? And, 
do structural or domestic political theories have greater 
explanatory power to predict or explain the actions of the 
individual states? 
The task of this study is to seek answers to these 
questions by examining the positions on the NATO enlargement 
debate across six countries. Using International Relations 
(IR) theories, it will analyze the perspectives of the United 
States, the Russian Federation, and the Central European 
states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
The study will examine these perspectives comparatively, 
3 
conducting qualitative case studies based on two competing 
levels of analysis: 1) the international system (systemic)/ 
and 2) the state system (domestic). 
Hopefully/ the comparative case studies will provide 
three things. First/ they will provide a deeper understanding 
of the individual situations of the six countries; Second/ 
they will provide a survey the relative explanatory powers of 
the competing theories and levels of analysis to determine if 
one does a more consistent job of predicting and explaining 
the states/ actions. Finally/ it will attempt to provide an 
overview of some pertinent implications of the enlargement 
process. 
The systemic and domestic levels of analysis were chosen 
because there is a continuous and vibrant debate between 
supporters of the two over which does a better job explaining 
the causes of state behavior. At the systemic level/ the 
belief is that states are unitary actors trying to survive in 
an anarchical system. Since there is no central authority/ 
states seek to ensure their survival by maximizing their power 
relative to other states. At the level of the state/ the 
belief is that internal workings and conditions of the state/ 
such as type of regime and economic interdependence/ can 
affect the behavior of the state. 
4 
The relative explanatory power of each level of analysis 
is tested by inferring hypotheses from each on the balancing 
behavior of states. The inferred hypotheses are then applied 
to the current alignment decisions of Russia, the United 
States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia to 
see which theories better explain their actions. Within the 
systemic level of analysis, this study infers hypotheses from 
balance of power and balance of threat theories. At the state 
level, the study infers hypotheses from theories on the 
political stability of the government, economic conditions, 
and the internal security threat to the country. Chapter II 
discusses this theoretical framework and underpinnings of the 
research. 
Chapters III through VIII are the comparative case 
studies of the Russian, Central European (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), and U.S. perspectives, 
respectively. According to Barry R. Posen, professor of 
Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
"The comparative case method allows the scholar to sample a 
range of causes identified as important by each theory, and to 
see if variations in those causes do indeed produce variations 
in outcomes." (Posen, 1984, p. 8) Variation in the causes, or 
independent variables, was a key criterion in case selection. 
Other criteria included a requirement to examine both 
5 
countries who support and oppose NATO enlargement (variation 
in the dependent variable) and countries who cannot afford to 
ignore the issue of NATO enlargement. Based on these 
criteria, the previously mentioned cases were selected. 
There is a wide variation in the independent variables of 
the six states. At the systemic level, there is a great 
disparity between the military power of the United States and 
all the other states. Large gradations in military power also 
exist both within the Central European states and between 
these states and Russia. Threat perceptions and geographical 
proximity to potential threats, two key factors in balance of 
threat theory, are also different among the six states. The 
United States has the benefit of the Atlantic Ocean between it 
and Europe, while Russia fears NATO's potential movement 
closer to its borders. 
There are also wide variations in the state level 
independent variables. The United States has a stable 
political system, while those of Russia and Slovakia are 
questionable. The political stability of the others lies 
somewhere in between. Economic conditions also vary 
drastically among the six states. In addition, Russia and 
Slovakia face significant potential internal security threats, 
while the United States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland do not for various reasons. 
6 
When it comes to support for the enlargement of NATO, the 
variations among the states are less. Russia outright opposes 
NATO enlargement. It is the only one; all of the other states 
support it. However, there are differences in the degree of 
support for enlargement among these other states. The United 
States has agreed, in principle, that the Alliance should 
expand in the future. Currently, however, the U.S. leaders 
have not supported a definite time line for admission of new 
members. The other states would like to see NATO open its 
doors immediately to new members. 
Finally, each of these states cannot afford to ignore the 
NATO enlargement issue. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
former National Security Advisor to President Carter, "It is 
axiomatic that the security of America and Europe are linked." 
(Brzezinski, 1995, p. 26) Anthony Lake, the current Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs, has said, 
"History has taught us that when Europe is in turmoil, America 
suffers, and when Europe is peaceful and prosperous, America 
can thrive as well." (Lake, 1996) 
While some of this is undoubtedly rhetoric, the economic 
importance of Europe to the United States cannot be 
discounted. More than 50 percent of U.S. investment abroad is 
in Europe. And, more than 60 percent of direct foreign 
investment in the United States comes from Europe. Finally, 
7 
Europe is the United States' second largest customer and 
second largest supplier, behind Asia. (Office of International 
Security Affairs [OISA], 1996) 
Russia also cannot ignore the security situation in 
Central Europe or the possible enlargement of NATO. NATO is 
a military organization, a historical enemy of the former 
Soviet Union, that is potentially moving closer to the borders 
of the Russian Federation at a time when Russia is militarily 
weakened. Russia has to contemplate the possibilities. 
According to Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, deputy secretary 
general of the Russian Security Council, NATO's "expansion . 
means the creation of a new line that divides the 
continent and is on or close to Russia's state borders 
The decision on enlargement is a call from the past. Its 
implementation will force Russia to take adequate 
countermeasures.n (Schmidt-Haeuer, 1995) 
Finally, the states of Central Europe cannot ignore the 
issue of NATO enlargement, either. They all perceive a 
"security vacuumn left by the dissolution of the bipolar 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
They feel that they need to integrate into the structures of 
the West, primarily NATO and the European Union (EU) . (Reisch, 
1994) 
8 
Of course, the selected cases are not the universe of 
cases that could be included in this study. The case could be 
made that other NATO members should be included besides the 
United States. There are variations in the independent 
variables among the other members, each supports NATO 
enlargement to one degree or the other, and there are 
compelling reasons why some of them cannot ignore the 
potential consequences of enlargement. Particularly, Britain, 
Germany, and France, the major continental powers in NATO, and 
Norway, Greece, and Turkey, as the main "flank" members of 
NATO, cannot ignore the issue. 
Unfortunately, the choice is one of resources. There is 
not enough time or resources available to do a systematic 
study of all cases. Therefore, the United States was selected 
as the representative member of NATO. This was done for the 
simple reason that America is the leader of the Alliance and 
has the greatest weight, both from a contribution point of 
view and a policy point of view. As a NATO diplomat put it, 
the "way things generally work in NATO . . [is] America gets 
what it wants." (Dobbs, 5 July, 1995) Empirical evidence 
tends to bear this out. The case of Bosnia is a good example. 
Without U.S. involvement and sheparding of the Dayton Accords, 
it is doubtful that the European NATO members would have 
broken out of their parochial infighting to find a solution. 
9 
Therefore, this work will conduct comparative case 
studies on the positions of the United States, Russia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia with regards to 
NATO enlargement. The hope is that the final results of this 
study will provide policy analysts a heuristic tool for 
studying the problem and developing relevant policies. The 
final chapter, Chapter IX, seeks to draw out relevant policy 
implications from the focused comparisons. It will also seek 
to determine the relative explanatory power of the competing 
theories to explain and predict states' actions when it comes 
to alignment choices. 
10 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Shall I join with other nations in alliance? 
If allies are weak, am I not best alone? 
If allies are strong with power to protect me, 
Might they not protect me out of all I own? 
The King of Siam 
The King and I 2 
It is impossible to speak of international relations 
without referring to alliances; the two often merge in 
all but name (Liska, 1962, p. 3). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is broken down into three sections. The 
first section deals with alliances in the international 
relations arena. The second section discusses the use of 
multiple "images" to study the phenomenon of alliances. 3 
These images correspond to the levels of analysis in the 
Chapter One. The section lays out theory relevant to the 
"third image," or the international system level, and the 
"second image," or the state level. Finally, the conclusion 
summarizes the chapter and reiterates key hypotheses inferred 
throughout. 
2Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein, The King and I; cited by Michael N. Barnett 
and JackS. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," International Organization, 
Vol. 45, No.3, Summer '91, p. 375. 
3The idea of images is from Kenneth ·waltz's Man, the State, and War. In this work, 
Waltz identifies man as the first image, the state as the second image, and the international system 
as the third image. 
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B. ALLIANCES 
As the quotation from George Liska above indicates, 
alliances are a key phenomenon in international relations. No 
matter the explanations used to describe or predict why 
alliances formed, or will form, it is an incontrovertible fact 
that alliances have existed throughout history. It is also 
true that no alliance lasts forever. Yet, many students of 
international relations will admit that there is not a 
definitive theory on alliances. Glenn Snyder calls alliance 
theory "one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of 
international relations." (Snyder, 1990, p. 103) 
Lack of a theory makes it hard to examine the NATO 
enlargement issue. In order to answer the questions outlined 
above, this chapter must develop the theoretical framework for 
exploring the issue. The rest of this section will identify 
the definition of alliance that the study will use. The 
following section will attempt to infer hypotheses from the 
systemic and domestic levels of analysis. 
What is an alliance? The one commonality among the 
literatures seems to be the lack of a consistent definition. 
Some are more similar than others. Arnold Wolfers defines an 
alliance as "a promise of mutual military assistance between 
two or more sovereign states." (Wolfers, 1968, p. 268) 
Stephen Walt similarly defines an alliance as "a formal or 
12 
informal relationship of security cooperation between two or 
more sovereign states." (Walt, 1987, p. 1) Michael Barnett 
and Jack Levy have a similar definition. They define an 
alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security 
cooperation between two or more states and involving mutual 
expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security 
issues under certain conditions in the future." (Barnett and 
Levy, 1991, p. 370) These are simple definitions that 
deal with the military aspect. They leave out any mention of 
political relationships or nonmilitary assistance between the 
sovereign states. This is problematic because "common usage" 
of the term encompasses all types of cooperation, including 
cooperation outside of the security venue, between entities. 4 
The Oxford English Dictionary has several definitions for 
alliance. Definitions that pertain to the field of IR are: 1) 
union by marriage, affinity; and, 2) combination for a common 
object, confederation, union, especially between sovereign 
states. Based on this definition and the everyday usage of 
the term, I define an alliance as: a relationship (formal or 
informal) between two or more states who agree to coordinate 
their efforts (military, political, economic, cultural, etc.) 
for the accomplishment of common objectives. 
4The idea of sticking to common usage for terms in international relations is elucidated by 
Randall L. Schweller in his article "Bandwagoning for Profit" in International Security, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, Summer 1994, p. 81. 
13 
C. MULTIPLE IMAGES 
In his book, Man, the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz 
distinguishes between three images. The "first image" is the 
nature of man. The "second image" is the nature of the state 
and society. The "third image" is the nature of the 
international system. (Waltz, 1959) This study will use the 
"second" and "third" images to examine the NATO enlargement 
debate. 
This research deals with many possible variables in a 
small number of cases. To deal with this problem, this study 
will focus on "key" variables of the levels of analysis, in 
order to maintain parsimony. Other scholars may argue with 
the selection of which variables are "key." It is then up to 
them to show, in future studies, why their selections would be 
more appropriate than those selected in this study. The 
remainder of this section will lay out the theoretical 
underpinnings of the two approaches. 
1. The Third Image 
The Realist paradigm and its variant, structural Realism, 
are the major theories that have been used at the 
international system level to attempt to explain alliance 
dynamics. One of the main treatises on Realism is Kenneth 
Waltz's book, Theory of International Politics. Realism has 
two main assumptions about the international system -- the 
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system is anarchic, and it is populated by sovereign states. 
These states are unitary actors who wish to survive. The 
system is a self-help system, and states who either cannot 
help themselves or do it less efficiently than others will 
have to contend with dangers and suffering. According to 
Waltz, ~fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states 
to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of 
power" (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). 
a. Balance of Power 
A balance of power in the system is desired because 
it provides ~safety for all states," with each one having the 
~ability to fend for itself." An imbalance of power, on the 
other hand, ~by feeding the ambition of some states to extend 
their control, may tempt them to dangerously adventurous 
activity." (Waltz, 1979, p. 132) When confronted by a 
significant external threat to its survival, a state has one 
of two choices -- balancing or bandwagoning. 
Balancing is, according to Waltz, ~the behavior 
required of all parties in self-help systems." (Waltz, 1979, 
p. 163) The anarchic condition of the system means that the 
highest goal of the state is its security and survival. In 
order to survive, states can attempt to balance in one of two 
ways -- internally or externally. Internal balancing involves 
mobilization or creation of power from organic assets of the 
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state. 5 External balancing involves aligning with another 
state or coalition. If they are externally balancing, states 
prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions because the 
stronger side is threatening them and they will be more 
appreciated and safer on the weaker side. (Waltz, 1979) The 
two types of balancing lead to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A state will attempt to balance 
internally before attempting to balance externally 
against a threat. 
Hypothesis 2: A state will balance by joining the 
weaker of two coalitions to offset the threatening 
power of the stronger state or coalition. 
The opposite of balancing is bandwagoning. If 
balancing is joining with the weaker side, then bandwagoning 
is joining the stronger state or coalition. (Waltz, 1979) 
There is a debate over the definition for bandwagoning. 
Stephen Walt, in his book, The Origins of Alliances, modifies 
Waltz's definition and says that "bandwagoning refers to 
alignment with the source of danger." (Walt, 1987, p. 17) 
Walt claims that there are two basic reasons that a state will 
align with the source of danger -- appeasement and material 
gain. In either case, the perceived threat has to be present. 
5Intemal balancing, because of the so-called security dilemma, can have unintended 
negative effects. According to Waltz, the security dilemma "describe[s] the condition in which 
states, unsure of one another's intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a 
vicious circle in motion. Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy 
more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else who in tum 
responds by buying arms." (Waltz, 1979, p. 186) 
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Randall Schweller, in an answer to Walt's balance of 
threat theory, claims that there are a number of different 
types of bandwagoning. While acknowledging bandwagoning with 
the source of danger (both to survive and gain the spoils of 
victory), Schweller also points out that there are a number of 
types of bandwagoning for profit when there is no threat of 
danger. He labels these types: "jackal bandwagoning," an 
offensive maneuver designed to gain the bandwagoning state 
rewards from the rise of a "revisionist" state; "piling-on 
bandwagoning," when a bandwagoning state piles-on the 
bandwagon at the end of a conflict, again to share in the 
spoils; and, "wave of the future bandwagoning," where a 
bandwagoning state follows a state that it thinks represents 
the "wave of the future." (Schweller, 1994) 
These various approaches to bandwagoning lead to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: States may bandwagon with a stronger 
state if they fear the stronger state can destroy 
them and they feel they have no other recourse 
(capitulation) . 
Hypothesis 4: A state may bandwagon with a stronger 
state for the chance of receiving profit (jackal-
or piling-on) or new technology (wave of the 
future) . 
b. Balance of Tbrea t 
In The Origins of Alliances, Walt introduces balance 
of threat theory as a "refinement" to balance of power theory. 
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This theory says that a state will balance against the 
greatest threat, which is not necessarily the state with the 
most power. In addition to the distribution of power within 
the system, a state looks at three other variables in its 
calculation of the threat geographic proximity of the 
threat, offensive capabilities of the threat, and the 
aggressiveness of the threat. (Walt, 1987) 
According to Walt, "whereas balance of power theory 
predicts that states will react to imbalances of power, 
balance of threat theory predicts that when there is an 
imbalance of threat . . , states will form alliances or 
increase their internal efforts in order to reduce their 
vulnerability." He says this improves on balance of power 
theory by "providing greater explanatory power with equal 
parsimony." (Walt, 1987, p. 263) Of course, it also dips down 
into the level of the state, exhibited by the requirement of 
a state to make a judgment call of the aggressiveness of its 
opponent's intentions. 
Whether the new theory actually explains more with 
equal parsimony is debatable. According to Harry Eckstein, 
the parsimony of theories is in proportion to: 
(i) the variety and number of observations 
they order; (ii) the number of discrete theoretical 
constructs (i.e., constructs not ... deducible from 
one another) used to order a constant volume ... of 
observations; (iii) the number of other theoretical 
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constructs subsumed or derivable from them; and, 
(iv) the number and complexity of variables used in 
the statements (Eckstein, 1975, p. 89) 
Based on this definition, balance of threat theory 
is not as parsimonious as balance of power. First, balance of 
threat does not order a greater variety and number of 
observations. The difficulty of gaging the nature of 
ostensibly offensive or defensive weapons, as well as the 
opponent's intentions, leads back to an overall emphasis on 
aggregate power. Second, the requirement for a threatened 
state to see that its opponent has both offensive capabilities 
and aggressive intentions is nothing more than the security 
dilemma found with balance of power theory. Walt merely adds 
another "discrete theoretical construct" that makes the theory 
more complex, not more parsimonious. The bottom line is that 
Walt increases the number and complexity of the variables used 
in the theory, without gaining any more explanatory power. 
The variables of offensive capability and 
aggressiveness of intentions should be lumped into one 
variable, making the theory more parsimonious. This variable 
is nothing more than the "security dilemma" found in classical 
Realist thought. Since perception of a threat is in the eye 
of the threatened state, whether or not these variables play 
any role in the threatened state's decision to balance against 
the threat depends on their transparency. Therefore, this 
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study will consider offensive capabilities and aggressive 
intentions as one variable -- transparency of the threat. 
If a state does not see that another state possesses 
weapons (whether originally offensive or defensive in nature) 
with offensive capabilities and a desire to use them against 
that state, why would it feel a need to balance against the I 
"threatening" state? If, however, the state can see that the 
"threatening" state possesses both the offensive capabilities 
and the aggressive intentions to use those capabilities, then 
it will attempt to internally and/or externally balance 
against the threat. 6 Of course, the balancing actions of the 
"threatened" state may cause the "threatening" state to 
balance internally and/or externally, launching the action-
reaction spiral predicted by the security dilemma. Given 
these considerations, the refined balance of threat theory 
leads to the following hypotheses on alliance dynamics: 
Hypothesis 5: "States that are 
greater threat than those that 
(Walt, 1987, p. 23) 
nearby pose a 
are far away." 
Hypothesis 6: The transparency of the threat 
(aggressiveness of intentions and offensive 
capabilities) will affect whether a state perceives 
a threat or not. 
61n this type of situation, suspicion that the "threatening" state possessed the offensive 
capabilities and aggressive intentions would be akin to seeing. 
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Hypothesis 7: A state will seek to balance against 
a threatening state that has greater aggregate 
power and is geographically proximate, if the 
threat is transparent (or at least not opaque) . 
2. The Second Image 
The "third image" dealt with the nature of the 
international system. The major theory used to explain the 
actions of states in the "third image" was Realism. However, 
a state's calculations of the balance of power alone cannot 
explain its actions. According to Richard Rosecrance and 
Arthur Stein, the past shows a "number of occasions in which 
other than strictly 'realist' determinants appear to have 
influenced or even decided national policy." (Rosecrance and 
Stein, 1993, p. 12) For a full picture, we have to consider 
the possibility that internal considerations affect state 
behavior. 
The "second image" deals with the nature of the state and 
domestic society. As such, the major areas to be covered will 
explain internal reasons for states aligning with one state or 
another. These main areas are domestic politics and internal 
security threats. 
a. Domestic Po2itics 
This study argues that it is imperative to include 
an examination of the domestic political system of a state, 
along with its position in the power distribution of the 
international system, in attempting to determine why it 
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chooses to align or not. The domestic political system of a 
state can and will affect its actions in the international 
system. The foreign policies of a state "are not simply the 
result of their positions in the international system as 
defined by power but also vary with respect to their leaders' 
willingness and political ability to respond to systemic 
imperatives." (Hagan, 1994, p. 183) Richard Rosecrance and 
Arthur Stein sum up well the importance of the second image: 
A central conclusion ... is that domestic 
constraints are sufficient to prevent or retard the 
policy response apparently dictated by 
international pressures. International stimuli 
generate a response when the domestic political and 
economic factors are conducive to it. Conversely, 
domestic imperatives can sometimes generate 
aggressive policies that should be precluded by the 
restraints of the external environment (Rosecrance 
and Stein, 1993, p. 17) 
What are these domestic constraints? In the rest of 
this section, we will discuss key political and economic 
constraints that affect a state's decision to align. By 
political constraints, the focus in on constraints within the 
system of government. The next section lays out extra-
governmental threats that can affect alignment or alliance 
decisions, such as ethnic disputes or organized crime. 
No matter the source of constraint within the state, 
domestic constraints affect the state's choice of balancing 
method (internal or external) . The constraints can affect 
22 
balancing in one of two ways. At times, internal constraints 
may limit a state's ability to mobilize internal resources, 
forcing the leaders to attempt to conduct external balancing. 
Conversely, at times, internal constraints may make external 
balancing unviable or undesirable, forcing the leaders to 
attempt to conduct internal balancing. (Barnett and Levy, 
1991) This study focuses on three key domestic constraints 
that can affect the state's alignment or alliance decisions: 
1)political stability; 2) economic constraints; and, 3) 
internal security threats. 
b. Political Stability 
The first key political constraint that can affect 
a state's alignment choices is political stability. For 
purposes of this study, political stability is defined as the 
combination of the "maintenance of state structures and the 
maintenance of state managers' own positions of political 
power." (Barnett and Levy, 1991, p. 373) The primary measure 
of the viability of state structures is what Hagan calls 
"state power vis-a-vis societal actors." (Hagan, 1994, p. 193) 
The presence and strength of opposition groups to the ruling 
party, as well as divisions within the ruling party, are 
indicators of the viability of the leaders' political power. 
23 
The desire to maintain state structures and personal 
political power can affect leaders' alignment choices. If the 
state is strong and the leadership is confident of its 
political power, then the leadership has the freedom to 
extract resources from the state. Because of this, internal 
balancing will occur prior to external balancing. On the 
other hand, if the state is weak vis-a-vis societal actors and 
the leadership faces opposition or is not cohesive, then the 
state's first choice will be external balancing, as an attempt 
to extract internal resources for balancing may further reduce 
state strength or the political power of the leadership. 
In addition, states which have to contend with weak 
structures and/or unsupported governments will seek external 
balancing before internal balancing in the hope of gaining 
external validation of the internal legitimacy of the regime. 
External validation is ~attempts by state officials to utilize 
their status as authoritative international representatives of 
the nation-state to enhance their domestic political 
positions." (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989, p. 464) 
These dynamics of attempting to maintain state structures lead 
to the following hypothesis on a state's alignment policies: 
Hypothesis 8: A state possessing leadership 
confident in its power, and either strong state 
power vis-a-vis societal actors or good state-
society relations, will attempt to balance 
internally prior to balancing externally. 
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Hypothesis 9: A state possessing leadership that 
is not confident in its power, and either weak 
state power vis-a-vis societal actors or poor 
state-society relations, will attempt to balance 
externally prior to balancing internally. 
Hypothesis 
leadership 
externally 
validation 
government 
10: A state with a poorly supported 
and/or unstable structures may seek to 
balance in order to receive external 
of the internal legitimacy of the 
or leadership. 
c. Economic Constraints 
The other major type of domestic constraint that a 
government may encounter is economic constraint. The 
condition of the economy can force a government to adopt an 
external balancing scheme. This can happen in one of two 
ways. First, a state facing maj~r domestic constraints may 
attempt to externally balance in order to secure resources 
(economic, military, technical, etc.) to improve the domestic 
economy. This is known as "external extraction." 
(Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989) Second, if a state 
cannot internally mobilize the power necessary to confront a 
security challenge, then it is forced to balance externally in 
order to meet the threat. (Barnett and Levy, 1991) The effect 
of economic constraints leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 11: A state may externally balance to 
gain resources for internal improvements of the 
domestic economy. 
Hypothesis 12: If a state lacks the resources to 
internally balance against a threat, it will go for 
external balancing in order to meet the threat. 
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d. Internal Security Threats 
The internal security situation of a state will also 
affect its alignment choices. Threats to the security of the 
state can come from a variety of sources -- ethnic groups, 
revolutionary movements, etc. When these threats threaten the 
existence of the state, the state will look to external 
sources, if it cannot mobilize sufficient resources 
internally. According to Barnett and Levy, 
If internal threats to the government are more 
salient than external ones, ... political leaders are 
often tempted to try to secure the material 
resources necessary to deal with those 
threats ... through external alliance formation 
rather than through internal extraction from a 
society that is already economically stretched and 
politically alienated. (Barnett and Levy, 1991, p. 
378) 
The effect of the internal security threat on the alignment 
choices of a state leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 13: If a state perceives its internal 
security situation as more dangerous than external 
threats, and it cannot internally mobilize 
sufficient resources to deal with the threat, then 
it will externally balance to acquire the necessary 
resources. 
D. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
1. Third Image -- International System 
a. Balance of Power 
Hypothesis 1: A state will attempt to 
balance internally before attempting to balance 
externally against a threat. 
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Hypothesis 2: A state will balance by 
joining the weaker of two coalitions to offset the 
threatening power of the stronger state or 
coalition. 
Hypothesis 3: States may bandwagon with a 
stronger state if they fear the stronger state can 
destroy them and (capitulation) . 
Hypothesis 4: States may bandwagon with a 
stronger state for the chance of receiving profit 
(jackal- or piling-on) or new technology (wave of 
the future) . 
b. Ba~ance of Threat 
Hypothesis 5: "States that are nearby 
pose a greater threat than those that are far 
away." (Walt, 1987, p. 23) 
Hypothesis 6: The transparency of the 
threat (aggressiveness of inientions and offensive 
capabilities) will affect whether a state perceives 
a threat or not. 
7: A state will seek to 
threatening state that has 
power and is geographically 
threat is transparent (or at 
Hypothesis 
balance against a 
greater aggregate 
proximate, if the 
least not opaque) . 
2. Second Image -- The State 
a. Po~itica~ Constraints 
Hypothesis 8: A state with a leadership 
confident in its power and either strong state 
power vis-a-vis societal actors or good state-
society relations will attempt to balance 
internally prior to balancing externally. 
Hypothesis 9: A state with leadership 
that is not confident in its power and either weak 
state power vis-a-vis societal actors or poor 
state-society relations will attempt to balance 
externally prior to balancing internally. 
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Hypothesis 10: A state with a poorly 
supported leadership and/or unstable structures may 
seek to balance externally in order to receive 
external validation of the internal legitimacy of 
the government or leadership. 
b. Economic Constraints 
Hypothesis 11: A state may externally 
balance to gain resources for internal improvements 
of the domestic economy. 
Hypothesis 12: If a state lacks the 
resources to internally balance against a threat, 
it will go for external balancing in order to meet 
the threat. 
c. Internal Security Threat 
Hypothesis 13: If a state perceives its 
internal security situation as more dangerous than 
external threats, and it cannot internally mobilize 
sufficient resources to deal with the threat, then 
it will externally balance to acquire the necessary 
resources. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that a state's alignment 
and alliance choices can be influenced by both ·systemic 
conditions and domestic constraints within the state. By 
surveying the theoretical underpinnings of Realism and various 
theories of domestic politics, I have inferred hypotheses 
about what causes a state to implement balancing strategies, 
either internal or external, to reduce threats, again either 
internal or external, against the survival of the state. 
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Structurally, I have explored the balance of power within 
the system and the balance of threat to show why state's make 
certain alignment choices. Using balance of power theory, I 
inferred hypotheses on why a state balances against or 
bandwagons with a threat. Using balance of threat theory, I 
inferred hypotheses on what role the geographical proximity, 
transparency, and aggregate power of the threat play in the 
state's alignment decisions. 
At the state level, I have examined how various 
constraints and internal threats to the state can also affect 
the state's alignment decisions. Political constraints 
include the orientation of the state leadership, and the need 
to maintain state structures, the leaders' political power, 
and the internal legitimacy of the state government. 
Economically, the state's ability to mobilize resources to 
meet either external or internal threats can influence the 
alignment choices of the state. 
I will use these theories to explain the stances toward 
NATO and NATO enlargement of the United States, Russia, and 
the leading Central European candidates for admission into the 
Alliance (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). 
In the course of these comparisons, the inferred hypotheses 
will be confirmed, refuted or found to be in need of 
modification. The degree to which the hypotheses, as a whole 
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in each level of analysis, hold up to the examination of these 
focused comparisons will show the relative explanatory power 
of each of the theories. 
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III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Rudyard Kipling, Alfred Milner, Alfred Thayer Mahan 
would say that this is a feeble, shiftless, 
demoralized, decadent, undisciplined people. In 
particular, they would say that the Russian ruling 
elites are utterly cynical and corrupt, that they 
are ruthlessly obsessed with short-sighted personal 
gain, and that their patriotic rhetoric masks a 
fundamental lack of all real patriotism, spirit of 
self-sacrifice, and capacity for fulfilling great 
imperial tasks. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Anatol Lieven 
The National Interest 
January 1996 
Of all the European states considered in this study, the 
Russian Federation is the exception, the "odd man out." 
Russia is the only state that does not support NATO 
enlargement. It also seems to be one of the states having the 
hardest time with the transition from communism to democracy. 
The country is beset by a host of internal problems, 
political, economic, and social. Although the leaders of the 
Russian Federation are currently struggling with these 
internal problems, they cannot afford, and do not want, to 
ignore the outside world. Obviously, their main concerns in 
foreign policy issues are the security of the state and 
Russian influence in the world. This chapter explores the 
current Russian views on the security environment in Central 
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Europe and the issue of NATO enlargement. 7 The chapter will 
explore Russian views and actions using both systemic and 
domestic factors affecting the country's national security 
decisions. In addition to ·surveying Russian actions and 
attitudes using these theories, the chapter will also endeavor 
to compare the relative explanatory power of each theory. 
B. THIRD IMAGE 
Prior to 1991, the Russian Federation was a republic 
within the Soviet Union. It did not have a need for a foreign 
policy and armed forces separate from those of the Soviet 
Union. Today, it is bordered by a number of new states, which 
it has never dealt with at the level of state-to-state 
relations. This forces Russia to examine the balance of power 
between itself and its likely adversaries. 
1. Balance of Power 
Russia did not create armed forces immediately after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. It tried to maintain a 
common defense space with the other newly independent states. 
When this failed, Russia developed its own military 
formations. Figure 3.1 lists the current military balance for 
Russia and its possible opponents. 
7This study focuses on the western (European) axis ofRussian security orientation. While 
it will bring out peripheral issues regarding the southern (Transcaucasus) and eastern (Asia) axis, 
it will only be in relation to influences, positive or negative, they can place on Russian actions in 
Europe. 
32 
In Europe, seven states border Russia from the Black Sea 
to the Barents Sea. These states are Ukraine, Belarus, 
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and Norway. Russia must 
also consider possible threats to its national security from 
both Central and Western Europe. The Central European states 
include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia. The Western states include the states of NATO, such 
as the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
8Finland possesses 9 brigades that have a primarily training role. 
9See Appendix for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The 
Miliary Balance 1994-1995. 
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Realistically, NATO is the only state or organization 
that can seriously threaten Russia. Therefore, this study 
will concentrate on the balance of power between Russia and 
NATO. The rest of this section will explore the balance. 
Numbers, however, can be deceptive. In today' s world of 
precision-guided munitions and stealth technology, quantity is 
not necessarily enough. Because of this, it is necessary 
first to explore the condition of the Russian armed forces. 
a. Russian Armed Forces 
By all accounts, the Russian armed forces are in a 
state of decline so steep and severe that "the Russian Army 
today is weaker in relative terms than it has been for almost 
four hundred years." (Lieven, National Interest, 1996, p. 24) 
The former Minister of Defense, General Grachev, has said the 
Russian military is "hungry, barefoot, and underfinanced." 
(Lambeth, 1995) General Lebed, the head of the National 
Security Council, describes morale in the armed forces in 
terms of "fatigue, apathy, and distrust." (FBIS, 9 July, 1996) 
The armed forces suffer problems in every area. This study 
focuses on six areas: 1) doctrine; 2) funding; 3) manning; 4) 
procurement; 5) reform, conditions, and morale; and, 6) 
capabilities and performance. 
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(1) Doctrine. 10 President Yeltsin signed the 
current Russian military doctrine, "The Basic Provisions of 
the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," in November 
of 1993. (Starr, Orbis, 1996) This was the document that 
laid out threats against the Russian state and the direction 
the armed forces would follow to combat those threats. While 
the document did not identify any state as an enemy, it listed 
the main external and internal sources of military danger to 
the Russian Federation. (Tishin, 1995) External sources 
included: territorial claims on Russia; local wars and 
conflicts; employment or proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD); and, interferences in the internal affairs 
and situation of Russia. Internal sources included: ethnic 
conflicts; attempts to overthrow the government; and illegal 
armed formations. It also rejected the Soviet policy of "no 
first-use" of nuclear weapons. (Tishin, 1995) 
The military doctrine was the basis of the plan 
for the reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces. 
Organizationally, a major priority was the development of 
10 Additional readings on Russian and late-Soviet military doctrine include: V. Mironov, 
"Russia's National Security Military Doctrine and the Outlook for Russian-US Cooperation in the 
Modem World," Comparative Strategy 13/1 (1994); A.A. Danilovich, "On the New Military 
Doctrines of the CIS and Russia," M.A. Gareev, "On Military Doctrine and Military Reform in 
Russia," and Charles Dick, "Initial Thoughts on Russia's Draft Military Doctrine," all in The 
Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 5, No.4, December 1992; Mary C. Fitgerald, "Russia's 
New Military Doctrine," Air Force Magazine, September 1992; and, M. Gareyev, "Some 
Problems of the Russian Military Doctrine," International Affairs, August 1993. 
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mobile forces that could initially fight "local wars and armed 
conflicts . . . [which were recognized] as the main dangers to 
stability and peace." (Tishin, 1995, p. 120) These mobile 
forces' role in the local conflicts would be to rapidly deploy 
to "localize" and isolate the fighting, so that efforts could 
be made to find a peaceful solution. The need for creation of 
the mobile forces was an acceptance of the fact that the 
political situation no longer required large forces and the 
Russian economy could no longer support the financial burden. 
(Tishin, 1995) 
Technologically, the doctrine supported a shift 
from production of quantity to quality. Priority of 
development was to go to design and production of systems for 
command and control, communication, electronic warfare, and 
weapons delivered by precision guidance systems. The goal of 
the military-technical support was "prompt provision of the 
Armed Forces with sufficient effective armaments and materiel 
to protect the vital interests of the nation." (Tishin, 1995) 
( 2) Funding. There is a chronic lack of 
funding today in the Russian Armed Forces. This shortage of 
funds affects training, operations, maintenance of equipment 
and personnel, procurement, and modernization. For 1996, the 
Russian Armed Forces received $8.9 billion in the state 
budget. This was roughly half of what they had requested. It 
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represented 12 percent of Russia's 1996 budget. (Starr, 12 
June, 1996) Fiscal limitations are causing many problems in 
the Armed Forces. 
Operationally, the Russian Armed Forces have 
trouble operating and maintaining their equipment. Since 
1992, Russian forces have suffered through a severe shortage 
of fuel. Because of this, Russian pilots have not been able 
to log adequate hours to remain proficient and safe, which has 
resulted in an increased aircraft accident rate. (Lambeth, 
1995) Spare parts are in short supply, and equipment 
routinely fails. In fact, according to Anatol Lieven, a 
senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 
Washington, D.C., the "greater part of Russian military 
equipment can only survive by cannibalizing other equipment." 
(Lieven, National Interest, 1996, p. 28) 
Inoperable equipment and lack of money for 
training have combined to decimate the operational readiness 
of the Russian Armed forces. Effective training has become 
"all but impossible;" the Russian Armed Forces are not 
conducting any division-level or joint training exercises. 
(Parrish, 9 August, 1996) In fact, they have not conducted 
any exercises at division-level and above since 1992. 
(Lambeth, 1995) These problems of training and maintenance 
have led General Grachev to proclaim that only 50 percent of 
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the Army is adequately trained, and only 20 percent of the 
tanks are operational. (Kugler, 1996) 
In the estimates of some Western military 
experts, during 1995, the "Russian Defense Ministry . . . had 
only seven divisions that it even pretended were 'battle-
ready'." (Lieven, National Interest, 1996, p. 27) Richard 
Kugler, of the RAND Corporation's National Defense Research 
Institute, is more generous, putting the figure at 10 
divisions, or roughly 12 percent of the Russian forces. 
Whatever the figure, this dismal state of readiness makes it 
unlikely that the Russian Armed Forces could challenge NATO in 
any credible conventional manner. 
(3) Manning. Budgetary constraints have also 
combined with management problems to affect the Armed Forces' 
ability to maintain and professionalize their forces. This is 
potentially the most serious long-term problem of the Russian 
Armed Forces. Equipment can be replaced, or high-quality 
personnel can be trained to effectively employ even older 
equipment. But, no amount of high-tech weaponry will win in 
combat if there are insufficient numbers of trained personnel 
to operate it. In 1992, Russian Armed Forces had a total of 
2. 8 million personnel. Today, that number is supposedly 
around 1.7 million. (FBIS, 10 April, 1996) 
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This number represents the authorized slots in 
the Armed Forces. It does not represent their actual 
strength. Today, estimates are that the actual strength may 
be as low as 1. 2 million. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996) This 
current personnel shortage is exacerbated by a shrinking draft 
pool, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, the flight 
of qualified officers and volunteer soldiers from the Armed 
Forces, and the manning policies of the Armed Forces. 
The draft pool is shrinking for two main 
reasons -- exemptions and draft dodging. According to Richard 
Starr, Russian legislation set the "percentage of those not 
exempt from the draft" at 23.8 percent of the eligible 
population. (Starr, 1996, p. 65, my emphasis) Since most of 
those with higher educations are exempt, it has resulted in a 
-drop in the quality of recruits. There has been a 15 percent 
drop in the number of high school graduates entering the Armed 
Forces between 1988 and 1993. In addition to the large number 
of people exempt from the draft, there is also a significant 
problem with draft dodging. Official figures show that as 
many as 30, 000 recruits have dodged the draft in every 
semiannual call-up since 1992. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996) 
Since 1992, 150,000 officers have left the 
Armed Forces. Many of these officers were "younger and better 
qualified" than those who stayed in. (Parrish, 9 August, 
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1996) Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and contract soldiers 
have also been leaving in search of better-paying jobs. 
Because of budgetary constraints, the Armed Forces cannot 
afford to pay these soldiers adequately. More than 50,000 
contracts for volunteers have been dissolved. General Grachev 
has said the Armed Forces "simply cannot afford" the 
expenditure of contract servicemen. (FBIS, 10 April, 1996) 
Current manning levels for NCOs are less than 50 percent of 
the authorized strength. (Lambeth, 1995) 
( 4) Procurement. There seems to be a 
significant contradiction in the procurement processes of the 
Russian Armed Forces. The contradiction is caused by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the lessons Russian 
planners appear to have taken from the Gulf War. During the 
Cold War, the majority of the best Soviet forces and equipment 
were stationed in what is now Central Europe and the "near 
abroad." After the split, "Russia inherited obsolescent 
equipment from the rear areas facing Western Europe, whereas 
the latest and more advanced weapons remained in East-Central 
Europe or in Belarus and Ukraine." (Starr, 1996, p. 60) 
During and after the Gulf War, Russian military planners were 
apparently "mesmerized" by the technological superiority of 
the U.S. forces. (Starr, 1996) 
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These disparate events have caused 
contradictions in Russian procurement and thinking. On the 
one hand, normal procurement and production to replace older 
systems has nearly stopped. For example, in the 1980s, Soviet 
tank production was around 2000 per year. In 1994, Russian 
tank production was only 40 tanks, representing a steep 
decline. (Parrish, 9 August, 1996) On the other hand, the 
state defense order, which is separate from the defense budget 
and will fund "accelerated R&D of a new generation of weapons 
for the Russian armed forces as well as for production of such 
advanced equipment, 11 is 25 percent more than the entire 
Ministry of Defense's budget. (Starr, Orbis, 1996) Since 
there is bound to be a significant time lag between 
conceptualization of these weapons and their introduction into 
the force, Russian material capabilities can do little but 
decline in the interim. 11 
( 5) Reform, Conditions, and Morale. As 
mentioned earlier, General Grachev has called the Russian 
Armed Forces "hungry, barefoot, and under financed, 11 while 
General Lebed has described the morale of the soldiers in 
11In addition, it is interesting to note that the Russians may have missed an important 
lesson from the GulfWar. While it is hard to argue against the fact that high-tech weapons played 
a significant part in the destruction of the Iraqi Army, they would not have been nearly as effective 
if the United States had not had highly-qualified and highly-trained personnel operating the 
systems. The previously mentioned problems and defects in the personnel system of the Russian 
Armed Forces leads one to believe that they missed this crucial factor. 
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terms of "fatigue, apathy, and distrust." Many factors have 
contributed to these descriptions and the conditions of the 
Russian Armed Forces the performance in Chechnya, 
abominable living conditions, salaries that are pittances, 
widespread corruption, alcoholism, and a host of other 
problems. Anatol Lieven believes that "the reasons for its 
present collapse have above all to do with morale." (Lieven, 
National Interest, 1996, p. 24) In addition, he posits that 
the "demoralization of the army derives partly from the 
demoralization of the Russian society." (Lieven, National 
Interest, 1996, p. 25) Regardless, the collapse of morale is 
a reality, and it significantly reduces the elan of the 
Russian Armed Forces. 
(6) Capabilities and Performance. All of the 
aforementioned major problems, as well as others, have had a 
cumulative, negative effect on the capabilities and 
performance of the Russian Armed Forces. Chechnya has shown 
the world this fact. The Chechens have been able to not only 
attack Russian forces inside Chechnya, they have also 
conducted operations inside Russia. Currently, the Russians 
have a hard time assembling even small forces for "peace 
keeping" operations. Their logistical system is "stretched to 
the breaking point" trying to sustain the forces in Chechnya. 
(Lambeth, 1995) They have suffered "repeated tactical 
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failures" that make one question the quality of the leadership 
and wonder if they have any means of incorporating lessons 
learned into new tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
All of the mistakes and calamities point to the 
fact that "it is unlikely that Russia, with its decimated and 
poorly supported conventional forces, could mount a large-
scale cross-border operation against a well-equipped enemy." 
(Lambeth, 1995, p. 90) At least, they could not mount these 
types of operations today. Assessments such as this must not 
be taken totally at face value, as a final and definitive 
appraisal of the Russian Armed Forces. History shows that the 
Russian Armed Forces have been extremely irrepressible in the 
past, regardless of the situation. For example, in 1939-40, 
after Stalin's purges of the military, the Finns were able to 
humiliate the Russian Armed Forces. Soon thereafter, the Red 
Army fought tenaciously against the German Wehrmacht, 
ultimately defeating probably the finest army in the world at 
the time. 
b. The Armed Forces of NATO 
Unfortunately for the Russian Federation, that well-
equipped enemy could be the combined forces of NATO, at least 
in their minds. These forces are "more ready, better trained, 
and have better weapons" than Russian forces. (Kugler, 1996) 
And, the balance of power is continuing to shift in favor of 
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the NATO forces, both conventionally and in the nuclear arena, 
especially if Russia ratifies and abides by START II. 
Figure 3.2 lists the balance of forces between the 
major NATO forces and the Russian Armed Forces. Figure 3.3 
lists the change in the balance between the United States and 
Russia in nuclear weapons from 1991 to START II levels. These 
two figures show why Russia is nervous about NATO enlargement. 
Country Personnel Divisions Sep Tanks AIFV/ Arty SSM Aircraft Atk 
Bde APCs Helo 
Cbt Trans 
Russia &1 714 000 69 19 19,500 35,000 21,300 Varies 2150 650 1000 
NATO 1 190 800 21 4 6840 18630 5578 Varies 1720 316 561 
VJSeuad 498,000 17 17 5646 6638 5097 63 995 78 164 
NATO+ 1,688,000 38 21 12,486 25,268 10,675 Varies 2715 394 725 
VJSePrad 
F1gure 3.2 The M1l1tary Balance between Russ1a and NATO 
Strategic Nuclear Forces (land, 1991 After START II 
sea, and air) 
Russia USA Russia USA 
Nuclear Warheads 5,946 2,901 1,125 1,354 
# of defended targets 2,238 2,596 660 2,078 
F1gure 3.3 Strateg1c Offens1ve Weapons of Russ1a and the USA12 
On paper, Figure 3.2 shows that Russia has a 
numerical advantage over NATO forces. However, based on the 
preceding discussion on the conditions in the Russian Armed 
Forces, the implications to be drawn from just looking at the 
numbers are erroneous. The lowest current manpower estimate 
for Russian forces (1.2 million) would give them an equivalent 
12Provided by Richard Starr. Original source: Sergei Grigor' ev, "Novyi Stregicheskii kurs 
Roskii na zapadnom napravlenii," Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 1 (5), 13 January, 1996, 
p. 4. 
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number of men under arms, not an advantage in that category. 
Assuming General Grachev is right about the percentages of 
adequately trained personnel (50%) and operational equipment 
(20%), the number of Russian "trained" divisions and 
operational tanks would be 34 and 3900, respectively. While 
these are only rudimentary calculations, it is easy to see why 
the Russians are worried about the balance of power in Europe. 
This increasing shift in conventional military power 
toward NATO is occurring at the same time that "the 
credibility of Russian deterrence has substantially diminished 
in both psychological and technical terms." (Bluth, 1995) 
This is due to the reductions of the Russian strategic 
offensive nuclear weapons under the INF, START I, and START II 
treaties. Figure 3. 3 shows that, in 1991, Russia had a 
distinct quantitative advantage over the United States. In 
addition, it had almost three warheads for every U.S. target. 
If START II is ratified by the Russians, the 
warheads will be greatly reduced. The United States will 
possess more total warheads than Russia. Russia would only 
have .5 warheads for each defended U.S. target. While the 
Russians will still maintain more warheads than Britain or 
France, Russia will not be able to coerce the European members 
of NATO because the U.S. umbrella will still protect them. 
45 
2. Balance of Threat 
a. Aggregate Power 
The preceding discussion identified that NATO is the 
only state or organization that can match the aggregate power 
of the Russian Federation. The forces of NATO are better 
trained, better equipped, and better prepared than the Russian 
Armed Forces. Problems in doctrine development, funding, 
manning, procurement, morale, and performance have called into 
question the quantitative advantage that the Russian Armed 
Forces have. In addition, Russian military personnel believe 
that NATO has a quantitative advantage, even if the overall 
numbers do not show it. According to an unidentified Russian 
general, General "N," "Today, NATO surpasses Russia in the 
number of troops and conventional arms in Europe by a factor 
of two or three. After Poland, Hungary and ex-Czechoslovakia 
join the alliance, the gap would grow wider." 
October, 1995) 
b. Geographical Proximity 
(FBIS, 17 
Enlargement of NATO into Central Europe would be 
problematic and troubling to the Russians for two reasons. 
The first reason, obviously, is that enlargement would bring 
an opposing alliance 500 miles closer to Russian borders, 
"leapfrogging" over the former East German. According to 
Russians, this would be in violation of the spirit of the 2+4 
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agreements, which prohibited NATO from stationing NATO troops 
in that area. As one Russian general puts it, NATO is "a 
powerful military grouping, which everyone in the Soviet Union 
young and old alike regarded as the likely enemy just a few 
years ago, [which] is moving close to Russia's bord (FBIS, 5 
July, 1996) ers." If the alliance eventually moves into the 
Ukraine or the Bal tics, it would put NATO troops "within 
striking distance of the Russian heartland." (Lieven, Atlantic 
Monthly, 1996) 
The second reason is the geographical deployment of 
the Russian Armed Forces. They are "geographically out of 
balance" and not well-situated to confront NATO actions. 
During the Cold War, three quarters of Soviet troops were 
forward deployed in either Eastern and Central European 
countries or deployed in the western part of the Soviet Union. 
The other quarter was in Asia. Today, those percentages are 
almost reversed. According to Kugler, "owing to differential 
reduction patterns, only 33 percent of the existing posture is 
now deployed in western Russia." (Kugler, 1996) Lack of funds 
prohibits the Russians from addressing this imbalance of 
forces. 
c. Transparency of the Threat 
Given Russian concerns over NATO enlargement based 
on NATO's aggregate powers and potential geographic proximity 
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to the Russian Federation, does that make NATO a threat to 
Russia? As stated in the theory chapter, for purposes of this 
study, transparency of threat is determined by the ability of 
a state to see two things in potentially threatening states: 
1) possession of offensive capabilities; and, 2) indicators of 
aggressiveness of intentions. Based on these requirements, 
NATO, in the eyes of the Russians, could be seen as a threat. 
As the study has previously shown, NATO does possess 
large offensive capabilities. These capabilities include 
advanced weapons and technologies that "mesmerized" and 
obsessed the Russians after the weapons' demonstration and use 
during the Gulf War . 13 In addition, three members of NATO 
possess nuclear weapons capable of striking Russia. 
While NATO professes not to have any aggressive 
intentions toward Russia, many people in Russia believe it 
does. They fear enlargement is "nothing but a geopolitical 
encirclement and attempted isolation· of Russia." (Bluth, 
1995, p. 395) This, according to Lieutenant General Ivashov, 
13For additional readings on Russian analyses of the lessons of the Persian GulfWar, see: 
Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Soviet Military Doctrine Implications of the Gulf War," International 
Defense Review, 1 August, 1991, and "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Air Force Magazine, 
September 1992; James J. Tritten, "The Changing Role ofNaval Forces: The Russian View of the 
1991 Persian Gulf War," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1992; 
Edwin T. Bacon, "The Former Soviet Union and Analysis of the 1991 GulfWar," The Journal of 
Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 5, No.2, June 1992; and, Stuart Kaufman, "Lessons from the 1991 
GulfWar and Russian Military Doctrine," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
September 1993. 
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a Russian military professor and analyst, presents a "real 
threat to Russia, even though our NATO partners are seeking to 
convince us of the opposite." (FBIS, 5 July, 1996) 
Others wonder why NATO wants to expand when it "won" 
the Cold War, and the Russians "lost." General Lebed has said 
that NATO is acting like a "big drunken hooligan in a 
kindergarten who says he will hit anyone he likes." He also 
said, "The Cold War is over. They won, and we all agreed to 
this. So why have you decided to re-open the competition?" 
(Lieven, Atlantic Monthly, 1996) Much of this line of 
reasoning and questioning can be linked to "lingering 
hostility from the Cold War." (Kugler, 1996, p. 21) 
Still others use the words and actions of NATO 
members to support claims of NATO's aggressiveness. 
Lieutenant General Ivashov has pointed out that the U.S. 
national security strategy "unambiguously" proclaims that the 
United States is "the world's greatest power, with global 
interests and a global responsibility . [and the] U.S. 
Armed Forces must be able to counter the military strength of 
regional powers whose interests conflict with the interests of 
the United States and its allies." He also believes that 
NATO's training with Central European countries in exercises 
is a pretext for combat training. According to him, "Most 
often what these exercises rehearse are . plans for 
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operations in the initial stage of war and the conduct of 
large-scale combat actions using all troop categories and 
branches of the bloc's joint armed forces." ( FBIS, 5 July, 
1996) 
3. Summary of Third Image Factors 
a. Balance of Power . 
With regard to the Russia case and balance of power 
theory, two of our inferred hypotheses were refuted, one was 
confirmed and one was neither confirmed nor refuted. The case 
refuted our hypothesis that a state would seek to balance 
internally prior to externally. Until Russia realized that 
the other newly independent states were not interested in 
maintaining unified security and military strategies, it 
sought to balance externally with the rest of the CIS against 
NATO. It was only after this realization that Russia 
attempted internal balancing actions, such as development of 
a national military strategy and a reform program for the 
armed forces. 
The case refuted our hypothesis that a state would 
align with a stronger state or coalition for the chance to 
receive profit. Russian actions do confirm the traditional 
balancing hypothesis, which states that a state will balance 
with the weaker power or coalition against the stronger one; 
confirmation of this is evident in Russian effort to 
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reintegrate the military strategies of the CIS, as well as 
possible gestures toward China. Finally, the case neither 
confirmed nor refuted the hypothesis that a state would 
bandwagon with a stronger state to prevent its own 
destruction, as it is not currently under the threat of 
annihilation from any quarter. 
b. Balance of Threat 
The Russian case confirms all of the inferred 
hypotheses from balance of threat theory. The Russian 
Federation actively opposes NATO enlargement. Enlargement of 
NATO would bring a coalition with equal or greater aggregate 
power closer to the borders of Russia. 
Russian statements and actions confirm that many 
members of the military and government see NATO as having both 
offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions. In 
confirmation of our hypotheses, Russia therefore views NATO as 
a threat and is attempting to balance against it. Again, 
Russian military, political, and economical efforts both 
within the CIS and with China and other countries support this 
contention. 
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C. SECOND IMAGE 
1. Political Constraints 
Today, the Russian political system revolves around 
President Boris Yeltsin. At times, he has been called ~czar 
Boris." This nickname may be appropriate, since, according to 
Stephen Blank, the ~current structure or lack of a system is 
uncomfortably reminiscent of the late czarist system." Blank 
has called Russia today a ~quasi-authoritarian system 
where authority is nonrational, personalized, and organized in 
competing vertical patron-client chains dependent on the 
ruler's personal preference." (Blank, 1996, p. 15) President 
Yel tsin is able to rule in this ~czarist" fashion for two 
reasons -- the strong presidential-style system adopted by the 
constitution of 1993 and his ~divide and rule" leadership 
style. 
The Russian constitution of 1993 gives the president 
broad powers over both the prime minister and parliament, 
which consists of a lower house, the Duma, and an upper house, 
the Federal Council. The Russian President is ~dominant over 
the prime minister" and is generally free from potential 
~parliamentary interference." Because of this system, the 
president is free to establish foreign policy and the national 
security strategy. (Blank, 1996) 
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In the time of a crisis with the Duma, the president has 
the authority to dismiss the parliament by calling for new 
parliamentary elections. The Duma does not have a reciprocal 
measure to check the president's power. The closest it could 
come would be to pass a vote of no-confidence in the 
government. In the event of a no-confidence vote, the prime 
minister would have to resign, but not the president. (Blank, 
1996) In addition to these advantages over the prime minister 
and parliament, the president also has the power to issue 
binding presidential decrees. These decrees14 are "by nature 
executive acts and are mandatory for compliance on the entire 
territory of the Russian Federation." (Freedom House, 1995, p. 
118) 
President Yeltsin does not just rely on these 
constitutional measures to ensure the continuity of his 
"reign." He also uses a "divide and rule" style of leadership 
to pit his subordinates against one another constantly. This 
prevents any one of them from gaining too much power, 
especially relative to President Yeltsin. To do this, 
President Yeltsin uses a "well-established strategy of 
creating mulitiple overlapping . . . structures which compete 
with and balance one another." (Parrish, 29 July, 1996) 
14It should be noted that, although the president issues these decrees, they are not 
universally followed in Russia today. 
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Two examples that illustrate this tactic are Yeltsin's 
creation of multiple "armies" outside of the Armed Forces and 
the recent creation of the Defense Council. The "other Armed 
Forces," such as those in the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) 
and the Federal Security Service (FSB), serve as 
counterweights to the regular Russian Armed Forces. (Starr, 
1996) The Defense Council, which has overlapping 
responsibilities and personnel with the Security Council, was 
"designed to clip [Security Council Secretary] Lebed's wings, 
and to ensure that he remains a faithful subordinate with 
little ability to make independent policy decisions." 
(Parrish, 29 July, 1996) 
The combination of strong presidential powers, the 
ability to issue decrees outside of Duma legislation, and the 
successful tactic of "divide and rule" to limit any individual 
group's power potentially give President Yeltsin the ability 
to conduct broad actions to balance against internal and 
external threats. This situation, however, does not give him 
an unlimited ability to balance, especially internally. There 
are constraints in the system. One of the main political 
constraints is tensions over center-periphery relations. 
In Russia today, a major issue is "the struggle by local 
authorities in the republics, oblasts, and krais for greater 
autonomy and a more equitable . . sharing of power with 
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Moscow." (Clark and Graham, 1995, p. 329) While Chechnya is 
an example of the fact that some of these struggles can be 
both violent and ethnically based, most of them are 
economically based. There are three areas of disagreement: 
control of resources; decisions over economic policies; and, 
payment of taxes. (Clark and Graham, 1995) Recent moves by 
Moscow, such as the signing of bilateral treaties with 
republics, have lessened this danger. 
2. Economic Constraints 
Most of the current economic indicators of the Russian 
economy are negative and reflect an economy struggling to make 
the transition from central control and planning to a free 
market. While there is no doubt there are serious problems in 
the Russian economy, evidence points to the fact that Russia 
still has the economic capability to balance internally 
against threats. This section will explore some of the 
negative points and indicators of the Russian economy first. 
Then, it will attempt to show that not only does the Russian 
military-industrial complex (voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks, or 
VPK) have the potential to support internal balancing efforts 
of Russia, but also that it is engaged in this production at 
the present. 
The major Russian economic constraint is a lack of money. 
The country is currently experiencing a severe budget crisis 
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caused by lower than expected revenues and a growing budget 
deficit. The budget deficit is currently around 6 percent of 
GDP. It is aggravated by an inefficient and easily evaded tax 
collection system that only collected 59 percent of the 
expected tax revenues in the first half of 1996. This 
unexpectedly low collection rate forced the government to 
increase foreign borrowing and cut spending in critical areas, 
including the army. (Gurushina, 1996) 
The inefficient tax collection system is not the only 
source of declining revenue for the Russian Federation. 
Revenue is lost in three other areas. First, there has been 
an increase in the flight of capital out of the country. 
Second, there has been a large movement on the part of both 
individuals and business to not pay their taxes. According to 
Lev Makarevich, a finance expert for the Association of 
Russian Banks, "The fiscal burden is so high (80-120 percent) 
and there are so many taxes (more than 200) that absolutely 
all economic entities engage in evasion." ( FBIS, 17 July, 
1996) Finally, there is a growing "shadow economy" that 
"exists outside the scope of the law" and may be as large as 
40-50 percent of the GDP. (FBIS, 16 July, 1996) 
While the tone of the preceding discussion is undeniably 
negative, there are some Western experts that believe that the 
"uniformly pessimistic" view of the Russian economy is 
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incorrect. Charles Wolf, an analyst at the RAND Corporation, 
believes that the pessimists are looking at incorrect and 
misleading data. He argues that there are reasons for 
"limited optimism." These reasons include development of a 
private market, which is not adequately reflected in GDP 
statistics, the modest growth of professionalism in the 
government, and increasing Russian contacts with Western 
businessmen and business practices. (Wolf, 1995) 
Whether the pessimistic or the optimistic view is taken, 
there is evidence that the VPK can still support Russian 
efforts at internal balancing. According to Richard Starr, 
"Russia retained 70 percent of the USSR's military-industrial 
complex . , with between 2,000 and 4,000 industrial plants 
that employ 5 to 8 million highly skilled workers." (Starr, 
1996, p. 76) Diversity and possession of large amounts of 
natural resources mean that Russia can operate an "autonomous 
defense industry base" to support the Russian Armed Forces. 
(Starr, 1996) Today, although it has been downsized, the VPK 
is actively producing weapons systems for domestic and foreign 
use. 
The VPK has "continued production of new Russian 
offensive weapons systems." The Topol M-2 modification of the 
SS-25 has been flight tested and enters serial production this 
year. The VPK has produced "miniature nuclear weapons" for 
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Russian ground forces. Seven new nuclear-powered, 
Severodvinsk-class submarines are currently in production. 
They will be outfitted with the new D-31 submarine-launched 
ballistic missile. (Starr, 12 June, 1996) And, the T-90 main 
battle tank (MBT) is currently in volume production (between 
100-150 have been produced) and is replacing older T-72 MBTs 
in the Far Eastern Military District. (Foss, 1995) In 
addition to the new production going on within the VPK, the 
complex also recently received a significant increase in the 
resources available to it. This occurred because President 
Yeltsin issued a decree which reduced the "untouchable 
reserves" by 20 percent. Many of these resources will now go 
to the VPK. (Starr, 12 June, 1996) 
These continuing efforts of the VPK show that Russia is 
actively pursuing its own revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
as a means of balancing internally. Attempting to harness the 
RMA is nothing new for the Russians. Beginning in the 1980s, 
Soviet military experts, such as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, 
believed that new technologies were generating an RMA. After 
the Persian Gulf War, Russian scientists believed that "Desert 
Storm confirmed these predictions and serves as the paradigm 
of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics." 
(Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 78) 
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3. Internal Security Threat 
In a speech last year to the Duma, President Yeltsin said 
he "foresees more Chechnya-type situations in the future." He 
further indicated that Moscow would encounter "special danger 
from armed conflicts breaking out in Russia and on its 
borders, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, because 
of aggressive nationalism and religious extremism." (OMRI 
Daily Digest, 17 February, 1995) Conflicts of this type have 
already been seen in both Russia and the CIS. 
Chechnya is the epitome of these conflicts. Within 
Russia, fighting has also occurred between North Ossetia and 
Ingushetia. Russian units have also been involved in other 
conflicts within the CIS, such as the Armenia-Azerbaijain 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the civil war in Tajikistan, 
and the fighting in the Georgian areas of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. While it will be difficult for the Russians to 
predict where and when these conflicts will start, they do 
believe these conflicts are a possible internal security 
threat. The Geography Institute at the Russian Academy of 
Sciences has identified roughly 180 potential "territorial-
ethnic" conflicts in the former USSR, many of them within the 
borders of the Russian Federation. (Starr, 1996) 
The Russians do not seem sure about whether they can 
prevent these conflicts. In his annual report to the Duma in 
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1995, President Yeltsin said that ~the institutions of state 
power have yet to accumulate sufficient weight to ensure that 
force does not have to be applied to restore Russian 
sovereignty." (Blank, 1996, p. 11) The question is, if 
prevention fails and the Russians have to apply force in 
another Chechnya-type conflict, especially if Chechen 
operations are still going, will they have the resources to 
accomplish the mission? It seems doubtful, based on the 
previous discussion of the conditions of the Armed Forces. 
4 . Summary of Second Image Factors 
The Russian government is plagued by instability. 
President Yeltsin, although he has broad powers as the current 
system, continually feels it necessary to pit his subordinates 
against each other to insure that no one gets too much power. 
This, coupled with the power ministries (defense, security, 
interior, and counter-intelligence) acting so independently 
that they at times look like feudal states, makes it difficult 
for Russia to balance against threats. 
Based on our inferred hypotheses from domestic political 
theory, we predicted this unconfident leadership, with its 
weakened state mechanisms and poor state-society relations, 
would do two things. First, seek to balance externally 
against the prevalent threat before balancing internally. 
Second, seek external balancing to receive external validation 
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of the legitimacy of the regime. We do not see Russia doing 
either of these things, refuting our hypotheses. 
In the case of the first hypothesis, Russia is actively 
seeking to balance internally, against both an internal threat 
(Chechnya) and a possible external threat (NATO enlargement)·~ 
Although their efforts in Chechnya have been without much 
success, the Russians have made considerable efforts to 
destroy the internal security threat of the Chechen rebels. 
In terms of the external threat of NATO, Russia is releasing 
two critical resources of the state -- money and materiel --
to the VPK to provide the Armed Forces with the modern 
equipment that they think will help them deal with the threat. 
In the case of the second hypothesis, we do not see the 
Russian leadership seeking to balance externally for external 
validation of their positions and legitimacy. Instead, they 
are re~ying on internal methods to maintain their position and 
legitimacy. 
In terms of our hypotheses on economic constraints, the 
Russia case refutes the hypothesis on external extraction. 
This hypothesis said that a state may externally balance to 
gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic 
economy. This is not occurring with Russia. While it is true 
the leadership is looking for states to balance with, these 
states, primarily the other members of the CIS and China, 
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cannot provide the necessary resources to improve Russia's 
domestic economy. 
$ince Russia does possess significant internal resources, 
particularly natural resources, the case cannot confirm or 
refute the hypothesis that a state without internal resources 
to balance against a threat will seek to balance externally. 
For similar reasons, the case cannot confirm or refute our 
final hypothesis, which states that if a state perceives its 
internal security situation as more dangerous than external 
threats, and it cannot internally mobilize sufficient 
resources to deal with the threat, then it will externally 
balance to acquire the necessary resources. Russia has 
mobilized internal resources to combat the conflict in 
Chechnya. 
An alternate explanation for Russian actions could be 
that the Russian government's opposition to NATO enlargement 
reflects worries about the mass public's response to seeing 
Russia humbled by the West. This is unlikely. Based on 
interviews conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School with 
Russian officers, only the educated public worries about 
enlargement. The average Russian does not know or care about 
the issue; they are too concerned with their own travails. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the mass public would put any 
pressure on the government to counter NATO enlargement. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
As pointed out in the introduction, of all the case 
studies in this work, Russia is the exception. This is the 
case, as well, with respect to the abilities of the theories 
we have looked at to explain and predict Russian attitudes and 
responses to today's security situation in Central Europe. In 
this case, the systemic level's relative explanatory power is 
significantly greater than domestic political theory. Its 
combination of balance of power and balance of threat theory 
do a good job of predicting Russian actions. In contrast, the 
case did not confirm any of our hypotheses inferred from 
domestic political theory. 
Russian actions to attempt to reintegrate more closely 
the CIS and its endeavors toward China clearly demonstrate 
confirmation of our traditional balancing hypothesis. In 
addition, these actions also clearly confirm all of our 
balance of threat hypotheses. A coalition with equal or 
greater aggregate power is moving closer to the borders of 
Russia. It possesses large offensive capabilities and, at 
least in the eyes of the Russians, aggressiveness of 
intentions. The theory predicts this will cause Russia to 
balance against the stronger coalition, and that is what it is 
attempting to do. 
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IV. 'l'HE PERSPEC'l'IVE OF 'l'HE CZECH REPUBLIC 
A. IN'l'RODOC'l'ION 
This chapter sets out to elucidate Czech views on NATO 
enlargement and the security environment in the region today. 
It will examine both systemic and domestic factors affecting 
the country. Of the four Central European countries desiring 
entry into NATO, the Czech Republic was perhaps the "luckiest" 
geopolitically after the revolutions of 1989. It was the only 
state that had major, beneficial border adjustments. The 
adjustments made two potential adversaries with well-armed 
forces, Ukraine and Hungary, more distant. In addition, the 
partition of the former Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR) 
increased domestic stability by eliminating the only 
significant ethnic minority (Slovaks) . The rest of this 
chapter will: 1) briefly detail the Czech position on NATO; 2) 
examine Czech positions and actions based on "third image" and 
"second image" factors; and, 3) summarize the relative 
explanatory powers of our theories and their inferred 
hypotheses to explain and predict Czech actions and positions. 
B. CZECH POSI'l'ION ON NA'l'O 
According to Stephen Blank, the Douglas MacArthur 
Professor of Research at the U.S. Army War College, "Today the 
fundamental question and first priority for Prague is 
obtaining membership in an enlarged NATO." (Blank, 1996) The 
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Czechs look at NATO membership as a means of being accepted as 
a Western, instead of a Central European, state. According to 
Josef Zieleniec, the Czech Foreign Minister, 
It [is] very important for us to emphasize the 
Czech state's continuity in relation to the 
traditions of Czechoslovakia in the 1920's and 
1930's and ... to follow up on the prestige that 
Czechoslovakia had in the world. In order for this 
to happen, we must ... transform this state and we 
have to achieve what we set out to achieve in 1989: 
The Czech Republic must become a standard Western 
European state with an efficient Western European-
type economy (FBIS, 19 May, 1994) 
C. THIRD :IMAGE 
As stated in the previous chapter, the "third image" 
deals with the nature of the international system. The 
realist paradigm can help explain a state's actions or 
behavior. 15 The critical areas this study will explore are the 
balance of power in the system and the balance of threat. 
1. Balance of Power 
Geographically and militarily, the Czech Republic's 
two largest neighbors are Germany and Poland. Each possesses 
large armed forces and equipment. Figure 4.1 lists the 
current military balance between the Czech Republic and its 
neighbors, as well as U.S. and Russian forces. 
15This view is not universally held among Realists. Kenneth Waltz believes Realism explains 
the workings of the system, but does not develop a theory of individual states' foreign policies. 
Others, such as Collin Elman, believe that Realism does explain why a state adopts certain actions 
and positions. 
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Slovakia 47,000 2 0 912 1043 808 9 146 16 19 
Figure 4.1 The Military Balance16 for the Czech Republic 
The figure shows that the German forces are significantly 
larger than those of the Czech Republic. The same holds true 
for the Polish forces. The numbers and the associated 
balance, of course, can be misleading. In order to assess 
accurately the balance of power in the region, one has to 
consider factors such as the relative conditions of the 
different armed forces and their military-industrial 
potential. 
a. Czech Armed Forces 
The Czech armed forces are obviously not what they 
were prior to the revolutions of 198 9. Like all of the 
militaries in Central Europe since then, the Czech armed 
forces have experienced major disruptions. These disruptions 
have included reductions and reorganization of forces, reduced 
defense spending, halting modernization efforts, and erosion 
of their military-industrial support base. 
16See Appendix for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The 
Militarv Balance 1994-1995. 
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At the time of the partition of Czechoslovakia into 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, the Czech Republic got the 
better end of the deal militarily. Because the split of armed 
forces was done in a ratio of 2: 1 in favor of the Czech 
Republic and better quality troops were stationed in the 
western half of the CSFR, the Czech Republic's armed forces 
received an initial qualitative and quantitative advantage 
over those of Slovakia. (Sauerwein, 1994) These advantages 
did not, however, insulate the Czech armed forces from future 
manpower and fiscal cuts. 
After the partition of the CSFR in 1993, the Czech 
armed forces numbered 106,000. In 1994, this total was down 
to 92,900. By the end of this year, the number will be down 
around 65, 000. These reductions have led to a number of 
problems that affect the capabilities of the armed forces, 
including poor recruitment and retention of junior officers 
and generally low morale throughout. In addition to manpower 
reductions, there has been a 50 percent drop in defense 
spending since 1989. This has led to problems in training, 
readiness, and modernization. (USAREUR, 1995) 
The Czech military-industrial base has also suffered 
since the partition, diminishing the ability of the Czechs to 
modernize their forces. During the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union, in order to try to take advantage of economies of 
scale, directed that Pact countries had to produce specific 
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types of military hardware. Because of this, the Joint 
Technical Committee of the Warsaw Pact assigned Czechoslovakia 
production of "a wide range of military equipment, from combat 
vehicles, military trucks, and explosives to small arms and 
trainer aircraft (USAREUR, 1995, p. 15) Unfortunately for the 
Czech Republic, 60 percent of this arms production capability, 
primarily the heavy-weapons industries, was located in what is 
now Slovakia. Many of the Czech plants that remained have 
been closed down or converted to civilian products. 
(Sauerwein, 1994) 
b. Po~ish and S~ovak Armed Forces 
All of these disruptions to the Czech armed forces 
and the Czech military-industrial complex have affected the 
balance of power between the Czech Republic and its adjacent 
neighbors. Those neighbors that were also members of the 
Warsaw Pact -- Slovakia and Poland -- have suffered similar 
disruptions, to varying degrees. While each of these states 
still possesses large quanti ties of equipment, it is not 
enough. Effectively, the legion of problems in each of these 
armed forces, including budgetary, manning, training, and 
maintenance problems, significantly reduces their combat 
effectiveness. Because of this, the armed forces of each of 
these countries are at a level of "near impotence." 
(Sauerwein, 1994) 
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c. Aus~rian and Ger.man ~d Forces 
Conversely, with respect to the other two neighbors 
of the Czech Republic, Austria and Germany, the qualitative 
degradations of the Czech armed forces increase German and 
Austrian power relative to that of the Czech Republic. This 
is because the German and Austrian armed forces are not 
suffering from these fiscal and readiness problems. Their 
armed forces have modern equipment, cohesion, established 
force structures, and stable military-industrial complexes. 
2. Balance of Threat 
As described in the previous chapter, balance of threat 
theory looks at a combination of four characteristics of a 
potential threat -- aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and aggressiveness of intentions -- to 
explain a state's actions in the face of that threat. 
a. Aggrega ~e Power 
Figure 4.1 showed the military balance for the Czech 
Republic with respect to its neighbors. The figure represents 
the aggregate power of the different armed forces. For the 
Austrian and German armed forces, this power is actual power. 
In the event of a conflict, they could almost immediately 
bring this power to bear against the Czechs. For the Poles 
and the Slovaks, on the other hand, the aggregate power of 
their armed forces is primarily latent rather than real. It 
would take immense efforts on the part of either country to 
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translate this latent power into actual power. Regardless, 
the Czech Republic has to look long term for possible threats. 
Its assessment of these possible threats will affect their 
balancing choices. 
b. Geographic Proximity 
Geographic proximity necessitates that the Czechs 
look at these countries' long term threat potentials. Because 
they are geographically contiguous with the Czech Republic, 
each could directly influence Czech national security. This 
is not the case with other potentially unstable or aggressive 
states in Central and Eastern Europe today, particularly 
Serbia, Ukraine, and Russia. Slovakia separates the Czech 
Republic from the potential threat of these states. If things 
were to go bad, it provides a 200 mile buffer that helps to 
insulate the Czechs. The bottom line is that geography, 
especially after the partition, favors the Czech Republic. 
c. Transparency o£ the !l'hrea t 
Each of these countries is geographically proximate 
to the Czech Republic, but are they threats? In other words, 
what is the transparency of the threat? Official Czech 
government sources explicitly state that the Czech Republic 
does not consider any specific state as a threat. Instead, 
"threats to Czech security could arise through increased 
regional instability, especially to the East, or international 
crime, such as drug trafficking or attempts to smuggle nuclear 
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materials . through the country." (USAREUR, 1995, p. 13) 
Of all of the Czech Republic's neighbors, two states --
Germany and Poland -- possess more aggregate power than the 
Czechs, and two states -- Austria and Slovakia -- possess 
less. For reasons developed below, it seems that only 
Slovakia could develop into a long term threat in the balance 
of threat sense. 
The Austrian armed forces, in every quantitative 
category except transport aircraft, are smaller than the Czech 
armed forces. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, they have 
qualitative advantages in both personnel and equipment that 
give Austria the offensive capabilities to threaten the Czech 
Republic. However, Austria is not a threat because it does 
not possess aggressive intentions against the Czech Republic 
or any other state. Two pieces of evidence point to the 
validity of this assertion: 1) Since the negotiated 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria in 1955, Austria has 
remained neutral, which was a condition of the Soviet 
withdrawal; and, 2) Austria and the Czech Republic have a 
bilateral agreement for cooperation and military exchanges. 
(Frost, 1993) 
Germany and Poland both possess greater aggregate 
power than the Czech Republic. Of the two, Germany definitely 
possesses the offensive capabilities necessary to be a threat. 
Poland's offensive capabilities are debatable, given the 
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previous discussion of the manpower, training, readiness, and 
modernization problems prevalent in the Central Eastern 
militaries over the last seven years. Poland does, however, 
possess the military-industrial capability to correct at least 
the material problems in the long term. The country has a 
"balanced defense sector" and ranks first in arms production 
among Central and East European countries. (Sauerwein, 1994) 
Even though these two countries possess, or could 
possess, the offensive capabilities to threaten the Czech 
Republic in the long term, they are not threats either, at 
least in the military sense. This is because the Czechs do 
not perceive that they possess aggressive intentions toward 
the Czech Republic, and it is hard to envision development of 
these intentions in the future. According to the Polish Prime 
Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Poland is determined to 
contribute to collective efforts to safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilization of [the family of democratic 
states]." (Cimoszewicz, 1996, p. 3) Aggressive intentions 
would be incompatible with this stated goal and their desire 
to integrate into Euro-Atlantic economic and security 
structures. 
Similarly, Germany, since unification with the 
former East Germany, has continued its traditional post-World 
War II foreign policy of "firm integration in a Euro-Atlantic 
framework (Meiers, 1995, p. 82)," a position also incompatible 
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with aggressive intentions. In addition, the German national 
conscience has undergone a profound change since World War II, 
as the constitutional debates about deployment of German 
forces out of German terri tory show. According to David 
Haglund, Director of the Centre for International Relations at 
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 
Germans have grown used to the idea that their 
security was intimately bound up in the country's 
embrace of Western political, economic, and 
security institutions. Another Sonderweg would be 
simply impossible, because ruinous. The early 
battles over German rearmament demonstrated that, 
when it came to defending their own territory, the 
Germans could agree that the organized application 
of legitimate force could be an acceptable means of 
statecraft. Buy beyond the country's frontiers, or 
perhaps beyond NATO's, the German public has 
continued to see force as being of slight moral and 
practical utility. (Haglund, 1995, p. 34) 
This metamorphosis of the German national conscience 
can also be seen in the Bundeswehr, the German Armed Forces. 
The transformation of the Bundeswehr into an institution 
totally subordinated to the civilian government, and therefore 
unlikely to pursue expansionist policies in the future, can be 
seen in the phrase and policy called Burger in Uniform. 17 
Burger in Uniform, as mentioned earlier, represents both an 
idea and actual policy of the Bundeswehr. Esoterically, it 
represents the idea that the German military establishment is 
totally subordinate to the civilian government. 
17This discussion of Burger in Uniform is based on interviews conducted with 
German military officers, from various services, at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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Practically, it has a number of implications. 
First, it requires that the Minister of Defense must always be 
a civilian. Second, it regulates that military personnel 
cannot participate in political activities (demonstrations, 
debates, rallies, etc.) unless they are off-duty, and never in 
uniform. In addition, currently serving military personnel 
cannot hold elected positions in the German government. 
Finally, the German officers pointed out that Burger in 
Uniform is one of the major reasons they prefer maintaining a 
conscript system in Germany, rather than a primarily volunteer 
system. Burger in Uniform and the conscript system allow the 
education of German youth in the requirement to have a 
subordinated military establishment. 
Of course, just because the Czech Republic does not 
perceive Poland and Germany to be threats does not mean there 
are no problems between the Czech Republic and these two 
countries. With the Poles, Czechoslovakia had a border 
dispute during the interwar years over the area of Teschen. 
In 1920, the Allied powers awarded the town to Poland, but the 
more prosperous surrounding countryside to Czechoslovakia. In 
1938, Poland seized the area during the Munich Crisis. (Bell, 
1986) Today, however, neither state professes any claims on 
the territory of the other. (CIA, 1995) 
Problems with Germany also stem from World War II. 
They deal with the claims of restitution from Sudeten Germans 
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who were forcefully expelled from Czechoslovakia between 1945 
and 1947. The current issue is over the Extrajudicial 
Rehabilitation Law enacted by the then-Federal Assembly of 
Czechoslovakia in 1991. The law allows people who had 
property confiscated by the Czechoslovak government to file 
for restitution of the property. (Bren, 1994) 
The issue for the German government and the Sudeten 
Germans in Germany is that the measure sets the date of 
restitution as on or after 25 February, 1948, when the 
Communist government seized power. This date excludes Sudeten 
Germans from the right to seek restitution. German estimates 
of the value of the property confiscated from expelled Sudeten 
Germans are around DM 265 million. (Bren, 1994) However, 
although the issue has still not been resolved, it has not 
significantly affected Czech-German interstate relations. The 
issue did not prevent the two states from signing the 
Czechoslovak-German treaty of friendship and cooperation in 
1992. 
Unlike Austria, Germany and Poland, however, 
Slovakia does have some potential to be a long term threat to 
the Czech Republic. Materially, the aggregate power balance 
favors the Czechs. However, Slovak armed forces do possess 
weaponry and the military-industrial infrastructure and 
potential to possess offensive capabilities. Figure 4.1 shows 
Slovakia has mechanized forces, artillery, surface-to-surface 
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missiles, and sufficient quantities of advanced combat 
aircraft and attack helicopters to threaten the Czech 
Republic. In addition, Slovakia inherited the lion's share of 
the CSFR's weapons industry, and it is actively seeking the 
ability to technologically upgrade these defense industries 
from French, Belgian, and German firms. (Sauerwein, 1994) 
In addition to the possession of offensive 
capabilities, a rise of nationalist feelings and political 
instability could give rise to the necessary aggressive 
intentions that could make Slovakia a threat to the Czechs. 
In Slovakia, ~nationalist prejudices and ethnic tensions are 
never far below the surface." (Wallace, 1994) Other than as 
the immediate cause of the partition, these tendencies have 
had little disruption on the development of Slovak democracy. 
However, leaders such as the nationalistic Prime Minister 
Meciar could use them in the future to redirect the 
orientation in the direction of authoritarianism. Given 
Slovak relegation to a secondary status in the former CSFR and 
possible future jealousy over Czech integration efforts with 
the West, it is not difficult to see how Slovakia could 
develop aggressive intentions against its former partner. 
In addition to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, like 
all other countries in Central Europe, must consider the 
potential threat of Russia, for both historical and practical 
purposes. Historically, the Czechs will not be able to forget 
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that the Soviet Union, backed by its Warsaw Pact "client-
allies," invaded Czechoslovakia on 20 August, 1968, to quell 
the liberalization of the Czech Communist Party known as the 
"Prague Spring." (Rothschild, 1993, p. 172) 
Practically, potential instability in Russia could 
affect the Czech Republic through such things as increased 
refugee flows and organized crime. In addition, if Slovakia 
did not get into NATO, it might attempt to balance with Russia 
against the West. This would further exacerbate relations 
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Czech politicians do 
not seem too worried about the possibilities presently. 
According to Czech Prime Minister Klaus, 
Let us in no way underestimate it [the 
Russian threat]. However, I would not separate 
this threat from the whole issue. The Russian 
threat is not a military one. It is the threat of 
mastering -- or of not mastering the early 
postcommunist phase. This threat has social, 
economic, political, and, only at a certain point, 
military dimensions. At the same time, I concede 
that the Czech Republic is a little further toward 
the West than, for instance, Poland. This issue is 
more sensitive for the Poles than it is for the 
Austrians, for example. In this sense, I would 
place us more alongside Austria than Poland. (FBIS, 
11 January, 1994) 
3. Summary of Third Image Factors 
a. Ba2ance o£ Power 
Realism predicts a state confronted by an 
unfavorable balance of power will attempt to correct the 
imbalance. It can do this by balancing or bandwagoning. If 
a state attempts to balance against the external threat, it 
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can choose to balance internally or externally. Our inferred 
hypotheses predicted: 1) states will attempt to balance 
internally before externally; 2) states prefer to join the 
weaker of two coalitions to offset the threatening power of a 
stronger state or coalition; 3) weaker states may bandwagon 
with a stronger state if they fear they will be destroyed and 
they have no other recourse; 18 and, 4) weaker states may seek 
to bandwagon with a stronger state because of the chance of 
receiving profit or technology or to follow a new ideology. 
The Czech case clearly confirms the first 
hypothesis. Although painful, the Czech Republic has gone 
through both internal military and economic transformations 
that have streamlined its military structures, military-
industrial complex, and economic systems. In a sense that is 
counterintuitive to the quantitative mind set of the Cold War 
struggle, this seemingly detrimental internal balancing and 
adjustments will make the Czech Republic and its armed forces 
more powerful in the long term. 
The second hypothesis is refuted by the Czech case. 
Looking at the balance of power for the Czech Republic, the 
largest "power" that could threaten the security of the state 
is the combination of the forces of Germany and the other NATO 
countries. Our second hypothesis would predict that the Czech 
180f course, it must be emphasized that Great Powers never bandwagon. 
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Republic would be seeking to align and balance against this 
stronger coalition. Poland and Slovakia are two neighboring 
weaker states with which the Czech Republic could balance. 
Instead, it is trying to align with NATO. 
This is not a case of the defensive, or 
capitulation, bandwagoning that our third hypothesis 
predicted. As stated earlier, the Czech Republic does not 
consider any specific state a direct threat. Instead, this 
phenomenon is confirmation of the fourth hypothesis 
integration into NATO and Western European economic, social, 
and political structures will "turn a profit" for the Czech 
Republic. In other words, the chance of future "profits" has 
enticed the Czech Republic into bandwagoning with the West.
19 
b. Ba~ance of Threat 
Balance of threat theory can help explain Czech 
actions in today' s Central European security environment. 
Although Figure 4.1 shows that Russia clearly has more power 
and residual and latent military potential, the Czech national 
security documents do not define Russia as a threat. Instead; 
regional instability is on the top of the list of potential 
threats. Of course, this is not to say that the Czech 
government does not consider Russia a threat. 
19ln this sense, profits are not meant as a purely economic term; it is incontrovertible that 
the security guarantees provided by NATO, or the WEU, would be "profitable." 
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Balance of threat theory can explain this stance. 
The Russian Federation is not adjacent to the Czech Republic. 
It therefore cannot affect the national security of the Czech 
Republic as directly as the regional threats. Russian forces 
would have to transit Ukraine and Slovakia to attack the Czech 
Republic. While this is not outside the realm of possibility, 
especially given the instability in Ukraine and continuing 
Slovak relations with Moscow, there would be indicators of 
these movements that would serve to warn the Czechs. 
In addition, Russian operations in Chechnya call 
into question the capabilities of the Russian armed forces. 
Without offensive capabilities to back up rhetoric, even a 
resurgence of imperialism and aggressive intentions in Moscow 
should not change the Czech stance. 
would still pose a greater threat. 
Regional instability 
However, this is not 
necessarily a static condition. Russian capabilities have 
been resilient in the past. From the start of World War II to 
the Red Army liberation of Berlin, the Soviet Armed Forces 
went from basically nothing to a world power. 
Balance of threat theory can similarly explain Czech 
actions and attitudes toward their immediate neighbors. The 
German armed forces are both qualitatively better and 
quantitatively larger than the Czech armed forces. The Polish 
armed forces are quantitatively larger. Austrian forces, 
although smaller, have cohesion, modernization, training, and 
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readiness advantages that make them qualitatively better than 
the Czechs. Despite the fact that each of these armed forces 
possesses offensive capabilities that could threaten the Czech 
Republic, there is no move on the Czech side to balance 
against them. This is because none of these states has 
aggressive intentions against the Czech Republic. 
D. SECOND IMAGE 
The "second image" deals with the nature of the state and 
domestic society. This section will focus on domestic 
political constraints, economic constraints, and the internal 
security threat of the Czech Republic. 
1. Political Constraints 
The Czech government currently has few domestic political 
constraints that would keep it from balancing internally or 
externally. It is one of the most stable governments in 
Central Europe. The government is a parliamentary democracy 
with a two-house parliament that elects the president. The 
president appoints the prime minister. Four parties currently 
make up the coalition government. They share common views of 
market reform and a strong desire to integrate the Czech 
Republic into Western European institutions. (USAREUR, 1995) 
The governing coalition controls 110 out of 200 seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies, which is the lower house of 
Parliament. The coalition's control over Parliament is 
actually more pronounced than this figure would indicate, 
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because only one of the opposition parties has not splintered 
or lost deputies since the 1992 election. (USAREUR, 1995) 
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the current 
coalition ~represents a stable right-of-center majority that 
. shows no sign of losing popular support." (USDOC, 1994) 
2. Economic Constraints 
Because of the stability of the Czech political system 
and the market reforms introduced by the pro-market coalition 
government, the Czech Republic has an advanced economy. There 
is a generally positive trend in the Czech economy. Of 
course, it has not accomplished this feat alone; numerous 
foreign firms have invested in the republic. These joint 
ventures include formation of consortiums to "resume arms 
production for the domestic market and export (Simon, 1994, p. 
484)," which will improve Czech modernization efforts. 
Positive characteristics of the Czech economy include "a 
stable currency with few current-account foreign-exchange 
controls, low unemployment, low national debt, strong foreign 
currency reserves, and a small, general government fiscal 
surplus." (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995) Since 1993, the 
country has experienced positive growth in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) . Inflation has been reduced from around 60 
percent in 1991 to roughly 10 percent. Unemployment is a 
remarkably low 6 percent, lower than most Western European 
states. (USAREUR, 1995) 
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3. Internal Security Threat 
Prior to the partition of the CSFR, there were two 
primary internal security challenges, or threats the 
reemergence of Slovak nationalism and the ethnic Hungarian 
minority in the southern part of the Slovak Federal Republic. 
After the partition, these problems disappeared for the Czech 
Republic. Today, as a result of the partition, the Czech 
Republic does not have to deal with an internal security 
threat. It is primarily homogenous and does not have large 
ethnic minorities. 20 Ninety-four percent of the population is 
Czech. (New Europe, 1996) 
4. Summary of Second Image Factors 
The Czech government has a leadership that is confident 
in its own political position and the maintenance of the state 
structure. It has good state-society relations, primarily due 
its market reforms and the corresponding improvements in the 
economy. The hypothesis inferred from domestic political 
theory predicted that a state with a leadership confident in 
its own power and good state-society relations will attempt to 
balance internally prior to externally balancing. This is the 
case in the Czech Republic today. 
We also see the Czech Republic attempting to balance 
externally to gain resources for internal improvements of the 
20While most scholars consider the Czech Republic to be primarily homogenous, it is 
interesting to note that there is a distinct difference between Moravians and Bohemians. 
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domestic economy. As mentioned earlier, it is actively 
seeking joint ventures with foreign firms to acquire both 
foreign capital and technology. This phenomenon is not the 
external extraction of resources predicted by the hypothesis 
on the internal security threat, which stated that a state 
would try to balance externally to acquire resources 
unavailable indigenously for combating an internal threat. 
That hypothesis does not apply to this case, because there is 
no significant internal security threat to the Czech Republic. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, both systemic and domestic political theories 
can help explain Czech actions in, and overall responses to, 
the current security situation in Central Europe. This is in 
line with the study's position that decision makers must use 
a combination of the theories in both levels of analysis to 
determine state strategies and actions. Although the inferred 
hypotheses from both levels of analysis can help predict and 
explain Czech positions and actions, especially internal 
actions, the advantage in explanatory power has to go to 
"third image," or systemic, theories. 
Balance of power and balance of threat not only serve to 
predict and explain Czech actions, they also do a better job 
at predicting the direction of the balancing actions (i.e., 
toward Western Europe, instead of other Central European 
countries or Russia) . A comparison of two hypotheses, one 
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from each image, will illustrate this point. One of the 
hypotheses we inferred from balance of power theory stated 
that the chance of profit or ideology or technology can entice 
a state to bandwagon with a stronger state. A similar, yet 
competing, hypothesis from the "second image" stated that a 
state may externally balance to gain resources for internal 
improv~ments of the domestic economy. 
The "second image" hypothesis can only predict that the 
Czech Republic may externally balance to gain resources, such 
as energy sources or technology. It cannot predict whether 
that balancing will be with the West or Russia. Both have 
resources that could help the Czechs. Although it is not 
producing much, Russia still has huge deposits of natural 
resources. 
The first hypothesis can predict both the external 
balancing of the Czech Republic and the direction. It 
predicts that the Czechs will be enticed by long term profit 
and the chance to obtain improved technologies. These 
opportunities can only be currently gained from the West. 
According to the Czech Prime Minister, "Our road to Europe 
goes through Germany." (Sauerwein, 1994) This hypothesis, 
therefore, does a better job of explaining why the Czechs are 
more willing to bandwagon with a stronger state than balance 
with the weaker against the stronger. 
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V. THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUNGARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If the Czech Republic was the "luckiest" state after the 
revolutions of 1989, then Hungary was probably the 
"unluckiest" state. The breakup of the former Soviet Union 
and the former Yugoslavia have significantly complicated 
Hungarian national security policies. Because of these 
breakups, Hungary now must deal with five new states on its 
borders -- Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
In addition, there are a large number of ethnic Magyars living 
in the states bordering Hungary, which also serves to 
complicate Hungarian foreign policy. 
This chapter will follow the format set out in the 
preceding chapter on the Czech Republic. Its goal is to 
explore Hungarian views on NATO expansion and the security 
environment in Central Europe today. The chapter will use 
different theories of international relations to cover both 
"third image" (systemic) and "second image" (domestic) factors 
affecting the country's national security decisions. At the 
end of the chapter, it attempts to summarize the relative 
explanatory powers of each theory to explain or predict 
Hungarian positions and actions. 
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B. HUNGARIAN POSITION ON NATO 
According to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo 
Kovacs, "Hungary wants full membership in NATO, not some 
partial solution." (Szilagyi, OMRI Analytical Brief, 22 
March, 1996) Support for Hungary's admission to NATO is 
strong throughout the country. All of the major parties 
support Hungary's application for full membership. Hungary is 
actively working to improve its bilateral relations with 
Slovakia and Romania to meet the NATO criterion that states 
resolve border disputes and eliminate or reduce tensions 
caused by ethnic disputes. (Szilagyi, OMRI Analytical Brief, 
22 March, 1996) 
Hungary has also said that it would accept all 
responsibilities of NATO membership, to include the stationing 
of NATO troops and nuclear weapons on its territory. This 
view was stated by the Foreign Ministry Secretary, who said, 
"If a decision is made with the consent of Hungary, then it 
would be natural that in the implementation of that decision, 
Hungary will shoulder the obligations derived from that 
decision [NATO troops and nuclear weapons]." (Csongos, 20 
March, 1996) Hungary is actively supporting NATO's 
Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. It has allowed NATO 
AWACs to fly from its terri tory, provided space for an 
Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), and contributed a 400-man 
engineer unit to IFOR. (Szilagyi, OMRI, 22 March, 1996) 
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C. THIRD IMAGE 
1. Balance of Power 
Prior to 1989, Hungarian national security policy was 
fairly simple. Hungary was deeply embedded in the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization and, with the exception of neutral 
Austria, was surrounded by other members of the Warsaw Pact. 
Because it was not a "front-line" state, Hungary's military 
role was limited. It was a "glorified main supply route, 
support area and reserve base for the Soviet main axis across 
Germany, if and when that axis was to move West." (Gorka, 
1995, p. 26) With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact's military structure on 1 
April, 1991, Hungary had to begin looking at the balance of 
power between itself and its neighbors. Figure 5.1 lists the 
current military balance between Hungary and its neighbors. 
21See Appendix for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Military 
Balance 1994-1995. 
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a. Hungarian Armed Forces 
Since 1989, Hungarian armed forces have gone through 
a 50,000 reduction, to their present strength of 74,500. This 
reorganization has largely corrected some of the systemic 
problems inherited from the Warsaw Pact, namely oversized 
command structures, disproportionate sizes of combat units, 
and a large number of logistics and training units. 
(Sauerwein, 1994) 
The reorganization could not correct, however, the 
material deficiencies of the Hungarian armed forces. Because 
of the presence of 65,000 Soviet troops in the country, 
manning and equipping the Hungarian forces were never high 
priorities. Consequently, most of the equipment in the armed 
forces today is obsolete Soviet equipment. In addition to 
lack of modern equipment, Hungarian forces lack money for 
training, maintenance, and modernization. (Sauerwein, 1994) 
Even if the money were available for modernization, 
the military-industrial complex could not provide the 
necessary goods and services. During the days of the Warsaw 
Pact, Hungary only played a minor role in Pact defense 
production. In 1989, Hungary's defense industry was ~among 
Eastern Europe's smallest and account[ed] for just 1 percent 
of Hungary's total industrial production." (Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 28 October, 1989) For present day Hungary, the 
problem is not just a matter of scale. It is also a matter of 
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type. While it was a member of the Warsaw Pact, the Pact's 
Joint Technical Committee assigned Hungary production of 
military communication and electronic equipment. The only 
other equipment Hungary attempted to produce was small arms, 
scout cars, and a few armored personnel carriers. They 
produced no heavy weapon systems. (USAREUR, 1996) 
Using this brief description of the conditions of 
the Hungarian armed forces and its military-industrial 
complex, it is possible to compare the relative power of 
Hungary with its neighbors. Of the states that border 
Hungary, four possess larger armed forces. These states are 
Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine. Of the four, Hungary 
does not have serious potential security problems with Croatia 
or Ukraine. 
b. Romanian Armed Forces 
The Romanian armed forces are more than three times 
as large as the Hungarian armed forces. Along with the 
Romanian military-industrial complex, they have weathered the 
breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the economic hardships of 
Central Europe well. Capability assessments of the armed 
forces indicate that they "would be able, with adequate 
warning, to counter successfully a determined attack on 
national territory." (Jane's Sentinel, 1994) In addition, 
they are "probably also capable of undertaking successful 
large-scale incursions into the territory of Romania's 
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neighbors, if the political will to do so existed." (Jane's 
Sentinel, 1994) 
The Romanian government separated the military-
industrial complex from the centralized planning apparatus of 
the Warsaw Pact after the 1968 Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Today, according to the minister of national 
defense production, the country possesses a "pretty effective 
defence industry," and they are attempting to improve it with 
the acquisition of Western technology. The military-
industrial complex provides up to 85 percent of the state's 
defense needs. (Beaver, 1994) 
c. Ukrainian Armed Forces 
The Ukrainian armed forces dwarf the Hungarian armed 
forces. Ukraine, in its position as the most western republic 
of the former Soviet Union, had first rate units from all 
services of the Soviet armed forces. In total, Ukraine 
nationalized 30 percent of the equipment and 750,000 personnel 
of the former Soviet army that was west of the Urals. The 
equipment and personnel were first echelon forces, and they 
included tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. While 
Ukraine agreed to give all these weapons back to the Russian 
Federation for destruction, it still possesses large numbers 
of conventionally armed ballistic missiles capable of striking 
Hungary. (Jane's Sentinel, 1994) 
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Although severely constrained by the current 
economic situation, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex 
has the infrastructure to modernize Ukrainian forces. The 
military-industrial complex is a large one, having been 
nationalized by the Ukrainian government also. A modest 
modernization plan is underway now to keep the military-
industrial complex in operation. (Jane's Sentinel, 1994) Even 
without it, the Ukrainian armed forces possess, and will 
continue to possess, significantly more equipment than 
Hungary, as well as the industrial and knowledge base required 
to modernize that equipment in the future. 
d. Croatian Armed Forces 
Croatian forces are also larger than those of the 
Hungarian armed forces. As the figure shows, however, this 
advantage is significant only in the number of personnel. In 
terms of readiness and training, Croatian armed forces 
currently do not have the ability to conduct "large scale 
offensive operations against established neighbouring states." 
(Jane's Sentinel, 1994) Of course, the performance of the 
Croatian Armed Forces in the Krajina prior to the signing of 
the Dayton Accords may indicate that this assessment needs 
updating. Even with these improvements, however, Croatia 
lacks a well-developed military-industrial complex. (Jane's 
Sentinel, 1994) Because of this, Croatia does not have the 
ability to change internally the balance of power. 
93 
e. Serbian Armed Forces 
Serbia is the last neighbor of Hungary that has 
significant military forces. The Serbian armed forces 
performed poorly in the initial stages of the breakup of the 
former Yugoslavia. However, they have undergone a 
reorganization and downsizing since then. The net result is 
a more Serb-dominated and staffed structure. This should 
improve the capabilities of the armed forces. The armed 
forces are capable of defending Serbia. In terms of 
equipment, Serbia possesses sufficient material for defensive 
purposes, but will have serious problems replacing or 
modernizing the equipment, primarily due to the U.N. arms 
embargo during the Bosnian conflict and the loss of the 
infrastructure that was distributed throughout the former 
Yugoslavia. (Jane's Sentinel, 1994) 
2. Balance of Threat 
a. Aggregate Power 
Numerically, the preceding discussion identified 
four states that had larger forces than Hungary. These states 
were Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine. Of these four 
states, Croatia and Serbia do not currently possess equipment, 
readiness, or the military-industrial capability to seriously 
threaten Hungary. In other words, Hungary has greater 
aggregate power than both of these states. This is not the 
case with Romania or Ukraine. Romania has large and well-
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equipped armed forces, and a significant military-industrial 
complex that can provide for 85 percent of the country's 
defense needs. Ukraine's armed forces dwarf those of Hungary. 
In addition, Ukraine possesses large stockpiles of equipment 
and weapons systems. Even if its military-industrial complex 
cannot currently provide for modernization, because of fiscal 
constraints, Ukraine has a lot of spares. Based on this 
discussion, it is obvious that Romania and Ukraine have 
greater aggregate power than Hungary. 
b. Geographic Proximity 
Both Romania and Ukraine share commqn borders with 
Hungary. The border between Hungary and Romania is the 
longest -- approximately 450 kilometers in length. The border 
with Ukraine is much shorter -- approximately 100 kilometers. 
Because the Austro-Hungarian empire extended well-beyond the 
country's current day borders prior to World War I, both 
Romania and Ukraine have areas that belonged to Hungary. 
These areas have large Magyar populations. It is because of 
these ethnic Magyars that geographic proximity plays such an 
important role in defining the threats to Hungary. 
c. Transparency of the Threat 
The question is, given that Romania and Ukraine 
possess greater aggregate power, are there indicators that 
either of them could be a long term threat to Hungary? As 
stated in the theory chapter, for purposes of this study, 
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transparency of threat is determined by the ability of a state 
to see two things in potentially threatening states. The 
first is the possession of offensive capabilities. The second 
is indicators of aggressiveness of intentions. Today, both 
Romania and Ukraine possess the requisite capabilities. 
Neither one possesses aggressiveness of intentions. However, 
it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where Romania could 
develop those intentions. 
As stated earlier, both Romania and Ukraine possess 
equipment that gives them the capability to conduct offensive 
operations against Hungary. Ukraine possesses the most modern 
equipment that was in the Soviet armed forces at the time of 
the breakup. Romania has similar equipment and is actively 
seeking new technology that will give it the ability to 
improve these offensive capabilities. 
Although Ukraine possesses the offensive 
capabilities, it does not evince aggressive intentions toward 
Hungary. By all indications, relations between Ukraine and 
Hungary are cordial and cooperative. The countries have 
signed a multitude of bilateral agreements since 1991, 
including a declaration that guarantees minority rights. This 
agreement allays fears of the Hungarian government over 
treatment of ethnic Magyars in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a 
Ukrainian region once belonging to Hungary. The two states 
also have an agreement on military cooperation that calls for 
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regular consultations and visits. (Larrabee, 1993) Of course, 
all of this does not guarantee Ukrainian stability. Ukraine 
does have the potential to be a long term threat to Hungary if 
political conditions in Ukraine allow Moscow to reassert 
Russian influence. 
Hungary's relations with Romania are not so cordial. 
There is a significant strain between the two countries over 
the roughly two million Magyars that live in Translyvania. 
Romanian politicians do not want to grant these minorities 
collective rights, because they fear it will threaten Romanian 
territorial integrity. For their part, Hungarian officials 
regard ~the situation of the ethnic Hungarians living abroad 
as an essential component of relations with its neighbors." 
(Reisch, 1994, p. 4 6) These conditions are further 
exacerbated by the fact that the ultranationalist forces in 
Romania have significant power. (Reisch, 1994) These forces 
could inflame anti-Magyar feelings which could lead to 
official aggressiveness of intentions against Hungary. 
In addition to Romania, Russia is also a provocative 
potential threat, even though it is not an adjacent neighbor. 
Russia is historically one of the most serious threats to the 
region. (Or.me, 1991) Today's threat to Hungary from Russia is 
not necessarily a direct one. Instead, similarly to the case 
of the Czech Republic, instability in Russia threatens Hungary 
with cross border problems such as possible refugee flows and 
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organized crime. However, there is a possibility that Russia 
could directly impact Hungarian sovereignty. Either increased 
Russian nationalism and neoimperialistic policies or Russian 
reactions to NATO enlargement could lead Russia to increase 
pressures on Ukraine. If Russia were able to reexert 
influence in Ukraine as it has in Belarus, it could become the 
most dangerous threat to Hungary. 
3 . Sununary of Third Image Factors 
a. Balance of Power 
Balance of power theory by itself does not 
necessarily do a good job of explaining or predicting 
Hungarian positions and actions in today's Central European 
security environment. Of our inferred hypotheses, two are 
confirmed, one is refuted, and one is neither confirmed nor 
refuted. 
Although it has been painful, Hungary has attempted 
first to balance internally against outside threats. Since 
before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary has been 
reducing, streamlining, and reorganizing its forces. Today, 
although faced with severe fiscal constraints, Hungary is 
attempting to modernize its forces. It has had to prioritize 
its outlays. (USAREUR, 1996) All of these efforts are in line 
with the hypothesis that a state will attempt to balance 
internally before it balances externally. 
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The second hypothesis that is confirmed is the 
hypothesis on bandwagoning for profit. Hungary's stated goals 
are to be admitted into Western European structures. Yet, 
Hungarian officials are the first to admit that the country 
faces no direct and immediate threat. In contradiction to the 
third hypothesis, Hungary is not attempting to bandwagon with 
the stronger coalition because it fears that a stronger power 
will destroy it. Instead, it wants to bandwagon with the West 
because of the chance of receiving profit. 
Finally, Hungary's efforts to join NATO refute the 
hypothesis that states prefer to join the weaker of two 
coalitions to offset the threatening power of a stronger state 
or coalition. NATO is the preponderant power in the area. At 
the level of Central Europe overall, this hypothesis suggests 
that we should see Hungary attempting to balance with Russia, 
Ukraine, Romania, or some combination, to offset NATO's power. 
At the regional level, we could reasonably expect to see 
Hungary and Romania balancing against Ukraine, or Hungary and 
Croatia and Serbia balancing against Romania. That is not. 
happening. Balance of threat theory can help explain why. 
b. Balance of Threat 
Romania and Ukraine are the only geographically 
proximate states that have greater aggregate power than 
Hungary and possess offensive capabilities. Because they are 
nearby, these states pose a greater threat than others, 
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particularly Russia. While Hungary knows that each of these 
states possesses offensive capabilities, it does not think 
either one has aggressive intentions. However, the presence 
of anti-Magyar sentiments and ultranationalist forces in 
Romania could lead to aggressive intentions in the future. 
The appropriate reaction would be for Hungary to balance 
against that future threat. Admission to NATO would serve 
that purpose for the Hungarians. It would also serve as a 
hedge against any future threats caused by Russian influences 
in Ukraine. 
C. SECOND IMAGE 
1. Political Constraints 
Although there is little political instability in 
Hungary, it is not as stable as the Czech Republic. And, 
there are signs that problems could arise in the long term. 
The ruling coalition is led by the successor to the Communist 
Party -- the Hungarian Socialist Party. Along with its 
coalition partner, it controls 279 out of 386 seats in the 
National Assembly. 
ability to pass 
This advantage gives the government the 
whatever legislation it wants. The 
quantitative advantage may increase in the future, as 
opposition parties are financially strapped and the coalition 
is cutting state support for political parties. Since the 
ruling parties have considerable business interests, this 
could widen the gap in their favor (Freedom House, 1995) 
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The ruling coalition's large margin of victory in the 
elections of 1994 shows that the public supported the 
government. However, popularity and support have diminished 
because of economic hardships caused by the austerity program 
which the government instituted. This program has been very 
unpopular. (Szilagyi, Transition, 22 March, 1996) It has 
also shown divisions within the ruling coalition. If the 
economic situation gets worse, internal tensions within the 
ruling coalition could limit its ability to continue the 
reforms. (USAREUR, 1996) 
2. Economic Constraints 
Hungary is currently suffering from a number of economic 
ailments. These include reduced government spending, high 
inflation, high unemployment, a large foreign debt, and budget 
and trade deficits. (USAREUR, 1996) These difficulties limit 
Hungary's ability to spend the money necessary to balance 
internally against any threats. 
In addition to these problems, Hungary has the 
aforementioned problem of a small military-industrial complex 
that has no heavy weapon system production capabilities. This 
forces Hungary to remain dependent on external sources to 
equip and modernize its forces. Due to the fact of Hungary's 
membership in the Warsaw Pact, the majority of this equipment 
is Soviet. This means, lacking the capital to invest in 
Western systems, Hungary must rely on its former suppliers for 
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future modernization. These suppliers include Russia, 
Ukraine, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland. While it is doubtful 
whether Slovakia or Romania would sell military hardware to 
Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland probably would. This 
decreases Hungarian dependence on Russia, and it decreases the 
leverage Russia could exert on Hungary. 
3. Internal Security Threat 
There is no significant internal security threat to 
Hungary. The population of Hungary is primarily homogenous. 
Ethnic Magyars represent approximately 96 percent of the 
population. Other ethnic groups represented include Romanies 
(Gypsies), Slovaks, Germans, and Romanians. (Freedom House, 
1995) 
4. Summary of Second Image Factors 
The Hungarian coalition government is currently in a 
position where it has a large majority in the National 
Assembly. Due to new legislation reducing state financial 
support for political parties, and the ruling coalition's 
large business interests, the coalition should be able to 
increase its share of seats in the National Assembly. Their 
actions, to date, in the national security realm have been 
consistent with our inferred hypothesis from domestic 
political theory that a leadership confident in its own power 
would attempt to balance internally prior to externally. 
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In a situation similar to the case of the Czech Republic, 
some of their internal balancing actions have been 
counterintuitive to conventional thinking on balancing, such 
as reorganization and reductions of the armed forces. These 
actions may not quantitatively help the state, but they 
qualitatively affect the balance. In addition, the Hungarian 
leadership has not had carte blanche to conduct internal 
balancing. For example, economic factors have inhibited full 
implementation of modernization, forcing the government to 
prioritize these efforts. (USAREUR, 1996) 
Hungarian actions in the face of these constraints 
confirm the inferred hypotheses on economic constraints. 
These hypotheses stated: 1) a state may externally balance to 
gain resources for internal improvements of the domestic 
economy; and, 2) a state that lacks the resources to balance 
internally against a threat will attempt to balance externally 
to meet the threat. Both of these hypotheses predict and 
explain Hungarian efforts to join NATO. Admittance into 
Western European structures will provide needed capital for 
the Hungarian economy. In addition, Hungary can reasonably 
expect its military to benefit from the receipt of technology 
and excess NATO equipment, primarily U.S. equipment under the 
Foreign Military Sales or Excess Defense Articles programs, in 
the event of admission. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
As in the case study of the Czech Republic, both systemic 
and domestic political theories can help explain and predict 
Hungarian overall responses to today's security situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Justification for Hungarian 
actions tends to confirm hypotheses from both levels of 
analysis. In the Hungarian case, however, there is not a 
disparity in the relative explanatory power of the theories. 
Both theories do an equally good job of predicting and 
explaining Hungarian actions. The rise in the standing of 
domestic political theory can be attributed to the strength 
and validity of the hypotheses on economic constraints. The 
Hungarian economy is much worse shape than the Czech economy. 
This causes the Hungarians to seek external extraction of 
resources, which is predicted by the hypotheses. 
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VI . THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLAND 
The geography has not changed -- the Germans are still on one 
side, Russia is on the other. 
Professor Bronislav Geremek 
Chairman, Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs 
(Gizinski, 1994) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores Polish views on NATO enlargement 
and the current security environment in Central Europe. Prior 
to 1989, Poland's security environment was stable. It was 
bordered by other members of the Warsaw Pact on all sides --
East Germany on its western border, Czechoslovakia to the 
south, and the Soviet Union to the northeast and east. Today, 
Poland faces a different geopolitical situation -- to the west 
is a reunified Germany, to the south are the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, and to the east is a slew of newly independent 
states that includes the Russian Federation (the Kaliningrad 
Oblast borders Poland), Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. 
B. POLISH POSITION ON NATO 
According to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of 
Poland, Poland considers admission to NATO as "one of the 
major objectives of Polish foreign policy." (Cimoszewicz, 
1996, p. 3) Axel Krohn, a former researcher at the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, believes there are 
three reasons for Polish interest in joining NATO. The first, 
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as stated by the former Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski, is 
Poland's desire to gain the U.S. nuclear security guarantee to 
hedge against resurgence of an expansionist Russia. The 
second is the hope that admission to NATO will speed Poland's 
entrance into the European Union. The third is to preclude 
the development of a strong German sphere of influence in 
Central Europe. (Krohn, 1995, pp. 596-597) 
C. THIRD IMAGE 
Poland today is completely surrounded by different 
states than it was prior to 1991. The dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact led to "new insecurities and deficiencies after 
the integrated military and command structures had fallen 
apart.H Today, while the likelihood of a large-scale attack 
on Poland has decreased, the likelihood of local and regional 
conflicts throughout Europe, such as the fighting in the 
former Yugoslavia, has increa·sed. (Sauerwein, 1994) The 
likelihood of conflicts forces Poland to look at the balance 
between itself and its neighbors and likely adversaries. 
1. Balance of Power 
Today, seven states border Poland. Figure 6.1 lists the 
current military balance between Poland and its neighbors. 22 
The figure also lists the numbers of U.S. and Russian forces. 
22Jt is interesting to note that Poland is the only one of the Central European states in this 
study that has a navy. The balance of naval forces between Poland and Russia is discussed later. 
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Flgure 6.1 The Mllltary Balance23 for Poland 
Of the states that border Poland, it has potential 
problems with five -- Belarus, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, and 
Ukraine. (Larrabee, 1993) Of the five, Lithuania, assuming 
it remains independent of Russia, can be discounted as a 
potential threat. Its armed forces are just too small. 
However, Poland cannot discount the others as it surveys the 
balance of power in the region. Prior to examining the 
relative balance of power between Poland and its neighbors, it 
is necessary to explore the conditions and status of the 
Polish armed forces and the indigenous military-industrial 
complex. 24 
a. Polish Armed Forces 
Since 1988, Polish forces have undergone extreme 
changes in size, structure, and deployment. In 1988, there 
were 413,000 personnel in the armed forces. Today, that 
figure is 283,600, which is still above the 234,000 level 
23See Appendix A for a tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The Militarv 
Balance 1994-1995. 
24Both will contribute to the country's ability to balance internally against a threat. 
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mandated by the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE). Structurally, the army has gone from 13 
divisions in 1988 to 10 divisions and two brigades today. 
This structure will be further reduced to a force of six 
mechanized infantry divisions, six mechanized infantry 
brigades, and seven cadre divisions. Finally, Polish armed 
forces have undergone a large redeployment from a primarily 
western-oriented defense pattern to a country-wide deployment. 
(Sauerwein, 1994) 
The condition of the armed forces is dismal. The 
army lacks modern weapons, particularly anti tank systems, 
modern main battle tanks, communication systems, combat 
helicopters, and radar systems. Current equipment is Soviet 
equipment that is two to three generations behind western 
equipment. (Jakucki, 1994) Half of the air force's combat 
aircraft (220/438) will reach the end of their effective 
service life in the next two to three years. There is hardly 
any money available for modernization. The defense budget has 
shrunk 60 percent in the last seven years (2.4 percent of GDP 
for 1996). (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 4, 1995) 
Unlike the Czech Republic and Hungary, however, 
Poland does have the necessary military-industrial base 
infrastructure to correct most of these problems, if they can 
get the necessary foreign capital and technology. Poland's 
military-industrial role in the Warsaw Pact production scheme 
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gave it a "balanced defence sector that produces jet and 
turboprop trainers, transport aircraft, helicopters, tanks, 
armoured vehicles, rocket artillery, radars, small arms, 
frigates, landing craft, and minesweepers." (Sauerwein, 1994) 
The Polish defense industry, like all Central European arms 
manufacturers, has gone through reductions and conversions 
since 1989. Currently, Poland has a total of 28 defense 
enterprises and 11 repair facilities, giving it 19 percent of 
its 1988 production capacity. (Sauerwein, 1994) 
Based on this brief discussion of the conditions of 
the Polish armed forces and its military-industrial complex, 
it is possible to survey the relative power of Poland's 
neighbors. Of the states that border Poland, three possess 
larger forces than Poland. These are Germany, Ukraine, and 
the combination of Belarus and Russia. Poland has potential 
security problems with all of them. 
b. Belarus/Russian Azmed Forces 
Since 1993, it has become increasingly clear that 
Russia does directly border on Poland through Belarus. Within 
the former Soviet Union, Belarus was the most Russified of the 
Soviet republics, outside of the Russian Federation. Today, 
the old Soviet-era flag is the national flag of Belarus. 
(Defense and Foreign Affairs, 1995). The economy of Belarus 
is inextricably linked to the Russian economy, particularly in 
the energy sector, where Belarus is heavily dependent on 
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Russian oil and gas supplies. There is a "virtual 
integration" of the two economies, the Belarusian Central Bank 
has been dissolved, and the Russian rouble is the official 
currency of Belarus. (Jane's Sentinel, 1994) 
Russia and Belarus have continued to increase 
military and security cooperation. In December, 1995, the 
countries agreed to "strengthen ties between the military-
industrial enterprises of the two states, to expand joint use 
of Belarusian military infrastructure, particularly in air 
defense, and to coordinate regional planning efforts." 
(Garnett, 1996, p. 70) Finally, Russian border guards and 
customs agents currently man the Poland-Belarus border. 
(Kuzio, 1995) 
Therefore, the danger to Poland from Belarus does 
not come from the Belarusian armed forces by themselves. 
These forces are small and in a state of flux. The armed 
forces have a declared self-defense role. Currently, Belarus 
has five separate mechanized infantry brigades in its force 
structure. It possesses significantly more equipment than it 
can possibly man, including approximately one hundred short-
range ballistic missiles (SS-lC Scud B and SS-21). (The 
Military Balance, 1994) The problem is the integrative trend 
seen between Belarus and Russia. 
It is not infeasible that, under the auspices of 
integration of forces of the Commonwealth of Independent 
110 
States (CIS), Russia could station forces in Belarus, opposite 
Poland. In the two military districts closest to Belarus 
(Leningrad and Moscow), Russia has approximately 200,000 
troops. These forces include three armies, with a combined 
total of six motorized rifle divisions (MRD) , five tank 
divisions (TO), and three airborne divisions (ABO). The total 
numbers for major combat systems include 3,300 main battle 
tanks (MBT), 4, 000 armored combat vehicles (ACV), 2, 600 
artillery pieces, 90 short range ballistic missiles, and 
hundreds of combat aircraft and helicopters. 
Balance, 1994) 
(The Military 
In addition to these forces, Russia has the highly 
militarized Kaliningrad Oblast, which borders Poland on the 
north. This area has three divisions and two separate 
brigades stationed in it, with roughly 1,100 MBTs, 1,300 ACVs, 
600 pieces of artillery, and 40 short-range ballistic 
missiles. (The Military Balance, 1994) While it is true that 
Kaliningrad is the home of the Russian Baltic Fleet, this 
force level seems excessive for defensive purposes only. 
The Russian Baltic Fleet, of course, also poses a 
threat to Poland and Polish Armed Forces. According to Boris 
Makeev, a former Captain 1st Rank in the Soviet Navy and 
Leading Scientific Researcher of the Department of Disarmament 
Problems of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow, "The Northern and Baltic regions 
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are the most important from the point of view of Russia's 
national security and the threat from maritime axes since they 
are under the control of NATO." (Makeev, 1995, p. 88) Current 
Russian naval forces in the Baltic Fleet include the 
following: 10 diesel submarines, 32 major surface combatants 
(3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 26 Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 
ships, 20 assault ships, 200 naval aircraft, 35 naval 
helicopters, a naval infantry brigade, and a coastal defense 
SSM regiment. (Makeev, 1995, p. 90, and The Military Balance, 
1994, p. 116) These forces dwarf Poland's 3 submarines, 2 
principal surface combatants, and 32 assorted patrol and 
coastal combatants. (The Military Balance, 1994, p. 97) 
In summary, Belarus, by itself, does not possess 
more power than Poland. However, the combination of Belarus 
with Russia, leading to the basing of Russian forces in 
Belarus, and Russian forces stationed in Kaliningrad, far 
surpasses the capabilities of the Polish armed forces. While 
the war in Chechnya has called into doubt the capabilities of 
the Russian armed forces, that civil war should not be allowed 
to "put the nail in the coffin" of their capabilities. After 
all, the Red Army defeated Hitler's elite forces only a little 
while after the Russians had been embarrassed during the 1939-
1940 Winter War with Finland. 
It would be incorrect to assume that Russia's best 
fighting formations are operating in Chechnya; the area just 
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is not that important to Russia's overall national security. 
The best forces seem to be in and around Moscow. For example, 
there are three "elite" divisions in the Moscow area. 
(Shlapentokh, 1995) The bottom line is that, although the 
capabilities of the Russian armed forces may have seriously 
declined, they cannot be ignored, especially by Poland. 
c. German Armed Forces 
German armed forces possess both qualitative and 
quantitative advantages over the Polish armed forces. 
Qualitatively, Germany has more modern equipment, compared to 
the outdated Soviet equipment of the Polish armed forces. It 
is particularly effective in production of armored and tracked 
vehicles. The German main battle tank, the Leopard 2, is 
considered to be "Europe's de facto tank standard" and is used 
by five European countries. In addition to its own military-
industrial complex, Germany could also call on those of the 
other major Western European countries, assuming that whatever 
operations it took were under the auspices of NATO. These 
countries have numerous joint projects, such as the EF2000 
combat aircraft and the Eurocopter Tiger attack helicopter. 
(Jane's Defence Weekly, March 20, 1996) 
Quantitatively, Figure 6.1 shows Germany's numerical 
superiority over Poland. The numbers are, of course, 
deceiving. Although Poland has large amounts of equipment, it 
has already been pointed out that this equipment is outdated, 
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and Poland has a hard time maintaining it and replacing it. 
Therefore, the military balance is even more in the Germans' 
favor than the figure indicates. The only area where Poland 
possesses an advantage over Germany is in the area of short-
range ballistic missiles. This advantage, however, would be 
mitigated by three factors: 1) German possession of precision 
guided munitions; 2) NATO's nuclear and tactical ballistic 
missile umbrella; and, 3) Germany's possession of 154 U.S. 
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which can accept the 
Advanced Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) . 
Balance, 1994) 
d. Ukrainian Ar.med Forces 
(The Military 
Ukrainian forces were discussed in depth in the last 
chapter on Hungary. Ukrainian forces are more than twice the 
size of Poland's armed forces. The Ukrainian armed forces 
possess the most modern equipment that the Soviet armed forces 
had at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, including 
a large number of short-range ballistic missiles and modern 
tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and combat 
aircraft. Although it is constrained by severe economic 
problems, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, which 
also "inherited" significant capabilities, has the potential 
to modernize the Ukrainian force. Therefore, for the 
foreseeable future, Ukraine will continue to possess larger 
forces, more modern equipment, and a greater industrial 
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capacity to modernize that equipment than Poland. 
2. Balance of Threat 
a. Aggregate Power 
Numerically, the preceding discussion identified two 
main states that had larger forces than Poland. These states 
were Germany and Russia. Both of these states have greater 
aggregate power than Poland. Germany possesses technological 
and industrial capabilities that increase its power relative 
to that of Poland. Russia, on the other hand, has severe 
handicaps in all areas of its armed forces and economy that 
actually lessen the balance of power gap between itself and 
Poland. Nevertheless, both countries could threaten Polish 
national security, if the political will were present. 
b. Geographic Proximity 
As the quotation at the beginning of the chapter 
points out, Poland, although surrounded by a number of new 
states, has returned to its traditional geographic situation. 
Germany is on one side, and Russia is on the other. Germany 
and Russia have roughly equivalent length borders with 
Poland. 25 Germany, of course, is the closer threat 
geographically. Germany could bring the bulk of its forces to 
bear much more rapidly than Russia. The closest Russian 
forces to Poland (38,000 troops) are in Kaliningrad. The rest 
25 The border between Germany and Poland is approximately 460 kilometers, and the 
border between Kaliningrad and Poland is approximately 440 kilometers. 
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would have to move from Russia proper through Belarus. This 
would not be difficult, given the incredibly close relations 
between Belarus and Russia. Therefore, the Poles cannot afford 
to assume that the Russia threat is diminished just because 
the ~technically" sovereign state of Belarus is in between 
Poland and Russia. 
c. Transparency of the Threat 
Germany, however, is not a threat to Poland, at 
least not militarily. While Germany does possess significant 
capabilities that could be used offensively against Poland, it 
does not possess aggressiveness of intentions toward Poland. 
As stated in the theory chapter, transparency of threat is 
determined by the ability of a state to see two things in 
potentially threatening states. These two i terns are: 1) 
possession of offensive capabilities; and, 2) indicators of 
aggressiveness of intentions. 
Germany is not a threat to Poland because it does 
not possess aggressive intentions. The Czech case brought out 
the point that Germany is strongly integrated into the Euro-
Atlantic framework and has incorporated the lessons of the 
past into its national conscience. In addition, Germany and 
Poland have undergone a post-Soviet rapprochement since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Germany is now one of 
Central Europe's strongest advocates, as well as Poland's 
leading trade partner. It has provided vast amounts of aid 
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to this area. (Pond, 1996) German intentions are to stabilize 
the region to the East. As German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
said, " ... the most effective way of serving stability .. 
. is to support the fledgling democracies of Central Eastern, 
and Southeastern Europe." (Kohl, 1994, pp. vi) 
Russia, like Germany, possesses capabilities that it 
could use against Poland in an offensive manner. Unlike 
Germany, however, it is not as easy, in the eyes of the Poles, 
to posit that Russia has no aggressive intentions. Recent 
Russian attempts to reassert influence in the Near Abroad and 
to reintegrate the newly independent states into the CIS have 
been interpreted as a return of neoimperialism in Russia. 
(Milewski, 1994) This neoimperialist policy can be construed 
by Poles as aggressiveness of intentions on the part of 
Russia. According the Polish Secretary of National Defense, 
No doubt the biggest visible danger is 
Russia's return to the imperial policy first 
pursued by the Czars and then by the Soviet Union. 
The idea of so-called nearest foreign terri tory 
that we hear from the lips of leading Russian 
politicians, references to alleged "historic 
Russian spheres of influence" which include Poland; 
the loud objections to the possibility of Poland 
joining NATO, and remarks about alleged duty to 
protect all Russian-speaking peoples in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union -- all this we 
consider an expression of imperial policy, contrary 
to the standards of CSCE and hostile to Poland. 
Right now, the greatest threat is that Russia might 
interpret an absence of reaction to such rhetoric 
as silent approval thereof, or even as an 
encouragement to proceed from words to deeds. 
(Milewski, 1994) 
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3 . Summary of Third Image Factors 
a. Balance o£ Power 
Balance of power theory can again help us explain or 
predict Poland's positions on NATO expansion. Our inferred 
hypotheses from balance of power theory hold up for the most 
part. 
The first hypothesis says that a state will attempt 
to balance internally before externally. We saw that this was 
the case with Poland. The Poles have made major changes to 
the size, structure, and deployment of their armed forces. 
Instead of the majority of their forces facing toward the 
West, they now have them more evenly spread out around the 
country, in recognition of the threat from the East. In 
addition, they have downsized their military-industrial 
complex to make it more streamlined. 
At the same time, Polish authorities and defense 
industries have sought out Western firms and governments in an 
attempt to gain technology and foreign investment in the 
Polish military-industrial complex. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 
November 11, 1995) This will give Poland the ability to 
modernize its forces, which will allow it to balance 
internally against threats. This behavior is in line with our 
inferred hypothesis that says a state will bandwagon with a 
stronger state, or coalition (NATO and the West, in this 
case), for the chance of profit or receiving new technology. 
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The case can neither confirm nor refute our 
hypothesis on traditional defensive bandwagoning. This 
hypothesis said that a state will bandwagon with a stronger 
state if it fears the stronger state can destroy it and there 
is no other recourse left but to bandwagon. Poland is in no 
immediate danger of destruction. It wants to bandwagon with 
the West for profit, not because of fear of its own 
destruction by the West. 
Our hypothesis on traditional balancing is refuted 
by the case of Poland. The hypothesis says that a state will 
balance by joining the weaker of two coalitions to offset the 
power of a stronger state or coalition. Looking at the 
balance of power situation in Central Europe today, this 
hypothesis would predict that Poland would align with some of 
the newly independent states, primarily Russia, to balance 
against the overwhelming power of NATO. This is not the case, 
and balance of threat theory can help explain why. 
b. Balance o£ filrea t 
Germany and Russia are the two geographically 
proximate states that have greater aggregate power than Poland 
and also possess the offensive capabilities to threaten 
Poland. Yet, Poland does not consider Germany a military 
threat, but it does think that Russia could be a threat. Our 
inferred hypothesis on transparency of the threat can explain 
this stance. This hypothesis said that a state had to see 
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both offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions 
before it would perceive a threat. While Germany possesses 
the offensive capabilities, it is not aggressive toward 
Poland. 
Russia, on the other hand, has the offensive 
capabilities and has conducted itself in such a manner that 
Poland perceives it to be possibly aggressive. Therefore, in 
line with our inferred hypothesis that said a state would 
balance against a threatening state that had greater power, 
was geographically proximate, and evinced a transparent 
threat, Poland is attempting to balance against the threat of 
Russia by integrating into Western security structures. 
D . SECOND :IMAGE 
1. Political Constraints 
Poland is a presidential-parliamentary democracy. A 
coalition made up of two parties descended from the Communist 
Party -- the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish 
Peasant Party (PSL) -- currently controls the government. In 
coalition, these parties control 66 percent of the seats in 
Parliament, or Sejm, and 73 percent of the seats in the 
Senate. (Freedom House, 1995) This gives them sufficient 
control of the legislature to pass whatever legislation they 
desire. 
It is likely that these parties will win again in 1997 
for several reasons. First, although they only gained 36 
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percent of the popular vote in the 1993 elections (Freedom 
House, 1995), the large number of political parties present 
will make it difficult for challengers to gain more than the 
5 percent of the national vote required to be represented in 
the Senate and the Sejm. Second, voter turnout has been 
decreasing, which favors the incumbents. 
Finally, successful stabilization policies and market 
reforms have given Poland one of the "fastest growing 
economies in Europe." (U.S. Department of State, August 1994) 
Based on the ruling coalition's current position and the 
likelihood that it will continue governing Poland after the 
1997 elections, it is safe to say that there are few political 
constraints limiting Poland's ability to balance against an 
enemy, either internally or externally. The major constraints 
that limit the government's ability are economic constraints. 
2. Economic Constraints 
Although Poland does have one of the fastest growing 
economies in Europe, it has serious limitations that hamper 
the country's ability to conduct internal balancing efforts. 
These limitations include: problems in industrial 
privatization, lack of capital to finance reconstruction, 
insufficient funds for research, development, and 
modernization, and the lack of modern technology. 
The majority of industries in the military-defense 
industrial complex are still state-owned. Of 28 enterprises 
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in the defense industry, ten are state-owned, and the state 
still controls majority holdings in the rest. (Sauerwein, 
1994) State control limits the capital that the industry can 
attract, which decreases the research, development, and 
modernization the industry can do. Small defense budgets 
exacerbate this problem. Poland spends 11 percent of its 
defense budget on investment level expenses (R&D and 
procurement of new systems). The NATO average is 30 percent. 
The risk for the Polish armed forces in this situation is 
"technological decline and obsolescence." (Piatkowski, 1996) 
3. Internal Security Threat 
There is no significant internal security threat in 
Poland. It is a primarily homogeneous society. Ethnic 
minorities include Germans, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. 
Figure 6.2 lists the major ethnic divisions of the country. 
0 Polish- 97.6% 
• Ukrainian - .6% 
lfj German - 1.3% 
• Belarussian - .5% 
Figure 6.2 Ethnic Divisions of Poland 
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4. Summary of Second Image Factors 
The Polish coalition government currently controls 
majorities in both the Senate and the Sejm, or Parliament. 
Due to several factors, it is likely that the coalition 
government will remain in power after the 1997 elections. 
This makes the government confident in its power and the 
maintenance of its position. Given this situation, the Polish 
government's actions in the realm of security have been 
consistent with our first inferred hypothesis from domestic 
political theory. The hypothesis said a leadership confident 
in its power would attempt to balance internally first. 
The hypotheses on economic constraints are also borne out 
by the case of Poland. These hypotheses state: 1) a state may 
externally balance to gain resources for internal improvements 
of the domestic economy; and, 2) a state that lacks the 
resources to balance internally to meet a threat will attempt 
to balance externally. Both of these hypotheses predict 
Polish behavior toward NATO. Membership in NATO will provide 
Poland with access to capital and technology that will improve 
the Polish economy. These resources, such as the proposed 
sale of U.S. F-16 fighters to Poland, will help Poland balance 
against its primary external threat -- Russia. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In the case of Poland, both systemic and domestic 
political theories help explain the overall Polish responses 
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to the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe today. 
Both reasonably predict Polish behavior. As we have seen in 
each of the preceding two cases, inferred hypotheses from both 
levels of analysis are borne out. 
In systemic terms, we see a similar pattern in Poland 
that we saw in Hungary. Balance of power theory correctly 
predicts that Poland will attempt to balance internally and it 
will want to bandwagon with the West for the chance to receive 
both profit and technology. However, the hypotheses on 
capitulation bandwagoning and traditional balancing do not 
accurately predict Polish behavior. Poland, although it is 
bandwagoning with the West for profit, is not bandwagoning in 
the traditional sense. 
The hypotheses on domestic political theory are also 
borne out. These hypotheses accurately predict that the 
confident Polish leaders, with their wide majority in 
Parliament, will attempt to balance internally against 
external threats. At the same time, and not at odds with the 
internal balancing efforts, they attempt to balance externally 
for extraction of outside resources to help the domestic 
economy and the internal balancing efforts. 
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VII . THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
There's something to be said for being No. 2. No 
false image of competence to maintain. No 
irrationally inflated ego to burst. No chance of 
slipping from the top. All these make Slovakia a 
worthwhile destination on a sojourn through Central 
Europe. Historically overshadowed by the Czech 
lands in general, and the Golden City of Prague in 
particular, Slovakia nonetheless maintains a 
distinct and fascinating culture to investigate. 
At first hard to figure out, but after some digging 
maybe a little more interesting too. 
Anonymous 
Slovakia Document Store 
World Wide Web 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Slovak Republic is undoubtedly the "younger brother" 
of the countries of Central Europe. It was the last state in 
the region to gain its independence, only becoming a sovereign 
state on 1 January, 1993, with the "Velvet Divorce" of 
Czechoslovakia. Slovakia has had less time to develop 
basically everything -- democratic institutions, a civil 
society, national security orientations, armed forces, etc. 
The short time-span, coupled with a lack of experience in 
governance and nationalistic sentiments, has caused problems. 
According to Andrew Cottey, "Since gaining independence, 
Slovakia has been plagued by political instability and doubts 
about its democratic credentials." (Cottey, 1995) 
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This chapter explores Slovak views on the security 
environment in Central Europe today and NATO enlargement. The 
chapter will use different theories of international relations 
to explore factors affecting the country's national security 
decisions. The end summarizes the relative explanatory powers 
of each theory to explain or predict Slovak positions. 
B. SLOVAK POSITION ON NATO 
The stated official Slovak position is that it wants to 
become a member of NATO. According to the Slovak Foreign 
Minister, Juraj Schenk, NATO is ~the most effective existing 
security organization able to respond effectively to all 
potential security problems in Central and Eastern Europe." 
(Fisher, 1996) He further stressed that Slovakia cannot 
guarantee completely its security without NATO. Official 
government declarations proclaim integration with Europe as 
the republic's most important strategic goal. (Fisher, 1996) 
C. THIRD IMAGE 
Prior to 1993, Slovakia was not a state. it was a 
federal republic in Czechoslovakia, with no requirement for a 
separate foreign policy or armed forces. Today, the 
likelihood of a large-scale attack on Slovakia has decreased. 
None of its neighbors has territorial claims on Slovakia, and 
all of them are suffering numerous problems that would inhibit 
expansionistic moves. However, the likelihood that local and 
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regional conflicts could affect Slovakia has increased. The 
conflict in the former Republic of Yugoslavia is an example. 
Slovakia's neighbor, Hungary, is worried about the ethnic 
Hungarians in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. Tensions 
between Serbia and Hungary over Serbian treatment of this 
minority could lead to a conflict. In any such conflict, 
Slovakia might find it hard to remain uninvolved because of 
its own large ethnic Hungarian minority. Because of dynamics 
like these, Slovakia must look at the balance of power with 
its neighbors and likely adversaries. 
1. Balance of Power 
Prior to the partition of Czechoslovakia (CSFR) in 1993, 
the Slovak Republic, as an integral part of the CSFR, had no 
need for a national security strategy. After the "Velvet 
Divorce," or peaceful partition of the CSFR into the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic, Slovakia had to develop both 
a national security strategy, a corresponding national 
military strategy, and the armed forces to support them. 
In order to develop these strategies and forces, Slovakia 
had to consider the armed forces and capabilities of 
surrounding states and likely threats. The two are not 
synonymous. Surrounding states are not necessarily threats, 
and likely threats are not necessarily the surrounding states. 
Figure 7.1 lists the current military balance for Slovakia. 
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Country }'enonne1 ,· Divisions Sep .. f Tanks: AlFV/ Arty SSMs Aircraft Atk 
.· 
Bde APCS >:; :Helo 
··' 
Cbt Trans .. 
USA- Europe 159,600 2 0 1968 3160 1373 Varies 228 26 153 
Russia 1,714,000 69 19 19,500 35,000 21,300 Varies 2150 650 1000 
Slovakia 47,000 ~ .. 0 912 1()43 808 .. 9 146 16 19 
Austria 51,250 0 5 169 447 230 0 54 31 0 
Czech Rep. 92,900 5 3 1433 1659 1418 14 240 14 36 
Hungary 74,500 0 12 1191 1645 991 0 171 14 39 
Poland 283,600 10 2 2110 2291 1880 40 438 34 70 
Ukraine 517,000 14 3 5430 5216 3638 272 1433 274 307 
Flgure 7.1 The Mllltary Balance26 for the Slovak Republlc 
Five states border the Slovak Republic. All of them have 
larger armed forces than Slovakia. Of the five, it has 
potential problems with three -- the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Ukraine. Prior to examining the relative balance of power 
between Slovakia and its neighbors, it is necessary to explore 
the conditions and status of the Slovak armed forces and the 
indigenous military-industrial complex. 
a. Sl.ovak Armed Forces 
Of all the armed forces of the states in Central 
Europe, Slovakia's armed forces have had the greatest 
challenges since the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. There were no 
Slovak armed forces prior to the partition. Afterwards, the 
Slovaks inherited personnel, equipment, and bases, which they 
had to mesh into armed forces. 
26See Appendix A for a complete tabulation of the military balance in Europe from The 
Military Balance 1994-1995 
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Challenges included forming a Ministry of Defense, 
appointing senior officers, obtaining weapons and equipment 
from the Czechoslovak military, modifying training and 
educational facilities, and building and expanding bases and 
facilities. (Herspring, 1994, p. 680) According to the 
"Slovak Republic Defense Doctrine," the Slovak government 
based decisions on the force structure on two conditions. 
First, although the Slovak government says Slovakia has no 
immediate threats, it reserves the right to defend itself 
against all threats. Second, it bases its defense structure 
on "defensive sufficiency" and the need for a "rational 
deterrent." (FBIS, 18 March, 1994) 
The partition agreement between the Czech and Slovak 
republics divided military forces, both personnel and 
equipment, on a 2:1 basis, in favor of the Czechs. Slovakia's 
share included roughly 55,000 personnel and hardly any 
infrastructure. Slovakia lacked an infrastructure because 
most of the forces of the former Czechoslovakia had been 
stationed in the western portion of the country. Only two 
low-readiness divisions (out of ten total) were stationed in 
the Slovak Republic. (Sauerwein, 1994) 
This lack of an infrastructure has hampered the 
Slovaks' ability to redeploy forces to an all-around defensive 
orientation and has limited their ability to utilize fully 
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some of the equipment it received. For example, Slovakia 
received ten MiG-29s from the former CSFR air force. Since 
then, it has also received five more from Russia as payment 
against Russia's foreign debt to Slovakia. The Slovak Air 
Force cannot use these aircraft, however, because the 
country's airfields are ~incapable of handling these and other 
combat aircraft." (Larrabee, 1993, p. 45) 
Since 1993, Slovak armed forces have been reduced 
from 55,000 to the current total of 47,000. Conditions and 
morale are not good. Although defense spending is on the 
rise, it is down nearly 50 percent in real terms since 1989. 
The budget for 1995 allocated 3. 2 percent of GDP toward 
defense spending, a nearly 20 percent rise over 1994 military 
spending. (USAREUR, 1995) According to the Slovak Minister of 
Defense, most of the money goes to pay for salaries, supplies, 
training, ammunition, international commitments, and resolving 
social issues, such as the lack of adequate housing for 
personnel. These requirements leave ~nothing for 
developmental programs." (FBIS, 29 February, 1996) Because of 
this, the Slovak armed forces must continue to deal with their 
reliance on outdated Soviet equipment and a dependence on 
Russia or other countries for spare parts. 
Poor economic conditions have similarly affected the 
military-industrial complex of Slovakia. During the Cold War, 
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it was home to large amounts of defense manufacturing 
facilities. Slovakia had 60 percent of the arms production 
capability of the former CSFR. The number of tanks produced 
in Slovakia was equivalent to the outputs of Germany and 
France. Times, naturally, have changed. According to the 
Slovak Minister of the Economy, arms production in 1993 was 
3.8 percent of the 1989 level. (Sauerwein, 1994) 
There are signs, however, that the situation of the 
military-industrial complex is improving. Economic indicators 
show Slovakia's economy improving in the military-industrial 
area. In 19 95, there was a 7. 4 percent growth in GDP in 
industrial production. (FBIS, 10 May 1996) The leading 
defense manufacturer, ZTS (Zavody Tazkeho Strojarstva), has 
formed a consortium of defense manufacturers. These 
manufacturers are actively seeking Western partners and 
technology. An example is the T-72 M2 upgrade, which ZTS 
developed in cooperation with a French and a Belgian firm. 
(Sauerwein, 1994) 
The West is not the only direction the Slovaks have 
turned for help and the hope of external extraction of 
resources. Recently, relations between Slovakia and NATO have 
been characterized as "schizophrenic.u 
1996) While military relations are 
(Fisher, 21 March, 
said to be good, 
"political relations have deteriorated, as Slovakia moves 
131 
further away from the democratic standards established by its 
Western partners." (Fisher, 21 March, 1996) In April, the 
U.S. House of Representatives passes a bill designed to 
facilitate the admission of Central European states to NATO. 
The bill included the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but 
omitted Slovakia. (Fisher, 23 April, 1996) According to the 
Benjamin Gilman, the Chairman of the House Committee on 
International Relations, "there is a perception in the U.S. 
Congress ... that the current government in [Slovakia] is more 
concerned about consolidating its power than it is committed 
to democratic reform." (Fisher, 23 April, 1996) Because of 
its domestic political situation and recent European and 
American statements, demarches, and actions, Slovakia 
perceives that it has less of a chance of being admitted to 
NATO than the other Central European states. 
To "hedge its bet" against being isolated, it is 
also seeking improved relations with both Romania and Russia. 
(Larrabee, 1993) With the Russians, the Slovaks signed an 
agreement on military cooperation in 1993. The agreement 
provides for "close security ties and Russian military 
supplies to Slovakia." (Cottey, 1995, 87) When the Russians 
transferred the previously mentioned five MiG-29s, as well as 
spare parts and ammunition, to Slovakia, it was done under the 
auspices of this agreement. 
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b. Ukrainian Azmed Forces 
The status of the Ukrainian armed forces and 
military-industrial complex have been covered in previous 
chapters. Ukrainian forces dwarf Slovak forces by a factor 
of ten. The Ukrainian armed forces possess the most modern 
equipment that the Soviet armed forces had, including short-
range ballistic missiles and modern tanks, armored combat 
vehicles, artillery, and combat aircraft. Constrained by 
severe economic problems, the Ukrainian military-industrial 
complex still has the potential to modernize the Ukrainian 
force. Ukraine will continue to possess larger forces, more 
modern equipment, and a greater industrial capacity. 
c. Czech Azmed Forces 
In terms of personnel and equipment, the Czech armed 
forces are roughly twice as large as those of Slovakia. From 
the beginning, Czech forces were of a higher quality than 
Slovak forces, due to the predominantly western orientation of 
the former Czechoslovak armed forces. In addition to 
advantages in ground forces, Czech aviation assets are better 
than Slovak assets because the Czechs have the infrastructure 
to support them. In terms of production capability, the Czech 
military-industrial complex is much smaller than the Slovak 
complex. The Czech Republic does not have the potential to 
modernize its forces that the Slovak Republic has. 
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d. Hungarian Armed Forces 
The Hungarian armed forces are larger than the 
Slovak armed forces. The Hungarian armed forces are farther 
along in their reorganization, given that they have had more 
time. However, they suffer similar ailments. Most of the 
equipment is obsolete Soviet equipment. They also lack 
funding for adequate training, maintenance, and modernization. 
Hungary is worse off than Slovakia in the area of defense 
production. While Slovakia has a "gross overcapacity" for 
heavy weapon production (Sauerwein, 1994), Hungary produces 
only light weapons and communication equipment. 
2. Balance of Threat 
a. Aggregate Power 
Numerically, the preceding discussion identified 
that every state bordering Slovakia, including Austria, has 
more aggregate power than the Slovak Republic. Of the five 
adjacent states, Slovakia has potential problems with three of 
them. Ukraine is indisputably the most potentially powerful. 
It possesses large forces, more modern equipment, and a larger 
military-industrial complex than Slovakia. While aggregate 
power advantages also go to the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
Slovakia possesses a military-industrial complex that could 
negate these advantages, given political will, new technology 
and financing. 
134 
Slovakia must also consider the threat from Russia 
in its deliberations. The Russian threat is similar to those 
that the Czech Republic and Hungary face. As mentioned 
earlier, Russia is historically the most serious threat to the 
region. Today, since Russia does not directly border 
Slovakia, the danger is not immediate. Instead, the situation 
in Russia is most likely to affect Slovakia through Ukraine. 
If Russian-Ukrainian relations continue to deteriorate, 
Slovakia would be one of the first states to be affected by 
the instability, especially mass refugee flows to the West. 
Since 85 percent of Slovakia's fuel supplies come from Russia, 
via pipelines that run through Ukraine, and Russia is the 
second largest exporter into Slovakia (USAREUR, 1995), 
tensions between Russia and Ukraine could seriously affect the 
Slovak economy. 
b. Geographical Proximity 
Slovakia considers local threats to be the 
predominant threats in Europe today. According to the Slovak 
Republic Defense Doctrine, 
It is apparent from the tenor of the international 
political situation that, first and foremost, the 
risks ensuing from the instability of the 
individual states and regions -- from which threats 
and risks to neighboring states and regions may 
also arise -- and not the risks stemming the end of 
the heterogeneous bipolar system of international 
relations are the predominant ones in Europe. 
(FBIS, 18 March 1994) 
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Of the five bordering states, Hungary has the longest shared 
border with Slovakia, representing almost 40 percent of 
Slovakia's total land boundaries. The Ukrainian border makes 
up only 6 percent of Slovakia's land boundaries. The boundary 
with the Czech Republic makes up approximately 16 percent. 
(New Europe, 1996) 
c. !l'ransparency of the 1'hrea t 
Given that the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Hungary 
possess greater aggregate power than the Slovak Republic, are 
there indicators that any of them could be a long term threat 
to Slovakia? As stated in the theory chapter, for purposes of 
this study, transparency of threat is determined by the 
ability of a state to see two things in potentially 
threatening states. The first is the possession of offensive 
capabilities. The second is indication of aggressiveness of 
intentions. Based on these two requirements, the Czech 
Republic and Ukraine cannot be considered threats to Slovakia, 
while Hungary has the potential to be a threat. 
Of the three states, Ukraine definitely possesses 
offensive capabilities vice Slovakia. As stated earlier, its 
weapon systems are the most modern in the region. Even if 
these weapon systems are not as modern as those of NATO, they 
are at least a generation ahead of those of Slovakia. What 
Ukraine lacks is aggressiveness of intentions toward Slovakia. 
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By and large, relations between Slovakia and Ukraine 
are good. The bilateral cooperation treaty and military 
cooperation agreement signed by the two in 1993 provide 
evidence of this fact. There are some potential tensions 
between the two over minority rights and Transcarpathia. The 
Transcarpathian Oblast of western Ukraine belonged to 
Czechoslovakia during the interwar years, when it was called 
Ruthenia. However, since Slovakia has made no demands for the 
return of the former Ruthenia, there seems to be little 
likelihood of Ukraine having any aggressiveness toward 
Slovakia. 
Slovakia also has possible conflicts with the Czech 
Republic, primarily based in the distribution of federal 
property and the dismantling of state structures. However, 
the Czech Republic cannot be considered a threat to the Slovak 
Republic. It lacks both credible offensive capabilities and 
aggressiveness of intentions. Its armed forces are in no 
condition to conduct major offensive operations against 
another state. In addition, the continuing survival of the 
Slovak state is a major benefit for the Czech Republic. 
Slovakia provides a 200-mile buffer between the Czech Republic 
and instability in the East. According to a Czech official, 
"in no case should we look with disrespect at Meciar' s 
Slovakia -- the existence of a politically stable 
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country between us and the former USSR is in the Czech 
Republic's vital interest." (FBIS, 25 January, 1995) 
That leaves Hungary. It is the only state that can 
reasonably be identified as a threat to Slovakia in balance 
of threat theory ·terms. Today, Hungary lacks the necessary 
offensive capabilities to pose a threat to Slovakia, 
especially considering its current military problems and its 
requirement to deploy sufficient forces to protect its border 
with Romania. However, it is not inconceivable that, if 
Hungary were admitted to NATO ahead of Slovakia, it could 
acquire equipment, technology, and training that would provide 
it with these offensive capabilities. 
In the minds of the Slovaks, the Hungarians already 
possess the requisite aggressiveness of intentions. Hungary 
is the "central security concern" of Slovakia. This is 
because of the large ethnic Hungarian population in the 
southern part of Slovakia. In some of these areas, up to 90 
percent of the population is Hungarian. The Slovaks fear the 
"minority may secede or that Hungary will try to reclaim its 
lost territory."n (Cottey, 1995, p. 88) The current Hungarian 
government has tried to allay these fears, but it is hampered 
by the statements and policies of the previous governments. 
27In 1920, the Treaty ofTrianon gave Czechoslovakia territory at the expense of 
Hungary. 
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Former Hungarian Prime Minister Antall proclaimed that he was 
the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians. (FBIS, 27 March, 
1996) Considering that the official population is around 5.5 
million people (New Europe, 1996), this caused problems with 
neighboring states, such as Slovakia and Romania, which have 
large ethnic Hungarian populations. 
3. Summary of Third Image Factors 
a. Ba.lance o£ Power 
With regard to the Slovak case and balance of power 
theory, we again have mixed results in terms of how our 
inferred hypotheses held up. The pattern of the results, 
however, is slightly different from the previous cases. Each 
of the other Central European states exhibited a similar 
pattern for the testing of the hypotheses: 1) they confirmed 
the hypothesis that states would attempt to balance internally 
before externally; 2) they confirmed the hypothesis that 
states would align with a stronger power for the chance to 
receive profit or technology (bandwagoning for profit); 3) 
they refuted the hypothesis that a state would balance with 
the weaker of two powers or coalitions against the stronger; 
and, 4) they neither confirmed nor refuted the hypothesis that 
a state would bandwagon with a stronger state to prevent its 
own destruction, assuming the weaker state feels it has no 
other recourse for its survival. 
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The Slovak government follows the pattern through 
the hypotheses on internal balancing and bandwagoning for 
profit. Contrary to the other three Central European cases, 
the Slovak case can also support the traditional balancing 
hypothesis, if we open our range limits to allow a state to 
pursue multiple and contradictory policies at once. 
Slovakia's dealings with Russia give an example of a state 
that is balancing against stronger powers. 
These actions do not necessarily indicate that 
Slovakia is balancing against NATO. In fact, it probably is 
not. Instead, Slovakia is balancing against its more powerful 
neighbors. Finally, the Slovak case returns to the familiar 
pattern with regard to the traditional bandwagoning 
hypothesis. The Slovak Republic's actions neither confirm nor 
refute the hypothesis, since it is not threatened with 
destruction by a stronger state without any other recourse. 
b. Bal.ance o£ Threat 
The Slovak case follows the pattern established in 
the other case studies for support of the inferred hypotheses 
from balance of threat theory. The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Ukraine are the only geographically proximate states with 
which Slovakia has potential conflicts. Because they are 
nearby, these states are more of a possible immediate threat 
to Slovakia than other states, particularly Russia. 
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Of these three states, only Ukraine clearly 
possesses the offensive capabilities to threaten Slovakia. 
The fact that Slovakia does not consider the Ukrainians a 
threat confirms the hypothesis that a threat will not be 
perceived, and consequently balanced against, unless the 
threatened state can see that the threatening state possesses 
both offensive capabilities and aggressiveness of intentions. 
Hungary, on the other hand, has the potential to be a long-
term threat to the Slovaks. Its policies on diaspora 
Hungarians have been perceived by Bratislava as aggressiveness 
of intentions. If a more nationalistic government came to 
power in Hungary, it could deliberately attempt to interfere 
in Slovakia, with the pretext of protecting ethnic Hungarians. 
The appropriate response for Slovakia would be to 
balance against the future threat. This could be accomplished 
either through admission to NATO or future rapprochement with 
the Russian Federation. As stated earlier, Slovak overtures 
and agreements with Russia help confirm our traditional 
balancing hypothesis. However, although Russia is one 
possible source of threat to Slovakia, these efforts would not 
necessarily confirm the defensive bandwagoning hypothesis, 
unless Russia was directly threatening Slovakia with 
destruction, and Slovakia felt it had no other choice but to 
join with the Russians. That is currently not the situation. 
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D. SECOND IMAGE 
1. Political Constraints 
Since its creation on 1 January, 1993, the Slovak 
Republic has been plagued by political instability. This 
instability severely affects the state's ability to react to 
both internal and external threats. The political instability 
manifests itself in a number of ways. Each limits the range 
of actions which the Slovak leadership can take. 
The primary instability is within the government. In the 
last two years, the Slovak Republic has had three different 
governments. Prime Minister Meciar is the prime minister for 
the second time; the first time, parliament forced him out of 
office with a vote of no-confidence. (USAREUR, 1995) Most of 
these problems have causes in the behavior of the coalition. 
Currently, the 150 deputies in Parliament come from 17 
different parties. No party has a clear majority. This makes 
it difficult to both communicate and reach a consensus. 
(FBIS, 4 July, 1996) The major ramification of the current 
distribution of seats in Parliament is that no party can pass 
legislation alone. 
In the Slovak system, legislation must be passed with at 
least 90 votes. Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS), which is the leading party in the current coalition, 
has 61 seats. Based on this count, they could block any 
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legislation, assuming all their deputies voted in concert. 
But, they cannot pass their desired legislation without help. 
According to Jozef Migas, the leader of the major opposition 
party, "the situation in Slovakia is a peculiar one." (FBIS, 
2 July, 1996) This "situation" led to a coalitional crisis in 
June of this year, when HZDS's coalition partners deserted 
them, paralyzing the government for ten days. (FBIS, 26 June, 
1996) 
Another factor of instability within the government is 
the ongoing feud between the president and the prime minister. 
Prime Minister Meciar criticizes President Kovac for 
"exceed[ing] the presidential powers" and for using methods 
that are "leaning toward monarchism or a certain mafia-like 
behavior (FBIS, 4 July, 1996) President Kovac, on the other 
hand, believes that parliament, under the direction of 
Meciar's HZDS, has "deprived [him] of ... power," and that 
"a president in the constitutional position of the Czech or 
Slovak type has only the power to openly criticize." 
Indicative of the seriousness of the feud is the fact that as 
of June of 1996, the two had not met in person since June of 
1995 (FBIS, 3 June, 1996) 
The differences between the various parties do not go 
across every issue in the Slovak Republic. The one area where 
they seem to be able to reach a consensus is nationalism. Two 
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particular pieces of Slovak legislation have received 
resounding criticism from the governments of Europe. The 
first is the "Protection of the Republic law." Designed as an 
amendment to the penal code, it makes activities harming the 
"interests of the republic" a crime and is "considerably 
reminiscent of the methods used by the states of the former 
Soviet bloc to silence the opposition at home and abroad." 
(Czech News Agency, 4 April, 1996) The second is a law that 
"prevents the establishment of autonomy in Slovakia on ethnic 
principles." According to the chairman of the Slovak National 
Party (SNS), the bill was needed because, "it is impossible to 
create room in a young republic giving certain irredentist 
forces an opportunity to set up any autonomy." 
February, 1996) 
(BBC, 11 
2. Economic Constraints 
The economic scene in the Slovak Republic is improving. 
Major economic indicators for 1995 were positive: 1) the GDP 
grew by 7.4 percent; 2) the percentage of the GDP generated 
by the private sector grew to 64.9 percent; and, 3) inflation 
was down to 7.2 percent, the lowest in post-communist 
countries of Central Europe. However, the Slovak economy has 
not recovered to even the 198 9 level, and it still faces 
challenges. One of the major 
imbalance of trade with Russia. 
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problems is the growing 
Slovakia currently has a 
trade imbalance of 32 million Slovak korunas (Sk) with Russia. 
(FBIS, 10 May, 1996) Perhaps as a hedge against future 
economic problems, the government has decided that it will not 
privatize all industries. 
pipeline networks, arms 
Electricity and gas companies, oil 
plants, and a small number of 
strategic enterprises will remain under state ownership. 
(FBIS, 8 February, 1996) 
Improvements in the economy have not been transformed 
into increased defense spending. The defense budget has been 
cut 50 percent in real terms from the 1989 level. (USAREUR, 
1995) As stated earlier, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) does 
not have any money for modernization of its equipment. Even 
if the MOD had sufficient money, the military-industrial 
complex lacks the technology to effectively modernize Slovak 
forces, which causes the state-owned complex to go to outside 
sources in search of technology. The MOD also has a hard time 
funding the necessary operational and quality of life 
construction projects that the armed forces need. (FBIS, 29 
February, 1996) 
3. Internal Security Threat 
Of the four Central European countries desiring 
admittance into NATO, the Slovak Republic is the only one with 
a significant ethnic minority population. Ethnic Hungarians 
make up 10.7 percent of the Slovak population. 
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These Hungarians primarily live in the southern part of 
Slovakia, along the Hungarian border. The area was part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I, when 
the Treaty of Trianon awarded the territory to 
Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks do not trust the ethnic 
Hungarians. In addition, because of statements by Hungarian 
politicians, Slovaks think that Hungary wants to reclaim the 
territory. 
According to the state secretary at the Slovak Foreign 
Ministry, this statement sent a "signal aimed at undermining 
the borders." He said it also meant "moral support for the 
politicians [in Slovakia] of Hungarian ethnic origin" and a 
"campaign for undermining stability in our geographic space 
with the goal of creating conditions for a change of the 
existing borders." (FBIS, 27 March, 1996) 
Slovak fears of ethnic Hungarians are actively exploited 
by politicians such as Prime Minister Meciar. They are easily 
exploited, because "in Slovakia, nationalist prejudices and 
ethnic tensions are never far from the surface." (Wallace, 
1994) Measures to control ethnic Hungarians include: 1) the 
Law on the Protection of the Republic; 2) the law preventing 
autonomy based on ethnic principles; 3) a constitutional 
emphasis on "national rather than citizens' rights (Larrabee, 
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1993, p. 44);" 4) prohibition of Hungarian-language signs and 
names; and, 5) changes to the organization of administrative 
districts to "undermine the political representation" of 
Hungarians. (Cottey, 1995, pp. 88-89) In addition, the 
internal threat is given equal importance with the country's 
external threat in the national security strategy. According 
to the official Principles for the Slovak Republic's National 
Security, "Despite the crucial role played by the external 
aspect of national security, the Slovak Republic is devoting 
no less attention to constituting the domestic dimension of 
its security (FBIS, 18 March, 1994) 
4. Summary of Second Image Factors 
While this study has shown that other Central European 
governments have some measure of instability in them, the case 
of Slovakia is the first where the ruling coalition does not 
have a majority in parliament and the state has a significant 
potential internal security threat. The current government 
does not have a stable and consistent coalition. This affects 
the government's ability to balance, either internally or 
externally, against threats. 
With regard to our inferred hypotheses from domestic 
political theory, the case refutes our hypotheses on political 
stability and confirms those on economic constraints and the 
internal security threat. We predicted that an unconfident 
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leadership would seek to balance externally before internally. 
This is not the case in Slovakia. They have attempted to 
streamline their armed forces, build previously nonexistent 
infrastructure, and improve the domestic military-industrial 
complex. It is also true that the Slovak government has 
concurrent orientations toward both the West, in the form of 
seeking NATO and EU membership and Western technology, and 
Russia, seeking opened markets to reduce the trade imbalance, 
military cooperation, and military equipment. However, these 
efforts are secondary to the internal ones. 
The case also refutes our hypothesis that an unconfident 
leadership may seek to balance externally to receive external 
validation of the internal legitimacy of the regime. This is 
not the case in Slovakia. The government has continued its 
internal, nationalistic policies, as indicated by the 
"Protection of the Republic Law," in spite of European 
disapproval. 
The actions of the Slovak Republic do confirm the 
hypotheses on economic constraints and the internal security 
threat. Since the Slovak Republic lacks the adequate 
resources to balance internally against both possible internal 
and external threats, it has to attempt to balance externally, 
which will allow it to gain resources to improve its domestic 
economy. Finally, the Slovak Republic considers its internal 
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threat at least as important as its external threat. External 
balancing, whether with NATO or Russia, will allow it to 
extract resources to combat future internal threats. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In the Slovak Republic case, both systemic and domestic 
political theories help explain and predict Slovak responses 
to today's security situation in Central Europe. The case 
confirms hypotheses from both levels of analysis. In this 
case, however, systemic theories do a better job of predicting 
Slovak actions and responses. 
The case of Slovakia confirms six out of seven of our 
inferred hypotheses from the systemic level of analysis. Of 
our hypotheses inferred from domestic political theory, the 
case refuted the applicable hypotheses on political stability. 
The Slovak leaders, who are not confident in their ability, 
still have conducted the actions necessary for internal 
balancing prior to external. 
Of the Central European states, Slovakia is the only case 
that confirms our hypothesis on traditional balancing. While 
it is seeking admission into NATO, it is also maintaining ties 
to the Russian Federation. While this is partly due to the 
fact that Slovakia is heavily dependent on Russia for fuel 
supplies and Russian imports, it also provides them a hedge 
against not being admitted to NATO. 
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VIII. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study set aside the Russian Federation as an 
exception, fundamentally different than the countries of 
Central Europe in its size and power potential. The United 
States is also an exception. In terms of power, no matter how 
measured, the United States is currently unmatched in the 
world. It is a "great power," with advantages in "size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, 
competence." 
military 
(Waltz, 
strength, 
1979, p. 
political stability, and 
131) President Clinton has 
asserted in the National Security Strategy that the United 
States is "the world's greatest power, and we have global 
interests as well as responsibilities." (National Security 
Strategy [NSS], 1996, p. iv) 
This chapter examines U.S. views on NATO enlargement in 
the context of the security situation in Europe, particularly 
Central Europe, today. It analyzes these views using 
different international relations theories and levels of 
analysis. Specifically, it explores U.S. actions and 
perceptions by examining the systemic and domestic factors 
affecting U.S. security decisions. The end of the chapter 
summarizes the relative explanatory power of each theory. 
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B . 'l'HI:RD IMAGE 
Washington is 3,674 miles from London, 3,841 miles from 
Paris, and 4,172 miles from Berlin. Even though these great 
distances separate the United States from the capitals of 
Europe, the United States has been called a "European power." 
Because of this, Richard Holbrooke, a former key member of the 
Clinton State Department, has said, "an unstable Europe would 
threaten essential national security interests of the 
United States." (Holbrooke, 1995, p. 38) In other words, the 
United States is "inextricably linked" to Europe. (DoD, Office 
of International Security Affairs [OISA], 1996) Therefore, the 
United States must look at the balance of power in the region. 
1. Balance of Power 
According to the Office of International Security 
Affairs' study on the U.S. security strategy for Europe, the 
United States has "influenced the balance of power" in Europe. 
This has been the case for more than fifty years. Today the 
"single most visible demonstration" of American commitment to 
European security is U.S. forward deployed forces, both 
conventional and nuclear. (DoD, OISA, 1996) These forces are 
the "best-equipped, best-trained and best-prepared" in the 
world (NSS, 1996, p. iii) 
The forces of the United States are not the largest in 
Europe. In fact, since 1989, they have gone through a 
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significant drawdown. In 1989, U.S. forces totaled 314,000 
personnel. Today, that number is around 100,000. (Joulwan, 
1995) Ground forces include an Army corps made up of the 
majority of two Army divisions. They each have two of three 
maneuver brigades; the third, or round-out, brigade for each 
division is based in the continental United States. Air 
forces consist of approximately 2.33 fighter wings. Naval 
forces are made up of sufficient ashore personnel to support 
a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group in the 
Mediterranean Sea. (National Military Strategy [NMS], 1996, 
pp. 7-8) 
Of course, these forces do not operate unilaterally. They 
operate multilaterally as part of NATO, which leverages their 
capabilities. U.S. forces are thoroughly integrated into the 
NATO military structure, to include serving in multinational 
units. Both of the two Army divisions in Germany belong to 
multinational corps with German forces. The U.S. V Corps, 
commanded by an American, has one German and one American 
division (1st U.S. Infantry Division, formerly 3rd Infantry 
Division) in it. The other Army division, the 1st Armored 
Division, is assigned to a multinational corps led by a 
German. In addition to operating in tandem with NATO forces, 
forward deployed U.S. forces receive significant Host Nation 
Support (HNS) from these allies. For example, Germany 
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provided $1. 43 billion in HNS to American forces in 1993. 
(DoD, OISA, 1996) Because of these structural and logistical 
arrangements, the capabilities of U.S. forces are enhanced. 
However, should the situation require it, the United States 
maintains significant capabilities to improve unilaterally the 
U.S. force structure, capabilities, and balance of power in 
its favor. 
One key to accomplishing this is the U.S. possession of 
strategic lift assets. These assets include strategic airlift 
and sealift. The U.S. airlift and sealift capabilities 
consist of both civilian and military assets. Together, they 
currently give the United States the capability to fly 47 
million ton-miles per day by air and move 15 million square 
feet of cargo by sea. In addition, the United States 
currently maintains 34 ships for afloat prepositioning. These 
ships contain unit equipment and war materiel for combat 
forces, and they can be rapidly moved to trouble spots. (DoD, 
Annual Defense Report, 1996) 
Another critical component of this capability to 
unilaterally improve the balance of power in its favor is the 
U.S. nuclear force. Although various arms control accords 
(START I/INF/START II) have reduced, or will reduce, the total 
U.S. nuclear force, it still contains a mix of strategic and 
nonstrategic systems, deployed in a "survivable triadn (air, 
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land, and sea) to "deter still very powerful strategic 
arsenals and to convince possible adversaries that any attempt 
to seek a nuclear advantage would be futile." (NMS, 1996, p. 
10) 
The United States is continuing to modernize its combat, 
nuclear, and mobility forces to allow it to keep qualitative 
advantages over potential adversaries. During the eight year 
drawdown of the U.S. military, a decision was made to slow 
down modernization to insure "near-term" readiness (i.e., 
funding of spare parts, training, and maintenance). 
Capabilities of the forces were not significantly degraded 
because the drawdown also eliminated aged equipment, leaving 
more modern equipment. The end result of the policy, however, 
was a 1997 modernization budget that is one-third of the 1985 
amount. (DoD, Annual Report to Congress, 1996) Beginning in 
1998, this will change. Because the drawdown will be 
complete, money can be redirected, and spending on 
modernization will increase. Over the next five years, the 
United States will spend almost $250 billion on new equipment. 
(White, 1996) 
All of these efforts are taking place in a time when 
"[p] erhaps for the first time in its history, the United 
States enjoys circumstances in which no other power poses 
credible military threats to its vi tal interests." (Sloan, 
155 
1995, p. 221) The question becomes, what are the threats 
driving U.S. actions? The Department of Defense's 1996 annual 
report to Congress lists a number of threats to the interests 
of the United States. These include: 
o Attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. 
interests to gain hegemony in their regions through 
aggression or intimidation. 
o Internal conflicts among ethnic, national, 
religious, or tribal groups that threaten innocent 
lives, or mass migrations, and undermine stability 
and international order. 
o Threats by potential adversaries to acquire 
or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and 
their means of delivery. 
o Threats to democracy and reform in the 
former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, 
and elsewhere. 
In Europe, Russia is the state that can pose all of these 
threats to the United States and its allies. Even in its 
currently decimated form, Russia is a potentially hostile 
regional threat that is "capable of fielding sizeable military 
forces which can cause serious imbalances in military power 
within regions important to the United States." (NSS, 1996, 
p. 14) Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, 
analysts at the RAND Corporation, support this contention by 
saying that while a "re-armed Russia would not be the military 
Leviathan the Soviet Union once was, [i]t would have an 
imposing military force, but probably not a great deal more 
than that of Iran, Iraq, or North Korea - in short, a major 
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regional contingency-sized force." 
Larrabee, 1995, p. 32) 
2. Balance of Threat 
a. Aggregate Power 
(Asmus, Kugler, and 
In comparison to Russian forces, the U.S. forces in 
Europe do not have a positive balance of aggregate power. 
However, since the United States is the leader of NATO, and is 
deeply embedded in its military structures, it is necessary to 
consider the U.S. forces in combination with those of the 
other members of NATO. As discussed earlier in the chapter on 
Russia, the U.S.-led NATO is the only state or organization in 
Europe that can match the aggregate power of the Russian 
Federation. The converse is also true. 
Russia is the only state in Europe that can hope to 
match the combined aggregate power of NATO. However, 
previously mentioned Russian problems in funding, manning, 
procurement, morale, deployment of forces, and performance 
negate the quantitative advantage of the Russian Armed Forces. 
Based on this fact, and the qualitative advantages (personnel, 
training, readiness, equipment) possessed by NATO, the balance 
of aggregate power favors NATO. This is the case with just 
currently deployed national and allie.d forces in the NATO 
area. The U.S. capability for power projection significantly 
increases the balance of aggregate power in favor of NATO. 
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Unfortunately, the balance of aggregate power is not 
totally one-sided in the U.S. and NATO's favor. This is 
because, unlike the other potential major regional threats 
today, Russia does possess nuclear weapons. Russia has, and 
will continue to have, large numbers of nuclear weapons and 
the means to deliver them. Previous discussion has shown that 
the Strategic Rocket Forces are the best-maintained units in 
the Russian Armed Forces today. In addition, as previously 
mentioned, Russia continues to improve its nuclear forces with 
such advancements as the Topol M-2 ICBM upgrade, miniaturized 
nuclear weapons, and a new submarine-launched ballistic 
missile. These nuclear "advantages" will give the Russian 
Federation greater aggregate power than could be expected 
based on the state of its conventional forces. 
b. Geographical Proximity 
The utility of using geographical proximity as a 
tool to study U.S. actions is questionable. Its usage 
produces a variety of contradictions that challenge the scope 
and definition of geographical proximity, especially when 
attempting to analyze the actions of a "superpower" possessing 
forward-deployed forces, power projection capabilities, and 
intercontinental nuclear weapons. For example, the United 
States is located more than three thousand miles away from 
Europe. Yet, for reasons of history, culture, economics, 
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etc., its national security interests are seen to be 
"inextricably" tied to not only those of its NATO partners, 
but also somehow to those of the newly independent states to 
the east of NATO. These "tied" national security interests 
lead the United States to deploy forward more than 100,000 
troops in Europe. This seems a small number when compared to 
overall Russian force levels, even if one accepts the lowest 
estimates of 1.2 million. 
However, the United States is not looking to 
increase its presence in Europe because it knows it has the 
power projection capabilities to deploy reinforcements rapidly 
to the theater. The facilities are already in place to accept 
these reinforcements, equipment is on the ground and ready for 
issuing, and the procedures have been practiced for decades 
during repeated Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) 
exercises. In this case, these power projection capabilities 
mitigate the negative effects of the United States not being 
geographically proximate to its European "neighbors." They 
also blur the line between long- and short-term forces the 
United States can bring to bear in extended deterrence crises. 
On the other hand, if forward basing and power 
projection capabilities can mitigate or ameliorate the 
negative effects of geography in favor of the United States, 
possession of nuclear weapons by potential adversaries negates 
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the benefits of geography for the United States. When a 
country possesses nuclear weapons and ICBMs, everywhere on the 
planet is geographically proximate. A Russia in its current 
state, without nuclear weapons, would not be a threat to the 
United States. However, since the Russian Federation does 
possess nuclear weapons (and, in fact, has placed more 
emphasis on their importance), it has the potential to be a 
threat to the United States and will continue to have this 
potential. According to the National Military Strategy, "For 
as long as these weapons exist, they will remain a threat to 
our security." (NMS, 1996, p. 3) 
c. Transparency of tlle Threat 
Based on the preceding discussion, it should be 
apparent that Russia possesses offensive capabilities that it 
could use against the United States. Due to the degradation 
of the Russian Armed Forces, these offensive capabilities 
really only exist in the nuclear realm. The question is 
whether the Russians possess aggressiveness of intentions 
against the United States. The answer is probably no. 
Official national security documents of the U.S. government, 
such as the National Security Strategy and the corresponding 
National Military Strategy, support the fact that Russia is 
not viewed by the Clinton administration as aggressive. This 
is not to say that these documents do not address the dangers 
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and negative consequences of the possible failure of Russian 
democracy. They do. However, while states such as North 
Korea, Iran, and Iraq are directly identified as ~potentially 
hostile regional powers" (NSS, 1996, p. 14), Russia is not. 
There are, of course, those outside of the 
Administration who consider Russia to be aggressive. An 
example of this group is the Central and East European 
Coalition. In a prepared testimony before the House 
International Relations committee, Frank Koszorus, the 
spokesman for this group, cited a number of possible reasons 
for future Russian aggression. The first was the unresistable 
temptation on the part of the Russians to expand their 
~strategic frontiers." The second was an argument of history, 
which said that American withdrawal before the ~European 
political order [was] settled" would invite Russia to move 
into Central and Eastern Europe. The third was that Russian 
nationalists would incite ~expansionist tendencies" in Russia. 
(Koszorus, 1996) 
Even though the national security documents do not 
adequately detail these possibilities, members of the 
Administration do acknowledge them. According to Walter 
Slocombe, Under secretary of Defense for Policy, ~we are not 
naive about Russia, and we are acutely conscious of the 
dangers ... Should Russia turn away from its new path, we can 
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re-evaluate our approach and indeed we would have to do so." 
(Slocombe, 1996) While the truth about Russia perhaps lies 
somewhere in between the official position of the Clinton 
Administration and that of groups such as the Central and East 
European Coalition, it is probably much closer to the 
Administration's position. As discussed in the chapter on 
Russia, and recognized by the administration, the political, 
economic, and moral climate of Russia simply will not support 
expansionist efforts, even if the sentiment is there. 
3. Summary of Third Image Factors 
a. Ba.lance o£ Power 
Balance of power theory and our inferred hypotheses 
from it do not do a good job of explaining or predicting U.S. 
actions towards the European security situation today. Only 
one of the inferred hypotheses holds up. The United States 
has sought to balance internally first. While pushing off 
decisions on possible balancing through enlargement of NATO, 
it has continued to restructure its forces, modernize its 
equipment, and add critical assets, particularly in strategic 
lift, to its inventory. 
U.S. actions do not support our other three 
hypotheses. The United States is not trying to push for 
admission to NATO of the states of Central Europe because it 
wants to balance in the traditional sense, joining with the 
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weaker of two states or coalitions to offset the threatening 
power of a stronger state. Instead, its seeks to establish a 
favorable situation that will allow the "building of tolerant 
democratic societies, and the balance of power that allows 
them to take root and flourish." (DoD, OISA, 1996) The other 
two hypotheses are also refuted, because the United States is 
obviously not conducting any type of bandwagoning, either 
defensive or for profit. Great powers do not bandwagon. 
b. Balance of !l'hrea t 
Similarly, balance of threat theory and its 
associated inferred hypotheses do not adequately explain U.S. 
actions. As mentioned earlier, our inferred hypothesis on 
geographic proximity is called into question by the 
contradictions caused by U.S. possession of forward-deployed 
forces, significant power projection capabilities, and nuclear 
weapons, as well as by Russian possession of nuclear 
capabilities. ICBMs make everywhere geographi"cally proximate. 
The blurring of the effects of geographic proximity caused by 
nuclear weapons points to the need for a modification of the 
hypothesis. In a conventional-to-conventional potential 
confrontation, states that are nearby pose a greater threat. 
However, if one, or both, of the potential adversaries possess 
nuclear weapons and adequate deli very systems to hit the 
other, geographic proximity matters less. 
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Of the other two hypotheses, the U.S. case does 
confirm the hypothesis that the transparency of a threat will 
affect whether a state perceives a threat. Russia possesses 
offensive capabilities which the United States must consider. 
However, Russia is not seen as a threat today, and is not even 
listed as a specific threat in the national security 
documents, because its cannot support, economically or 
politically, aggressive intentions against the United States. 
Finally, the U.S. case refutes our last hypothesis, 
which says that a state will seek to balance against a 
threatening state that has greater aggregate power and is 
geographically proximate, if the threat is transparent. 
Ostensibly, Russian forces are geographically proximate and 
have greater aggregate power than U.S. forces in Europe. 
However, U.S. power projection capabilities and nuclear forces 
erase these advantages and make it unnecessary for the United 
States to balance against Russia, no matter if Russia is a 
transparent or potential threat. The U.S. efforts to admit 
the Central European states into NATO are more in line with a 
great power trying to shape the system28 in a way beneficial 
to itself and its allies. 
28In his book, Theory of International Politics, Kenneth 
Waltz posits that possession of power gives the possessor a 
greater stake in the system and the ability to act for the 
system's sake, even if the great power "pay[s] unduly in doing 
so." (Waltz, 1979, p. 198) 
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C. SECOND IMAGE 
According to Senator Richard Lugar, "We spend so much 
time on the 'Russian factor' in the NATO enlargement equation 
that we tend to neglect the 'American factor'." (Lugar, 1995) 
When examining U.S. actions and perspectives on NATO 
enlargement, it is imperative to consider "second image," or 
domestic, factors. In the United States, domestic and 
foreign policies are as "inextricably" linked as the United 
States is with Europe. In fact, most of the time it is 
difficult to see where one stops and the other starts. 
According to the Clinton Administration's National Security 
Strategy, 
The line between our domestic and foreign policies 
is disappearing - that we must revitalize our economy if 
we are to sustain our military forces, foreign 
initiatives, and global influence, and that we must 
engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets 
and create jobs for our people. (NSS, 1996, p. I) 
The main foreign policy debate in the United States today 
is the debate over the future role of the United States in the 
world. According to Don Snider, Director of Political-
Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College's Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, "there is no real 
consen~us today as to the appropriate grand strategy for the 
United States." (Snider, 1995, p. 15) This lack of consensus 
is a political constraint that can lead to economic 
constraints. Because of the U.S. system of checks and 
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balances, the President and the Congress, which has the power 
of the purse, must generally agree on foreign policy that 
involves expenditure of funds. If there is no consensus, 
there will be no allocation of resources to support the 
policy. (Snider, 1995) The NATO enlargement issue is not 
immune to these political and economic constraints. 
1. Political Constraints 
When it comes to NATO enlargement, U.S. political 
arguments revolve around three issues -- what role the United 
States should play in the world today, whether the United 
States should extend security guarantees to the prospective 
states, and the cost. This debate does not always fall along 
partisan lines. According to Stanley Sloan, a senior 
researcher at the Congressional Research Service, "Both the 
Republican majority and Democratic minority of the 104th 
Congress include some members who favour a continuing US 
international leadership role and others who favour global 
retrenchment." (Sloan, 1995, p. 217) This diversity of 
opinions points to one of the major potential constraints of 
the U.S. political system -- lack of consensus. 
Today, before the 1996 elections, the U.S. government is 
"structurally and politically divided, with a Democratic 
President Clinton controlling the executive and the Republican 
Party ... in charge of both houses of Congress." (Sloan, 1995, 
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p. 217) On NATO enlargement, President Clinton's supports 
eventually admitting new members into the Alliance. Most 
Republicans also support enlargement. Their Contract with 
America included legislation to "mandate establishment of a 
program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of 
specified countries29 in Central and Eastern Europe." (Gilman, 
1996) 
However, there is an increasing number of representatives 
and senators who are leery and unsupportive of NATO 
enlargement. Led by Senator Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, 
they are primarily concerned with: 1) the fact that NATO 
expansion may have negative impacts on the situation in 
Russia; 2) the possibility that the United States may not have 
any vital national security interests in the area that would 
warrant extending security guarantees; and, 3) the potential 
costs of enlargement. (Giacomo, 1995) 
The security guarantee issue deals with Article Five of 
the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which established NATO. 
Article Five provides, in the event of an attack, a security 
guarantee to all members of the Alliance, saying: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one 
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all; and consequently 
29 In the House, the bill named the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland. In the Senate, the Brown amendment, named after its 
sponsor, mentioned these three, as well as Slovakia. 
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they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and 
in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic 
area. (GAO, 1996, Appendix I:0.0.5) 
Based on this article, the U.S. would have to provide the 
Czech Republic, or Hungary, or Poland, or any other potential 
new NATO member, with guarantees, including nuclear 
guarantees, for its safety. In the event of an attack on 
these countries, the U.S. would be obligated to respond. This 
article has led some people to question the importance of 
these countries to the United States. According to Michael 
Mandelbaum, a foreign policy analyst at Johns Hopkins 
University, "We haven't yet answered the question: Are we 
prepared to defend the Polish-Byelorussian border with the 
American nuclear arsenal?" (Dobbs, 1995) This issue is 
especially sensitive, considering that these countries "do not 
yet have long track-records of political democracy and free 
market capitalism." (Biden, 1995) 
Currently, those opposed to NATO enlargement are in the 
minority. However, the growing concern about the process 
could limit the Administration's capabilities to continue the 
enlargement process. Both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate have the ability to affect NATO enlargement. The 
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House of Representatives controls the federal budget. If 
there were sufficient opposition to NATO enlargement, it could 
refuse to provide funds. The Senate, on the other hand, is 
responsible for ratifying all treaties. If there were 
sufficient opposition in the Senate, it could refuse to ratify 
the accession of new members to NATO. (Kupchan, 1995) 
The Administration must also consider the American 
public's opinion, especially in an election year. One of the 
major areas of the public that it must consider and deal with 
is the large number of Americans who have their roots in 
Central Europe. These Americans "are concentrated in the 
Midwest and Northeast in sufficient numbers to be a potential 
swing vote.n (Kupchan, 1995) They compromise a potentially 
powerful lobby that the President cannot ignore. According to 
Eugene Iwanciw, a founder of the Central and East European 
Coalition, 
There are 23 million Americans who trace their heritage 
to Eastern Europe, including over 9 million Poles. There 
are a dozen states -- very important states for any 
presidential election -- where they constitute more than 
5 percent of the electorate. 30 Taking an expansionist 
position on NATO is a no-lose way of appealing to these 
voters. (Dobbs, 1995) 
30Six of which have more than 15 percent: Connecticut (18), 
Pennsylvania (18), New Jersey (18), Wisconsin (16), Illinois 
(15), and Michigan (15) . (Dobbs, 1995) 
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2. Economic Constraints 
For the United States, according to Joshua Muravchik, a 
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, resources do not 
significantly constrain its ability to conduct foreign policy. 
According to him, "America is the richest country the world 
has ever known, and its resources have been expanding 
There is no resource problem." (Muravchik, 1996, p. 8) He 
estimates that the percentage of the budget spent on foreign 
aid is less than one percent. (Muravchik, 1996) Of course, 
more than foreign aid is required to manage the international 
system. The problem, as indicated in the previous section, is 
the lack of consensus and the political will to allocate the 
funding for NATO enlargement. 
Robert Tucker, a contributing editor of The National 
Interest, believes that the great debate in American foreign 
policy today is not over what role the United States should 
exercise in the world. Rather, it is the contradiction 
between the American desire to "remain the premier global 
power and an ever deepening aversion to bear the costs of this 
position." (Tucker, 1996, p. 20) This aversion affects the 
dynamics of the public debate over NATO enlargement. 
According to Senator Nunn, the ranking Democrat on the Armed 
Services Committee, "As long as there is no price tag attached 
to them, resolutions about NATO expansion will pass 
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overwhelmingly. When you have a price tag, ... then a whole 
different set of players will get involved." (Dobbs, 1995) 
The difficulty is that the "price tag" is undefined. 
There have been a number of studies attempting to estimate the 
costs of enlargement. It is problematic, since the Alliance 
has a number of options for integrating new members, ranging 
from upgrading the new member states' abilities for self-
defense to building infrastructure and forward deployment of 
NATO troops on the territories of new members. (Asmus, Kugler, 
and Larrabee, 1995) 
According to the RAND Corporation, the cost of admitting 
new members could be between $20 and $50 billion over a ten 
year period. This amount would be distributed in an 
undetermined manner between current and new members. (Dobbs, 
7 July, 1996) Obviously, the current economic situations in 
these countries would limit their ability to contribute. 
The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on 
NATO enlargement estimates that NATO funding for new members 
would "probably be gradual, would vary considerably, and would 
probably not exceed a total of $50 million for any individual 
nation during the first 3 to 5 years of their membership in 
NATO." (GAO, 1996, Section 5.1) These figures are based on 
the following improvements to each new members' 
infrastructure: command and control information systems, 
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communications systems, air defense radars, air defense 
control centers, a collocated operating base, and a 
prepositioned material storage site. (GAO, 1996, Table 4) 
Since the United States contributes approximately 23 percent 
of NATO's common civil budget (GAO, 1996, Section 3.2), the 
RAND studies would indicate potential U.S. costs of $4.6 to 
$11.5 billion over ten years. The GAO report indicates annual 
costs of $11.5 million ·per new member, over a 3 to 5 year 
period. 
This money is available. In fact, the United States is 
spending more than that on some of the prospective new members 
right now. In 1995, the United States provided $54 million in 
bilateral assistance to Partnership for Peace (PfP) members. 
(GAO, 1996, Section 2) For 1996, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary will each receive $10 million in U.S. bilateral 
assistance, which is almost equivalent to what the GAO's 
estimated annual cost is ($11.5 million). Poland is scheduled 
to receive $25 million, more than twice what the GAO 
predicted. Total U.S. bilateral assistance ($100 million) to 
PfP member states for 1996 would pay the U.S. portion for nine 
new members, using the GAO estimates. (GAO, 1996, Table 3) 
As indicated by Senator Nunn earlier, he expects the 
debate over NATO enlargement to become more complicated when 
final and more accurate costs estimates are attached to the 
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issue. One reason for the reluctance of U.S. politicians to 
support the fiscal expenditure that will be required for NATO 
enlargement is that threats to U.S. national interests 
currently ambiguous. Another reason is that the United State 
has unilateral means available to increase its security. As 
discussed in the section on "third image" factors, the United 
States is conducting internal balancing. 
It is modernizing its combat, mobility, and nuclear 
forces, with plans to spend almost $250 billion dollars on new 
equipment in the next five years. It is also ensuring the 
survival of critical components of its military-industrial 
complex. According to Secretary of Defense Perry's message in 
the DoD's 1996 Annual Report to Congress, 
Another way we hedge against future potential 
threats is by maintaining selected critical and 
irreplaceable elements of our defense industrial base, 
such as shipyards that build nuclear submarines ... the 
Department will selectively procure certain major systems 
in limited quanti ties to keep their production 
capabilities warm. (DoD, Annual Report to Congress, 1996) 
3. Internal Security Threat 
Although there has been a number of recent incidences of 
political violence and terrorism in the United States, such as 
the bombing of the World Trade Center and the Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City, there is no serious threat to the internal 
security of the country. Radical groups, regardless of their 
affiliation, are confronted with large and effective local, 
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state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Because of this, 
the United States faces no internal security threat to its 
survival or sovereignty. 
4. Summary of Second Image Factors 
Our inferred hypotheses from domestic political theory do 
not do a good job of explaining or predicting U.S. positions 
and actions on NATO enlargement. Only one of our hypotheses 
is confirmed. We predicted that a state with a confident 
leadership and strong state power or good state-society 
relations would balance internally prior to externally. In 
today's security environment, the U.S. is conducting internal 
balancing, while in some areas, particularly Central Europe, 
it has not expeditiously moved towards external alignments. 
This is because the leadership is confident in the stability 
of the government, has good relations with society, and is 
confident they can implement internal balancing efforts. Due 
to the current societal debate on what role the United States 
should play in the world, the government is not as confident 
in its ability to conduct the external balancing. 
As for the rest of the hypotheses, they either do not 
apply or the U.S. case refutes them. Because the U.S. has a 
stable democratic government, unlikely to be deposed no matter 
who wins the next election, we do not see the Administration 
attempting, or needing to attempt, to balance externally 
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because internal balancing will further weaken its position. 
For similar reasons, we do not see the Administration seeking 
to balance to gain external validation of its legitimacy. 
Economically, we do not see the United States balancing 
for external extraction. As one of the richest countries in 
the world, it has the capabilities and the resources to 
balance against threats internally, and does not need to 
balance externally. Paradoxically, by choosing to align with 
the states of Central Europe through its support of NATO 
enlargement, the United States will have to contribute 
significant amounts of money. And, the European countries 
seeking admission to NATO currently have little ability to 
provide significant resources to the United States in return. 
Our final hypothesis concerned internal security threats. 
The United States today, although it has rising crime rates 
and a number of disparate groups who have actually used 
violence or have the potential to use it, does not have a 
significant internal security threat to its sovereignty or 
survival. Since it does not consider this threat more 
dangerous than external threats, and since it has the internal 
resources to combat the threat, the U.S. does not need to 
balance externally to gain resources. 
Given the inability of our inferred hypotheses to predict 
or explain U.S. actions on NATO enlargement, it is interesting 
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to consider possible alternative explanations for why the 
United States supports enlargement. One possible explanation 
is bureaucratic politics. There are NATO lobbies in the 
Department of Defense, the State Department, and in academia, 
all of which have an interest in the continuing existence of 
NATO. Each is a part of the bureaucracy, and bureaucracies 
seek both influence and their continued survival. These 
desires can sometimes affect national security decisions. 
According to Morton H. Halperin, in his book, 
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, participants in the 
national security decision making process ~come to determine 
the national security of the United States in terms of the 
health and well-being of the organization to which they 
belong, the political and other interests of the President, or 
their own personal interests." (Halperin, 1974, p. 20) This 
problem can be exacerbated during elections. Halperin has 
said that ~no President can ignore the pressures on him from 
the bureaucracy, especially the senior military and 
departmental officers, or the pressures from congressional 
leaders and the public, when a presidential campaign is around 
the corner." (Halperin, 1974, p. 306) These dynamics could 
affect whether, and to what extent, the United States supports 
NATO enlargement. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
In the case of the United States, our hypotheses inferred 
from both the systemic and domestic political theories did a 
resoundingly poor job of predicting U.S. actions. This 
performance on the part of our hypotheses does not impugn our 
theories. The United States is unique of all our cases. It 
is the only all-around great power considered in the cases. 
While Russia must still be accorded some measure of 
"greatness" because of its nuclear capabilities, it no longer 
can compete with the United States because it does not 
possesses adequate economic capability, military strength, 
political stability, or competence. 
U.S. internal balancing was the only area that was 
accurately predicted by our inferred hypotheses. This makes 
sense. The United States is in a period where the strategic 
environment is ambiguous. Currently, there are no immediate 
threats and no peer competitors. At this point, it is not 
evident where or when, or even if, they will develop in the· 
future. U.S. efforts at internal balancing provide a hedge 
against the future unknown. 
Even though there is not an unambiguous threat to the 
United States, it is still seeking to balance externally. The 
United States is one of the leading advocates ·for the 
accession of new members into NATO. This is in spite of the 
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fact that the United States will have to contribute almost a 
quarter of the total cost to NATO members and will have to 
provide security guarantees to states which may or may not be 
of vital national interest to the United States. Potential 
explanations exist for this behavior at both domestic and 
systemic levels of analysis. 
Proponents of liberal democracy might explain U.S~ 
actions by saying that it is in the best interests of the 
United States, as the most powerful liberal democracy, to 
sustain and perpetuate the existence of liberal democracies. 
According to Robert Kaufman, a professor of political science 
at the University of Vermont, the ~institutional constraints 
and the norms of liberal democratic regimes significantly 
ameliorate the security dilemma between such regimes." 
(Kaufman, 1994, p. 699) These constraints and norms are able 
to ameliorate the security dilemma by "reducing the 
expectation of violence, by promoting a broader convergence of 
interest, by muting what clashes of interest exist, and by 
imposing formidable constraints on the preemptive use of 
force." (Kaufman, 1994, p. 699) 
Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, might explain U.S. 
actions from a Realist's point of view by saying that the 
United States is acting this way because it cannot afford to 
ignore the system. According to Waltz, "Great powers are 
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never 'masters with free hands.' They are always 'Gullivers,' 
more or less tightly tied." (Waltz, 1979, p. 187) The United 
States is tied to the current system; it could try to withdraw 
from the system, but history is replete with isolationist 
states that the rest of the world would not allow to remain 
isolationist. Possession of power brings benefits -- the 
means of maintaining one's autonomy, wider ranges of action, 
ans bigger safety margins when dealing with less powerful 
states. It also gives the possessor a bigger stake in the 
system and the ability to act for the system's sake. (Waltz, 
1979). Acting for the good of the system, however, should not 
be considered an altruistic task. The United States will 
definitely receive benefits from a more stable and secure 
system. 
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IX. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study had three goals: first, to provide an understanding 
of the situations of the six countries most involved in the NATO 
enlargement debate today; second, to survey the relative 
explanatory power of the competing systemic and state level 
theories that purport to explain state behavior to determine if one 
does a better job of predicting and explaining states' actions; and 
third, to provide policy analysts a heuristic tool for studying the 
problem and developing relevant policies. This study used 
comparative case studies as the means to accomplish these tasks. 
The study considered the cases of Russia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the United States. The case 
studies of the perspectives of the six states fulfilled the 
requirements of the first goal. The rest of this chapter will try 
to fulfill the requirements of the other two. It will analyze the 
relative explanatory power of the two levels across the case 
studies. With a goal similar to that of Barry R. Posen in his 
book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, this analysis seeks to show 
the theories' "overall relative value ... of each as an instrument 
for the study of national strategy." (Posen, 1984, p. 222) 
Finally, it will attempt to draw out some relevant policy 
implications for analysts and leaders to consider. 
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B. RELATIVE EXPLANATORY POWER 
This section seeks to determine which theories, systemic or 
state level, do a more consistent job predicting and explaining the 
actions of the states involved in the NATO enlargement debate. In 
other words, it attempts to assess which of the two levels has the 
greater relative explanatory power. From the beginning, it is 
necessary to declare that this is a difficult task to do in a very 
precise fashion. In addition, the process is made more problematic 
by two factors. 
First, the determination of relative explanatory power is 
based on a comparison of how well the inferred hypotheses in each 
level of analysis held up over the six case studies. This is 
problematic because the determination of whether a case confirms or 
refutes a hypothesis is a subjective judgment arrived at after 
examination of a body of evidence. Unfortunately, absolute control 
of the variables is not possible, and there is no guarantee that 
the independent, key variables chosen for study are the only ones 
affecting the behavior of the states. 
Second, not every hypothesis is created equal. Some may have 
a greater weight in affecting the decisions and behavior of a 
state. This dynamic may occur both within a level of analysis and 
between the levels of analysis. In addition, the importance, or 
weight, given to the variable may depend on the observer assessing 
the situation or behavior of the state. Some Realists, for 
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example, would attach greater weight and emphasis to balance of 
power theory, even over balance of threat. 
Given these inherent limitations, an attempt at a somewhat 
rigorous comparison of the two levels of analysis to determine 
relative explanatory power is possible. To do this, I used a 
method of comparison similar to that of the U.S. Army's tactical 
decision making process31 for comparing alternative courses of 
action. This process calls for comparing alternative courses of 
action against each other based on criteria that pertain to, or may 
affect, the mission. 
For the case studies, a value is assigned to each hypothesis 
based on whether the case confirmed the hypothesis (value= 1), 
refuted the hypothesis (value= -1), or was able neither to confirm 
nor refute the hypothesis (value =0) . The basis for this selection 
of values is simple. A theory gains credibility when it is able to 
accurately predict or explain, through its inferred hypotheses, a 
state's behavior. Therefore, confirmation of a hypothesis is a 
positive "tick" for that theory's scorecard. Conversely, when a 
theory is not able to predict or explain a state's behavior, then 
it loses credibility. In this case, refutation of a hypothesis by 
a case negatively affects a theory's credibility. When a case can 
neither confirm nor refute a hypothesis, primarily because the case 
31The U.S. Army's tactical decision making process is outlined in Student Text 100-9, 
"Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking," U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1991. 
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does not meet all the conditions specified by the hypothesis, the 
credibility of the theory is not affected one way or the other. 
Once one of these three values is assigned to each hypothesis 
in a case, the values representing all the hypotheses in a level of 
analysis are summed for each case. Given these totals for all six 
cases, we can then compare the relative values of the two levels of 
analysis to determine which has greater relative explanatory 
power. 32 Figures 9.1 and 9.2 show the performances of the systemic 
and state level hypotheses, respectively. Figure 9.3 compares the 
totals for the two levels. 
Hypotheses Russia Czech Hungary Poland Slovakia United 
Republic States 
Balance of Power 
1. Internal balance before external -1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. Traditional Balancing 1 -1 -1 -1 1 0 
3. Defensive Bandwagoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Bandwagoing for Profit -1 1 1 1 1 0 
Balance of Threat 
5. Nearby states are greater threats 1 1 1 1 1 -1 
6. A state will perceive a threat if it can see or 1 1 1 1 1 1 
suspects another has aggressive intentions and 
offensive capabilities 
7. Balance against threat? 1 1 1 1 1 -1 
Total 2 4 4 4 6 0 
Flgure 9.1 Summary of Systemlc Level (Thlrd Image) Hypotheses 
32This method stresses positive numbers. The larger the total in each case, the more 
accurately the theory predicted or explained the actions of a state (i.e., the more confirmed 
hypotheses there were). 
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Hypotheses Russia Czech Hungary Poland Slovakia United 
Republic States 
Political Stability 
8. Confident leadership= internal balance 0 1 1 1 0 1 
9. Unconfident leadership= ext. balance -1 0 0 0 -1 0 
10. Unconfident leadership= external validation -1 0 0 0 -1 0 
Economic Constraints 
11. External balancing to gain resources for -1 1 1 1 1 -1 
domestic economy 
12. Lack of internal resources forces external 0 1 1 1 1 0 
balancing to meet threat 
Internal Security Threat 
13. External balancing for extraction of 0 0 0 0 1 0 
resources to combat internal threat 
Total -3 3 3 3 3 0 
F1gure 9.2 Summary of State Level (Second Image) Hypotheses 
Level of Analysis Russia Czech Hungary Poland Slovakia United 
Republic States 
Systemic Level 2 4 4 4 6 0 
State Level -3 3 3 3 3 0 
F1gure 9.3 Compar1son of System1c and State Level Totals 
As Figure 9. 3 shows, the systemic level did a marginally 
better job of predicting or explaining the actions of the six 
states considered in this work. The figure shows that, in general, 
the inferred hypotheses from neither level of analysis were able 
predict or explain U.S. actions. For the four Central European 
states, the relative explanatory power edge goes to the systemic 
level. In the case of Russia, the selected theories and inferred 
hypotheses from the state level were totally unable to predict or 
explain Russian behavior, while those from the systemic level were 
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at least able to explain some Russian actions. Therefore, overall, 
I assess that the relative explanatory power of the systemic level 
is greater than that of the state level, for the independent, key 
variables selected. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In the fall of 1993, Kenneth Waltz predicted the demise of 
NATO, saying that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years 
are." (Waltz, 1993, p. 76) Three years later, in the fall of 1996, 
this still is not happening; in fact, it is not even on the far 
horizon. Instead, we have seen a willingness of the members to 
increase both the scope of the Alliance's missions, in the form of 
out-of-area missions, and the size of the Alliance. In addition, 
France has returned to the military structure of the organization, 
increasing its size and capabilities. Instead of collapsing, NATO 
seems to be, in the parlance of the European Union, both deepening 
and broadening. 
There are two main paradoxes of the possible NATO enlargement. 
The first is, "If Russia is so weak in social, political, economic, 
and military terms, why does NATO need to expand?" The second is 
a paradox based on the self-fulfilling prophecy. Its argument is 
that if NATO enlarges, it will provoke Russia into becoming exactly 
what we fear; but, if NATO does not enlarge, the Russians will be 
encouraged to move back into their old area, or sphere, of 
interests. Neither of these paradoxes is easily solved. 
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This section attempts to draw out some of the pertinent 
implications of the policy of NATO enlargement. First, it covers 
an area that will be critical for any U.S. president to ~sell" to 
the American public, or at least the House and Senate, prior to 
enlargement -- how the United States will deal with Article Five 
security guarantees, both nuclear and conventional. Second, it 
discusses possible Russian reactions to enlargement. Finally, it 
considers what measures NATO can take to lessen the sting of 
enlargement for Russia, while still satisfying the expectations of 
new members. 
1. Article V and Deterrence 
As pointed out in the U.S. case study, the NATO enlargement 
debate in the United States is starting to take shape over two 
issues. The first issue is how much enlargement will cost. The 
second, and more germane, issue is whether the United States should 
provide extended deterrence coverage to the potential new members. 
In an effort to provide this extended deterrence, the United States 
could use either nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, or a 
combination of the two. For reasons enumerated below, the efficacy 
of using nuclear weapons in the case of an extended deterrence 
situation involving new members of an enlarged NATO is doubtful. 
Because of this, the United States and NATO should rely on a policy 
of conventional extended deterrence. 
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-a. Nuclear Extended Deterrence 
The role that nuclear weapons could play in an extended 
deterrence setting may be decreasing. In 1988, John Mueller, a 
professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, 
wrote an article discussing the ~essential irrelevance" of nuclear 
weapons. (Mueller, 1988) Stephen Cimbala, a professor at 
Pennsylvania State University, called into question the utility of 
nuclear weapons for extended deterrence. He said the United States 
lost its ability to conduct nuclear extended deterrence with the 
development of a Soviet second-strike capability. (Cimbala, 1993) 
There are two main issues for American planners and leaders 
thinking about using nuclear weapons in a future extended 
deterrence situation involving new members of NATO. 
The first is that the Russian Federation will maintain 
this second-strike capability. As pointed out in the Russia case 
study, even after ratifying and implementing START II, it will have 
enough land and sea-based warheads to hit U.S. targets in the event 
of a first-strike on Russia. The second issue is one of political 
will and national interests. The U.S. case study pointed out that 
there are those in the government who wonder whether Poland and the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia are really vital national interests to 
the United States. 33 
33This discussion, of course, assumes that the challenger is Russia. While this may not 
necessarily be the case, the United States' "pledge under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not 
to threaten nonnuclear states with nuclear attack (Watman and Wilkening, 1995, p. 80)" would 
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Certainly, Warsaw and Prague and Bratislava are not 
London or Paris or Bonn/Berlin. These places do not carry the same 
historical weight and importance in the minds of the American 
people that the major capitals of Europe do. Therefore, these two 
factors -- an assured Russian second-strike capability and possible 
future debates over the political will of the United States to use 
nuclear weapons to deter attacks against areas of dubious national 
interests -- could limit the credibility of a future U.S. attempt 
at nuclear extended deterrence in Central Europe. The solution is 
a robust ability to conduct conventional extended deterrence. 
b. Conventional Extended Deterrence 
In 1992, Charles Glaser, a professor at the University of 
Chicago, wrote that the ~united States and its NATO allies could 
choose to rely entirely on conventional forces to deter Russian 
conventional attack against Western Europe." (Glaser, 1992, p. 51) 
Given the previously detailed and pervasive problems in the Russian 
Armed Forces today, it seems this is more apropos now than then. 
Based on this, it would be prudent for the United States and NATO 
to base future extended deterrence strategy on the principle of 
conventional deterrence. 
Of course, extended conventional deterrence can be 
problematic. A major area of concern is the credibility of the 
deterrer's capabilities. According to Richard Harknett, a 
negate, or at least severely limit, the credibility ofU.S. extended nuclear deterrence attempts. 
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professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati, the 
credibility of a deterrent threat rests on two things the 
political will to go through with the threatened actions should 
deterrence fail and the capability to hurt the challenger. With 
nuclear deterrence, the major problem is the credibility that the 
deterring state will have the political will to use nuclear 
weapons. With conventional deterrence, the major problem is not 
the credibility of the deterrer's political will, but the 
credibility of the deterrer's capability. 34 (Harknett, 1994) 
The problem of conventional deterrence, according to 
Harknett, is that "[f] rom a challenging country's perspective, 
conventional deterrent costs are likely to be viewed as highly 
suspect. Regardless of formidability, conventional deterrence will 
be perceived as threatening costs that can be contested." 
(Harknett, 1994, p. 91) Challengers are likely to believe that 
they can contest these threatened costs "either through exploiting 
time, new tactics, [or] improved counter-weaponry." (Harknett, 
1994, p. 92) Harknett offers several solutions that the United 
States and NATO could use to lower the contestability of their 
threatened costs in future extended deterrence situations in 
Central Europe. The most important is sharing information with 
potential challengers. According to Harknett, "[i] nformation 
34In his article, Harknett really only considers substituting the effects of conventional 
weapons for those of nuclear weapons. He does not consider the balance of forces. 
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shared with the challenger concerning the deterrer's objectives and 
capabilities may be the most critical." (Harknett, 1994, p. 94) 
NATO is already doing this, to some degree. There is a Russian 
liaison officer at NATO headquarters in Brussels. More could be 
done, however, under either the auspices of Russian membership in 
the Partnership for Peace or a special charter between NATO and 
Russia, to further the image of NATO's conventional capabilities in 
the eyes of the Russians. There is, of course, a risk inherent in 
this strategy. By letting a potential challenger share information 
on capabilities, the deterrer runs the risk of having the 
challenger innovate to counter those capabilities, making 
deterrence less effective in the long run. 
2. Possible Russian Reactions 
Winston Churchill's 1939 characterization of Russia as a 
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma is no less true today, 
especially concerning its possible actions in response to future 
NATO enlargement. The goal of this section is not to prophesize 
exhaustively every possible Russian reaction. Instead, it seeks to 
survey two possible reactions, one at each end of the spectrum. 
According to Sherman Garnett, a specialist on Ukraine and a 
former policy analyst with the Department of Defense, Russian 
reaction to NATO enlargement would be immediate and negative. 35 
Some of the possible "worst-case" reactions of Russia to NATO 
35Talk given at the Naval Postgraduate School, 10 September, 1996. 
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enlargement can be drawn from a recent study by the Russian 
Institute for Defense Studies (INOBIS). According to Anton 
Surikov, the head of the institute, ~Most representatives of the 
power structures (defense, security, and police) are in agreement 
with our ideas." (Starr, 12 June, 1996) These ideas include: 1) 
countering the enlargement of NATO by establishing a military 
alliance within the CIS; 2) Redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to 
the Western, Northern, and Southern Theaters of Military Operations 
(TVD); and, 3) In the event of a total collapse in NATO-Russian 
relations, selling nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Iraq, 
and Algeria. (Starr, Orbis, 1996) Other potentially dangerous 
possibilities would include a rapprochement with China and the rise 
of ultra nationalists to power in Russia. 
Of course, Russian capabilities to do any of these things 
would be limited by its current social malaise, political 
instability, and military and economic weakness. Until they can 
fix these problems, it is unlikely that they could do anything that 
could stop NATO enlargement. Which brings us to the ~best-case" 
scenario of Russian reactions, at least for NATO -- the Russians 
essentially do nothing because they cannot do anything. 36 For the 
36This option, of course, does not presume inaction on the part of Russia. Certainly, there 
would be increased economic and military efforts to cement integration of Russia with the CIS. 
The greatest integration would probably be seen between Russia and Belarus. As previously 
mentioned, the relations between these two are currently tighter than between Russia and any 
other former republic. However, these actions could not stop, or even slow, NATO enlargement. 
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short term, this seems like the more probable Russia reaction, not, 
obviously, by choice. 
Two main areas could constrain Russia reactions to NATO 
enlargement. 
could affect 
The first is the social malaise of the society, which 
its support of any Russian countermeasures. As 
mentioned earlier, there has been a wholesale demoralization of the 
Russia population. Even if NATO enlarges, it is unlikely that the 
Russian government can generate any support against the enlargement 
from the populace. According to Igor Kuznetsov, an anthropologist 
from Krasnodar University in Russia, NATO enlargement is only an 
issue as part of the political game. Among the Russia populace, 
there is no echo of the issue. They are too concerned about their 
own issues and problems. 37 Therefore, it is doubtful that they 
would support any programs that diverted scarce resources towards 
a Russian confrontation with NATO. 
The second is the fragility of the anti-enlargement consensus. 
According to Sherman Garnett, ~The anti-NATO enlargement consensus 
is likely to break up once it happens." I believe this consensus 
also would breakup over the diversion of resources to counter 
enlargement. As outlined in the case study on Russia, the country 
is suffering from debilitating economic conditions. Each ministry 
and organization in the government seems to act like a feudal 
baron, trying to grab as much power, influence, and resources as 
37Talk given at the Naval Postgraduate School, 12 September, 1996. 
193 
possible for its barony. It is difficult to imagine that the 
threat of NATO enlargement would transcend this current situation. 
3. Easing the Sting 
The question becomes, how can NATO insure that it gets the 
"best-case" response from Russia over enlargement and not the 
"worst-case?" Obviously, it cannot guarantee either result. What 
it can do, however, is attempt to expand in such a way as to 
assuage Russian perceptions of threat and limit the likelihood of 
the "worst-case" coming to fruition. According to Sherman Garnett, 
the greatest leverage NATO has in this area is the manner in which 
it expands. A rapid enlargement might provoke the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of Russia becoming what we fear. On the other hand, an 
open and gradual enlargement, with a declared defensive strategy, 
could mitigate that likelihood. This section will highlight four 
possible strategies that may attenuate Russia anti-NATO feelings. 
a. Strategy of Attrition 
In an effort to allay Russian fears, NATO could adopt a 
formal strategy of attrition. According to the Russian military 
theorist Major General A.A. Svechin (1878-1938), adoption of a 
strategy of attrition envisages the creation of a protracted 
struggle; because of this, "an attrition strategy favored a 
defender with superior mobilization potential and economic 
resources." (Cirnbala, 1993, p. 171) These are the advantages that 
NATO has today. 
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The combination of superior Western economies and 
industry with American force projection capabilities gives the 
Alliance a unique capability to stop and counter any conventional 
attack in Europe. These same capabilities would also be able to 
reconstitute NATO fighting power faster than any potential 
adversary. By formally adopting a strategy of attrition based on 
reconstitution, NATO would be less threatening to Russia. For 
NATO, though, this would not have to entail any kind of toothless 
strategy. In other words, it would not preclude the use of 
offensive measures. As Stephen Cimbala says, "Attrition strategies 
and other varieties of non-offensive defense are non-offensive only 
to the degree that they abjure reliance on prompt offensives as 
decisive moves." (Cimbala, 1993, p. 182) Unfortunately, "the 
difference between ... offensively oriented and rearward looking or 
defensive conventional force postures is not always obvious." 
(Cimbala, 1993, p. 168) To preclude problems of perception about 
this on the part of Russia, NATO could increase its efforts to 
share information about the Alliance. 
b. Shared Information 
In order to facilitate the enlargement of the Alliance, 
NATO must share information with the Russians for two reasons. 
These reasons were discussed earlier, but it is important to state 
them explicitly here. The first reason is so the Russians can have 
a better view of the intentions of NATO. Sharing information with 
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Russia on the intentions of NATO in Central Europe will do two 
things: first, it will show Russia that Central Europe and newly 
admitted members are important to the Alliance; and second, it will 
show the Russians that NATO is not an aggressive organization bent 
on destroying it. 
The second reason is to insure the Russians know that 
NATO has sufficient, possibly overwhelming, capabilities to inflict 
damage on Russian interests, should it attempt to stop enlargement 
or interfere in the area. 
each other. The second 
These reasons are not in opposition to 
provides a better view of NATO's 
capabilities to the Russians. This should increase the credibility 
of U.S. and NATO efforts at extended conventional deterrence in the 
future. However, any program of shared information must be created 
with the inherent risks of sharing in mind. There are degrees of 
sharing; too much sharing could allow any potential adversary, 
including the Russians, to innovate and develop technologies and 
counter-measures for the advantages NATO has. 
c. Forward Dep~oy.ment qptions 
The third strategy that the U.S. and NATO can use to 
enlarge NATO, while at the same time ameliorating Russian fears of 
the enlargement, is to adopt a gradual forward deployment doctrine 
that includes: 1) creation of sufficient infrastructure to support 
force projection; 2)no deployment of nuclear weapons in peace time; 
and, 3) deployment of foreign troops only in multinational units 
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built around units of the country in which the deployment takes 
place. These options will do several things. 
First, creation and enlargement of infrastructure would allow 
for rapid force projection into an area in a time of crisis. This 
should be the first priority of enlargement. Once the 
infrastructure is in place, the system should be routinely and 
vigorously tested. Exercises in the vein of REFORGER to countries 
such as Poland, especially when observed by Russian military 
officials, would demonstrate the importance of the country to NATO 
and the capabilities of the Alliance. 38 
Second, by not deploying nuclear weapons into the territories 
of the new members, even though some of them have said they would 
accept them, NATO decreases the level of confrontation between 
itself and Russia. This is because, as mentioned in the Russia 
case study, there is a fear that enlargement will bring tactical 
nuclear weapons into range of the "heartland" of Russia. Besides, 
realistically, this is not a hard call for NATO to make. Between 
the British, French, and American nuclear forces, including naval 
assets that could cover Poland from the Baltic Sea, there are more 
than enough nuclear assets to hit any target in Russia that a 
tactical nuclear weapon stationed in a Central European NATO state 
could hit. 
380f course, these would not be "Return of Forces" exercises. They would be 
"Deployment ofForces" exercises. Hence, the exercise in Poland could be called DEFORPOL. 
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Finally, NATO forces could be stationed in these new 
member states as a part of multinational units only. In fact, I 
believe they should be stationed in the new members' territories. 
It would demonstrate NATO's commitment to these new partners. It 
might be less offensive, or more palatable, to the Russians if 
these units served under multinational colors. An American or 
British or German brigade or division, because of its capabilities 
and equipment, is a provocative force. However, battalions of 
these countries, integrated into a multinational unit with a more 
convoluted chain of command, different languages, and mixed 
equipment39 have to be less provocative to the Russians. On the 
NATO side, these multinational units would provide the armed forces 
of these countries daily examples of professional militaries and 
familiarity with NATO procedures and equipment. 
d. MU~ti~atera~ and Bi~atera~ Efforts 
The final strategy that NATO could use to soften the blow 
the Russia of enlargement could be multilateral and bilateral 
agreements between the members of the Alliance and Russia. These 
agreements could create parallel structures designed to increase 
the role of Russia in Europe, both in the security area and in the 
political and economic areas. The agreements could provide ties 
that will seek to substitute for items such as trade lost by the 
390fwhich, the equipment of the pre-enlargement NATO members would generally be 
compatible because of Standard NATO Agreements (ST ANAG), while that of the new members 
would be a mix of recently obtained, compatible equipment, and older Warsaw Pact equipment. 
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reorientation of the Central European states from East to West. In 
addition, incorporating Russia into the structures and institutions 
of Europe will help to allay Russian fears of isolation from the 
West. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As stated at the beginning of this study, NATO enlargement is 
the most contentious question in the European security environment 
today. The states involved support or oppose enlargement for a 
variety of reasons. President Clinton has said that it is not a 
matter of whether NATO will expand, but when. Given that it is 
likely to happen, it is the responsibility of policy analysts and 
leaders in every state to consider both the expected benefits and 
the possible consequences of NATO enlargement on the overall 
security environment. 
In order to do that, policy makers must have the tools to 
explore all aspects of the issue. The first tool this study 
attempted to provide was that of knowledge about the subject. The 
individual case studies were structured to give the reader an 
overall view of some of the systemic and state level factors 
affecting the debate over NATO expansion in those countries. The 
structure of the case studies also sought to provide a second tool 
for policy makers -- a determination of which level of analysis has 
greater explanatory power. 
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The schools of Realism and Liberalism offer competing 
explanations for the loci of state behavior. Realists believe that 
the nature of the system influences state behavior. Liberals 
believe that the nature of the state and its interconnectivity with 
other states influence state behavior. This study pitted some of 
the contending theories of the systemic and state levels of 
analysis against each other to determine if one level or the other 
does a better job of explaining and predicting state behavior. 
It was not possible to do this comparison over the universe of 
possible causes which influence the outcomes we see in state 
behavior. However, given our focused comparisons over the six 
cases and two levels of analysis, it was possible to make a 
determination of the relative explanatory power of the two levels. 
In this study, and for the key, independent variables which it 
considered, theories from the systemic level of analysis exhibited 
a greater ability to predict and explain state behavior. 
The final tool which the study sought to provide the reader 
and policy maker was an overview of several of what I consider key 
and pertinent implications of NATO enlargement that have to be 
considered along with the awareness of the situations in the 
individual countries. These implications included how security 
guarantees should, and will, be extended to the new members, 
possible Russian reactions to NATO enlargement, and some strategies 
for enlargement that might ameliorate the expected adverse reaction 
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on the part of the Russians. How NATO expands will directly 
influence how the Russians react. 
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APPENDIX 
The Military Balance1 For Europe 
1 John Chipman, director, The Militruy Balance 1994-1995, London: Brassey's Ltd., for 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994. 
2 Maneuver brigades only. 
3 Artillery totals are for towed artillery, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, 
and mortars. 
4The United States has material prepositioned in Europe for 4 armored and 4 mechanized 
infantry brigades. The numbers given for U.S. equipment totals reflect this prepositioned 
material. 
5U.S. and Russian missile numbers are not listed, given their vast amounts of surface-to-
surface missile systems. 
6Separate brigade numbers for France and Germany reflect the combined French/German 
brigade. 
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